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Regardless of the huge body of literature on the short-run performance of initial public 
offerings (IPOs), the anomaly remains unsolved and there are still less explored areas, mainly 
due to a lack of data availability and methodology restrictions. This thesis aims to provide a 
better understanding of IPO valuation and initial returns with an economic approach, which is 
new to the focus of current literature on firm- and issuing-characteristics. Specifically, this 
thesis introduces three new macroeconomic determinants in an IPO valuation, including the 
country-level financial integration, regional economic openness and geographic 
business/investment location of real assets, by focusing on the cross-country and real estate 
IPOs. 
Due to the already mentioned restrictions on data and methodology, the analysis of this 
thesis is carried out on three studies, each with a unique and different dataset. The results show 
that a country’s financial integration reduces IPO initial returns, along with the country-level 
institutional settings. Alongside this direct effect, the results also suggest a moderation effect 
where financial integration weakens the impact of country institutions on IPO underpricing. 
Furthermore, in the second study, urban economic openness at a regional (or city) level within 
a country is found to reduce IPO initial returns. We use the laboratory of real estate IPOs in 
China, where we observe high underpricing and cross-sectional variation in openness between 
regions. As this impact is transmitted through the geographic location of a company’s 
underlying real assets, the final study shows how this geographic factor matters for U.S. Real 
Estate Investment Trust (REIT) IPOs. The findings reveal a negative relationship between the 
geographic diversification of the underlying properties and IPO initial returns. Overall, this 
thesis highlights the importance of the macroeconomic conditions surrounding the issuing 
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Chapter 1 : Introduction 
Despite the vastly increased awareness that the public has of the importance of financial 
markets and hugely improved involvement that individuals and households have in all kinds of 
financial activities, initial public offering (or IPO, both are used interchangeably hereafter) 
remains an exciting field of research and its dynamics are still not fully uncovered. An IPO is 
almost like a ‘debut’ before which little is known about the issuing company and the IPO market 
is often the ‘stage’ for large institutional investors. The significance and importance of an IPO 
cannot be over-estimated and an IPO has the potential to raise a staggering amount of money 
as evidenced by numerous headline-grabbing IPO deals in recent history.  
An IPO represents a milestone in the life of a company where it completes its transition 
from a private company to a public one. A number of advantages and opportunities come with 
the completion of an IPO. The access to the public capital markets promises a wider selection 
of financing resources with lower cost of capital, supporting the future growth of a company. 
Being publicly traded can also add intangible values such as increasing the recognition and 
reputation among both investors and customers. Public companies need to meet strict 
regulations at all times which hugely improves their transparency and the quality of disclosures 
compared to private companies. However, all these benefits come with a price, not to mention 
that IPOs also bring in some disadvantages and new problems. An IPO is a complex process 
involving a number of professional parties, requiring sufficient time and preparation and 
accruing substantial costs, both direct and indirect, for the issuing company. Even after all this 
time and money invested in the research and preparation stage, completion of an IPO is never 
guaranteed. According to Allison et al. (2008), around 7 out of 10 companies which filed IPOs 
with the Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) in the U.S. between 2002 and 2007 had 
actually completed the IPOs. In other words, the withdrawal rate was around 30%.  




Due to the considerable size of the IPO market and the complexity of its process, IPO 
as a field has generated abundant research questions among which the anomalies of the short- 
and long-run performance of the IPO shares have become the centre of attention. This thesis 
focuses on the anomaly in the short-run performance of IPOs, also widely-known as 
underpricing1.  
1.1 Motivation 
IPO underpricing represents the extent of the price increase of the first trading day (from 
offer to closing price), which is commonly referred as ‘initial returns’. As an anomaly, 
underpricing occurs when the average initial return of the IPOs is significantly above zero. In 
other words, the IPO offer price is set much lower than what the market is willing to pay. By 
leaving money on the table, IPO underpricing also represents a transmission of wealth from the 
issuers to the investors. This underpricing anomaly has been observed throughout different time 
periods and across many countries.  
The research on the underpricing anomaly carries great importance. In today’s world, 
exciting stories surrounding IPOs are everywhere in the news and the record of the amount of 
money that an IPO can raise keeps being broken. When Alibaba, an online ecommerce company 
in China, went public on New York Stock Exchange on 18th September 2014, it soon claimed 
the title of the world’s largest IPO and was breaking news across the globe. Compared to the 
substantial amount of money that the IPOs raise, underpricing seems too trivial to be overly 
concerned with. However, the amount of money that an IPO can potentially leave behind due 
to underpricing is also substantial and cannot be neglected. 
                                                 
1 In the IPO literature, the short-run performance usually refers to first-day return on the offer price of the IPO, 
which is also commonly referred as ‘IPO initial returns’.  




To take just a few IPOs as examples. Storage Networks, the first U.S. company 
providing data storage service, went public on 30th June 2000. The offers were priced at $27 
per share and 9 million shares were sold making the total proceeds $243 million. The first-day 
trading closed at $90.25 per share resulting in an incredibly high initial return or underpricing 
of 234.26%. As a result, 569.25 million dollars, which could have gone to the issuers if the IPO 
was priced at the market price ($90.25 per share), were left on the table. In the end, the diluted 
wealth of the issuers was more than double what they raised in the IPO and it became hard to 
tell whether it was a success or failure. This might seem an extreme case, but even if the level 
of underpricing is relatively small, it is still very likely that a significant amount of money will 
be left behind. General Motors went public in 2010 and experienced a 3.6% underpricing which 
was below the average of 9.4% that year. With an offer price of $33 per share and 478 million 
shares sold, they still left $568.82 million for the investors. When it comes to some of the largest 
IPOs in history, the numbers become even more astonishing. For example, with 28.41% and 
38.7% underpricing, Visa and Alibaba left 5.075 and 9.517 billion dollars on the table, 
respectively. This phenomenon is certainly not exclusive to the U.S. market. For example, one 
of the biggest IPOs in the media industry in China—Phoenix Publishing & Media, Inc—
experienced 34.77% underpricing, leaving 1.56 billion Chinese Yuan (around 241.5 million 
U.S. dollars). Guotai Junan Securities Co. Ltd, one of the largest investment companies in China, 
issued an IPO in 2015 which raised 30.06 billion Chinese Yuan and left about 13.22 billion 
Chinese Yuan behind.2 According to Ritter (2017), a total of 155.14 billion dollars was left on 
the table between 1980 and 2016 for U.S. IPOs alone.3 With all these numbers, it is not difficult 
                                                 
2 The average exchange rate between U.S. dollar and Chinese Yuan is 6.22 in 2015. 
3 The data is from Jay Ritter’s website http://site.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter, which has the most comprehensive 
statistics on IPOs in the U.S. and some other countries. The data is regularly updated.  For the methodology used 
to calculate the total money left on the table, please refer to the file ‘Initial Public Offerings: Underpricing’ on the 
website. 




to understand why IPO underpricing has long been a strong research area and still considered 
as one of the most famous financial puzzles today.  
The literature on IPO underpricing is substantial and well-developed. There are quite a 
few established theories and models followed by a large number of empirical studies. However, 
not one single theory or model can account for all the underpricing and there are still questions 
which remain unsolved. There are different ways to categorize the underpricing literature. In 
this thesis, we follow the most common way as proposed by Ritter and Welch (2002) and 
categorize the literature into classic theories that are based on the information-asymmetry 
assumptions, behavioural arguments, and other studies that could belong to either or none of 
the above.  
A detailed review of the literature on IPO underpricing can be found in Chapter 2 and 
is structured based on the above categories. In short, classic theories are based on the 
assumption that there is information asymmetry existing in the valuation of the IPO company 
and underpricing is a result of this information asymmetry of which different channels or 
mechanisms are proposed by different theories. While the classic theories place an obvious 
focus on the pre-IPO valuation, the behavioural arguments generally believe that the level of 
underpricing is at least partly explained by the market sentiment. Most of the remaining studies 
focus on the allocation process of IPOs and the conflicts between parties involved in this 
process, including the role of underwriters.  
A common theme of the different branches of the mainstream underpricing literature is 
the focus on firm- and issuing-level characteristics rather than wider economic or institutional 
factors. Real estate IPOs are often excluded from studies on industrial IPOs not only because 
real estate is grouped under FIR (finance, insurance and real estate) industries but also that real 
estate IPOs experience much lower initial returns, as compared to industrial IPOs. This 




phenomenon is especially significant in the U.S. and before the 1990s. With both real estate 
companies and the institutional regime for this industry undergoing significant transformation, 
the patterns of real estate IPO pricing have also changed. After the 1990s, real estate IPOs have 
become, on average, underpriced, and most of the empirical studies find weak or no explanatory 
power in the existing theories, which apply to industrial IPOs, on the variation of real estate 
IPO performance. Therefore, the pattern of real estate IPO performance remains somewhat 
mysterious and needs further investigation. The other branch of literature which needs more 
attention relates to cross-country IPO studies. In fact, up to the 2010s the majority are domestic 
studies despite the fact that underpricing is a world-wide phenomenon and presents a significant 
variation between countries. A limited number of studies emerging in the last decade find 
country-level institutional settings account for a significant proportion of variation in firm-level 
underpricing, aside from firm- and issuing-level characteristics. This branch of studies has 
emerged only recently and the whole picture of the cross-country IPO performance is far from 
being fully revealed.  
This thesis adds to the literature by focusing on the insufficiently explored areas 
discussed above and proposes new drivers of IPO short-run performance by adopting an 
economic approach. Based on and beyond the previously acclaimed theories and models, this 
thesis looks at macroeconomic and institutional determinants which have not been explored in 
previous literature. Specifically, the investigations relate to country-level financial integration 
and institutional settings, domestic regional economic openness, as well as geographic location 
factors. To empirically study the roles of economic factors in firm-level finance activities can 
be problematic due to data availability and methodologies. In this thesis, a diverse database has 
been contributed with a number of different methodologies applied to uncover the above 
relationships.   




1.2 Outline of the Thesis and Contributions 
In Chapter 2, a detailed review of the literature on IPO underpricing is presented, 
following a brief summary of the research on IPO decisions. The studies are categorized into 
five groups of which the first three groups include classic theories, behavioural arguments and 
other studies, presented in Sections 2.3, 2.4 and 2.5 respectively. Section 2.6 presents the fourth 
group which is dedicated to IPO studies with real estate samples which are often excluded by 
mainstream studies. While some of the real estate IPO studies could also be categorized into 
classic theories, the focus is given to the special characteristics of the real estate industry and 
how these IPOs are different from industrial IPOs. The last group contains recent studies on the 
cross-country IPO performance, presented in Section 2.7. 
Chapter 3 builds on the very recent literature analysing the role of financial integration 
on IPO markets and adds to the literature with a first attempt to empirically test the impact of 
financial integration on IPO underpricing. Specifically, the argument that international financial 
integration at the country level negatively impacts on IPO underpricing, both directly and 
indirectly, is investigated. For this purpose, a large cross-country dataset has been adopted and 
the use of hierarchical linear modelling employed. Firstly, international financial integration of 
a country is found to negatively affect the level of IPO underpricing. Secondly, a moderation 
effect of international financial integration is also detected which weakens the explanatory 
power of the country institutions in the cross-country variation of IPO underpricing. The results 
stand through alternative proxies for international financial integration and different model 
specifications.  
The contributions of this study are threefold. First of all, it extends the existing literature 
on cross-country IPO performance by revealing a new significant determinant—international 
financial integration. As this impact is transmitted through an improved financial 




intermediation process, both domestic and foreign IPOs are affected by the financial integration 
process. Secondly, although previous cross-country studies have established the importance of 
a country’s institutional settings, especially the legal system, on the firm-level IPO underpricing, 
this study presents new evidence that the influences of a country’s institutions are weakened by 
the increasing level of its financial integration with the rest of the world. This result acts as 
further evidence supporting the general argument in the globalization literature that financial 
integration makes a country’s institutional settings matter less in capital markets. Finally, to be 
able to link the macro-level factors with the firm-level underpricing, we adopt hierarchical 
linear modelling (sometimes referred to as ‘multi-level modelling’) to deal with the structural 
problems existing in a large cross-country dataset. This adds to the methodology commonly 
adopted in the IPO literature which uses ordinary least square (OLS) estimations.  
Having proved the importance of the macroeconomy in IPO underpricing, the remaining 
two chapters focus on real estate companies, which provide a unique laboratory in which to 
study the impact that regional economic factors within a country may have on short-run 
performances of IPOs. 
In Chapter 4, the study extends the scope of Chapter 3 and investigates how regional 
differences in economic openness may affect underpricing within a country where legal 
institutions are the same across all regions. 
Specifically, it examines the empirical impact of urban economic openness on the short-
run underpricing of initial public offerings, using city-level real estate data. We argue that urban 
economic openness has a significant impact on the productivity and prices of both direct and 
indirect real estate through productivity gains of companies in more open areas as well as 
through the Balassa-Samuelson effect. This in turn positively affects the firm’s profitability, 
enhancing the confidence in the local real estate market and the future company performance 




and, therefore, decreasing the uncertainty about the IPO valuation. As a result, issuers have less 
incentive to underprice the IPO shares, evidenced by a negative relationship between the level 
of urban economic openness and the level of IPO underpricing.  
The main issue in finding a suitable laboratory for this analysis lies in the presence and 
measurability of both regional patterns of operations at company level and regional 
heterogeneity of economic openness. The Chinese real estate sector provides a unique dataset 
that makes empirically testing this relationship feasible. Firstly, Chinese real estate companies 
show strong geographic patterns focusing their businesses locally—usually at a city level. 
Secondly, a significant heterogeneity in the degree of openness across Chinese cities is observed. 
Controlling for company-specific variables, IPO location and state ownership, we find that IPO 
companies whose businesses are in more economically open areas experience significantly less 
underpricing. The results show high explanatory power and are robust to diverse specifications 
as well as different mythologies (2SLS). 
This study not only complements the study in Chapter 3, but it also represents a first 
attempt to demonstrate the relationship between firm-level underpricing and regional economic 
openness, which also adds to the recent literature on the impact of regional trade openness on 
asset prices. Since most of the existing theories are incapable of doing this, it identifies a new 
approach by which to investigate the extreme underpricing in other emerging markets where 
there is usually a great variance among regional economic development. By using real estate 
IPOs, the study also shows how the non-tradable nature of the asset class can lead to different 
drivers of IPO underpricing. 
On one hand, Chapter 5 further explores this indication on the underpinning of real asset 
holdings. On the other hand, it goes beyond the openness factors and introduces another 
macroeconomic factor—the geographic factor—into the valuation of real estate IPOs. This 




study focuses on the U.S. market where real estate IPOs present the most significant difference 
from industrial IPOs. Following recent developments in the asset pricing literature on 
geographic diversification, this study explains the short-run performance of REIT IPOs over 
time with a new approach beyond classic theories based on the assumption of information 
asymmetry. 
Although geographic determinants have attracted attention from academics for a long 
time, testing them on corporate finance activities is difficult due to data limitations. This study 
advances the literature presenting the first empirical test on the geographic influence on IPOs 
by exploring the special characteristics of real estate companies, which have unmoveable assets 
and are more prone to geographic factors. This study adopts a new model to explain real estate 
IPO performance, without assuming information asymmetry which would not be able to explain 
the negative initial returns of real estate IPOs. Finally, unlike previous studies which tend to 
adopt ad-hoc measures of geographic factors due to methodological limitations, the actual 
geographic diversification at the state level is constructed manually according to the holdings 
of property assets in different locations. This method of geographic variable construction can 
also be used in other corporate finance studies. 
By focusing on the U.S. market, we have access to the detailed firm-level data of real 
estate companies which are reported in the IPO prospectuses. A more diversified REIT is found 
to have less incentive to underprice or even overprice the IPO shares, which supports the 
argument that a more concentrated REIT, both at asset-type level and geographically, faces 
lower investment recognition and therefore more underpricing is needed to attract sufficient 
subscriptions. Even if both types of diversification are significant, geographic diversification 
shows a stronger impact on initial returns than property type diversification. This argument and 
the deadweight cost theory complement each other as lower deadweight cost associated with 




the IPO weakens the influence of the geographic diversification on the initial returns of IPOs. 
Results are robust to different measures of private market returns and time fixed effects and we 
show that a Herfindahl Index should be preferred as a measure of geographic diversification. 
The findings provide indications to issuers and investors on the IPO valuation of real estate 
companies. This approach can also be extended to other industries with similar features, i.e. 
substantial holdings in real assets, conditional on data availability.  
All three studies are descended from an economic perspective and provide evidence that 
macroeconomic conditions cannot be neglected when it comes to IPO valuations. Along with 
introducing a novel macroeconomic perspective in the literature focused on the determinants of 
IPO underpricing, we believe that this thesis contributes to the knowledge in several other ways. 
Firstly, it provides extra evidences to the heated arguments on the influence of the globalization 
process on financial markets and corporate finance activities. Secondly, it provides the policy 
makers with implications concerning how a country’s financial and economic developments 
can affect its companies.  It also implies a new angle by which to investigate other corporate 
finance activities, especially in emerging markets. Finally, it suggests that when investigating 
the effect of macroeconomic factors on corporate finance we should not simply assume that all 
the industries are affected in the same way. For example, we find that geographical strategy 
matters to the real estate IPOs with the impact transmitted via the real asset holdings. With the 
data technology developing, it is reasonable to expect more macroeconomic factors identified 
to be relevant to corporate finance decisions. While each study comes with a short summary, 
the overall conclusions and practical implications drawn from the findings are presented in 
Chapter 6.    




Chapter 2 : Literature Review 
2.1 Going Public 
Initial public offering (hereafter IPO) refers to a private company going public by 
offering part or whole of its stocks to the public for the first time. Once the IPO completes, the 
company’s stocks are publicly traded on a stock exchange. Nowhere near being a new concept 
in financial markets, it has been widely acknowledged that an IPO is an important step in a 
company’s journey of development and growth. With thousands of IPOs taking place around 
the world, as common as it is, the reasons why companies go public remain complex.  
Unlike the anomalies associated with the IPO price performance, why companies go 
public is a question that has come to attention much later. No matter what the incentives are, 
there is no doubt that IPOs come with a variety of advantages. It opens the door for the company 
to abundant external financing opportunities as well as lowering the cost of future capital raising. 
Most companies go public for financial purposes, such as to raise capital in order to fund their 
future investments or to provide a simple platform for the shareholders to liquidate their 
holdings in the future; it is an especially common exit strategy for venture capitalists. IPOs also 
bring the company non-financial benefits which could be, as minor as they look compared to 
financial advantages, very rewarding. For example, going public is the most effective way to 
increase a company’s public profile which in turn helps the company to boost its network. 
However, for all its advantages, an IPO can be a double-edged sword. For example, an IPO will 
create a dispersed ownership involving more individual investors, which makes it more difficult 
for the management team to convince the shareholders about investment decisions. Being a 
publicly listed company also means following the strict regulations regarding the revelation of 
all the required information to the public on a regular basis, which makes it inevitable that they 
share a certain amount of privileged information with their rivals.  




Going public had long been considered a company’s natural choice during its growth 
process, therefore the complexity of the decision to go public was neglected. It was not until 
the 1990s that questions around why some companies chose going public over staying private 
were raised. Initially, the theories about going public were mainly based on the life cycles of 
companies. Zingales (1995) presents the very first formal theory on going public decisions. He 
argues that the IPO is a method used by the issuers to maximize the valuation in the future 
acquisition event, implying that going public is a first step to selling the company in the future. 
This is supported by Pagano et al. (1998) who find that IPO companies, on average, experience 
twice as many changes in the controlling of ownership than their rivals which stay private. 
According to Zingales (1995), by going public, a company’s stocks are sold to a large number 
of smaller investors in the public market, which is much more competitive than the insider 
block holders. Therefore, it is more difficult for the acquirers to pressurize the dispersed outside 
investors than the inside block holders about the valuation of the target company. As a result, 
the value is maximised.  
Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1999) develop a more systematic life-cycle theory based on 
the three main differences between public and private companies, including the levels of 
ownership concentration, the costs to convince the investors about the new investment plans 
and the transparency of the stock price. To be more specific, an IPO means the company’s 
stocks will be held by a large number of smaller investors and the ownership is much more 
dispersed than in the private companies. As a result, the costs of convincing a larger number of 
smaller shareholders about the company’s future investments are increased. However, overall, 
it becomes easier to evaluate the public companies than the private companies as the 
transparency is increased. Due to these differences, there are both pros and cons for going pubic 
as well as selling the shares to private institutional investors, such as venture capitalists. The 
cost associated with the production of information on the company’s value is higher in public 




offering because of the large number of small investors. However, when raising the capital 
privately, the required return by the venture capitalists is usually much higher as they block-
hold the shares. As when to go public is really a trade-off between these two factors, 
Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1999) conclude that companies stay private in the early stages and 
go public once they have a longer track record which helps to lower the information production 
cost.  
Similar to Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1999), Boot et al. (2006) focus on how the 
different corporate governance, a by-product of the ownership structure, affects the decisions 
on going public. Boot et al. (2006) develop a model where disagreements exist between 
managers and investors, even if there are no agency or asymmetric information problems, 
simply due to their different beliefs in the future investments. Managers, whose goals are to 
maximize the company’s value, would have concerns that this kind of potential disagreement 
might jeopardize their value-maximizing decisions. However, naturally, a higher level of 
autonomy for the managers comes with a higher level of required return by the investors. Private 
financing gives the managers the best negotiating power over the decision-making autonomy 
whereas public financing offers the lowest cost of capital and less flexibility on the decision 
making. Assuming that managers are after the best trade-offs between the decision-making 
autonomy and the cost of capital, Boot et al. (2006) find that going public is most favoured over 
private financing when there is a medium level of flexibility of public governance. When the 
public governance allows the managers too much autonomy, the investors will require a much 
higher return. Private financing, therefore, is favoured. When the corporate governance allows 
little autonomy, managers would still prefer private financing, as governance from the public 
market could be invasive.  




Based on the advantages and risks of going public, Maksimovic and Pichler (2001) 
develop a model in which going public early or late depends on the  level of technological risk 
in the company’s industry. They point out that as public trading reveals more information to 
the company’s competitors, i.e. higher public share prices will induce the product market 
competition, the value of investors’ proprietary information is relatively larger in private 
financing. However, the public offering is more attractive due to the reduced risk of adverse 
selection. Maksimovic and Pichler (2001) argue that early IPOs occur in industries where the 
new-entrant risk is dominant and industries with dominant technological risks usually seek 
private financing first and public financing after the certainty about their new technologies has 
increased.  
As the life-cycle based theories fail to explain that some of the largest companies in the 
world stay private and some of the big public companies go private again, market-timing based 
theories start to emerge which predominantly argue that market conditions play an important 
role in a company’s IPO decision. Actually, as early as the life-cycle based theories, long before 
the market-timing arguments became mainstream, Lucas and McDonald (1990) presented a 
model based on the adverse selection theory in which the companies, given that the managers 
are informed, will postpone their IPOs if the market, on average,  undervalues the companies. 
In other words, a cluster of IPOs will happen following a market rise which creates a ‘hot issue’ 
market. Lerner (1994) points out that venture capitalists also play a role in the timing of the 
IPOs. They find that venture capitalists tend to bring the companies to the public when the 
market is positive or the equity valuation is high. When the equity valuation is relatively low, 
they tend to guide the companies towards private financing. Gompers (1996) further points out 
that young venture capitalists tend to bring the companies to the public earlier than mature 
venture capitalists do, in order to build up their reputation.  




Some studies describe an information spillover channel through which the market 
conditions affect the IPO decisions. For example, in a liquid market where the cost of capital is 
relatively low, the market price signals useful information to the managers which helps with 
the investment decisions, making public financing more attractive (Subrahmantam and Titman, 
1999). More interestingly, Subrahmantam and Titman (1999) point out that whether the 
company will benefit more from going public or staying private also depends on the market 
size and development, i.e. IPOs are preferred in a bigger and more developed market, explaining 
why IPOs seem more popular in the U.S. than in some European countries.  
‘IPO waves’ refer to the phenomenon when a cluster of companies go public within a 
short period. Why IPO waves exist is a topic closely related to the decisions to go public. Altı 
(2005) adopts the information spillover channel to explain the IPO waves and finds that IPO 
decisions are very sensitive to the recent IPOs as well as the IPO market conditions. Assuming 
the existence of a common factor in the IPO valuation of which the participating investors are 
asymmetrically informed, Altı (2005) argues that this private information about the common 
factor is gradually revealed by the outcomes of previous IPOs because the IPO offer price is set 
according to the indications of the participating investors’ interests. As a result, the valuation 
for the following IPOs becomes easier, leading to an IPO wave.  
Apart from the information-spillover based explanation by Altı (2005), Pástor and 
Veronesi (2005) develop a theory which considers going public as a real option for the company 
that will be exercised in the most beneficial conditions in a time-varying market. They divide 
the market conditions into three dimensions including the expected market returns, expected 
aggregate profitability and the ex-ante uncertainty about the ex-post average profitability of 
IPOs. By using the IPO data between 1960 and 2002, they find that all three market conditions 
contribute to IPO waves. Specifically, IPO waves are more likely to occur when the expected 




market return is decreased, expected aggregate profitability is increased or the uncertainty about 
the ex-post profitability of IPOs is increased. 
Chemmanur and He (2011) adopt an approach which refers to the product market 
competition to analyse the timing of going public and IPO waves. Their model is developed on 
top of the ‘first-mover’ advantage argument that those going public early will benefit from 
grabbing market shares from their competitors who stay private or go public later. Chemmanur 
and He (2011) provide empirical evidence that companies which go public, or go public early 
in an IPO wave, experience higher total factor productivity and post-IPO profitability than those 
companies which stay private, or go public late in an IPO wave, indicating the importance of 
product market considerations in the timing of IPOs. One counter-argument case to the ‘first-
mover’ advantage, raised by Ritter and Welch (2002), is that the internet software company 
Spyglass got battered by its competitor Netscape even though Spyglass went public much 
earlier than Netscape.  
2.2 The Anomaly of IPO Underpricing 
Unlike the decision on going public, the two anomalies associated with IPO 
performance, namely the short-run underpricing (hereafter underpricing) and the long-term 
underperformance of IPOs, have drawn a substantial amount of research interest since the 1970s, 
leading to a very well-developed literature. Considering the scope and objectives of this thesis, 
we focus on reviewing the literature on IPO underpricing.  
‘Underpricing’ refers to the excessive initial returns of the IPO shares, which is 
commonly calculated as the difference between the closing price on the first trading day and 
the IPO offer price. IPO underpricing is a global phenomenon that has been observed across 
markets, as recorded by Loughran et al. (1994, updated in 2015). They first reported the levels 
of IPO underpricing across different time periods for 52 countries in 1994 and have updated the 




data frequently since then. Loughran and Ritter (2004) find an average underpricing of 18.9% 
based on 5980 U.S. IPOs between 1980 and 2002.4 Wasserfallen and Wittleder (1994) record 
an average underpricing of 7.58% in Germany from 1961 to 1987. Hill and Wilson (2006) 
record 11.4% average underpricing in the UK from 1991 to 1998. An average initial return of 
29.6% for the Australian IPOs between 1994 and 2004 is documented in Dimovski et al. (2011). 
In general, the levels of underpricing in the Asian markets are found to be even higher. For 
example, Kirkulak and Davis (2005) observe an average underpricing of 42.6% for IPOs in 
Japan. Kim et al. (1993) find an average initial return of 57.5% for South Korean IPOs from 
1988 to 1990. In China, an extreme initial return of as high as above 100% or even 200% has 
been documented in a few studies (Mok and Hui, 1998, Chan et al., 2004, Fan et al., 2007, Tian, 
2011). Consistent with previous studies, this thesis also records significant levels of 
underpricing across countries, with emerging markets generally presenting even higher 
underpricing than developed markets. For example, it is recorded in Chapter 3 that Mainland 
China experiences an average underpricing of 50.03% between 1995 and 2011 while the 
average initial return of IPOs in Hong Kong and the UK is 14.80% and 16.55%, respectively, 
during the same period. Apart from ‘underpricing’, the difference between the first trading day 
closing price and the offer price is also referred to as ‘initial return’ or ‘first-day return’ in the 
literature. In this thesis, we use these terms interchangeably. 
2.2.1 The ‘Mystery’ 
In the 1960s, researchers started to show an interest in the initial performance of the 
newly–listed common shares. Ibbotson (1975) presents the first systematic study on the risk 
and performance profile of the new common-stock issues from 1960 to 1969 in the U.S. 
                                                 
4  The average underpricing in the U.S. is updated annually and can be found on Ritter’s website: 
https://site.warrington.ufl.edu/ritter/ipo-data/.  




market.5 He discovered a positive average initial return of 11.4% and argued that the offers 
were significantly underpriced. With findings that he was unable to explain back then, he called 
the IPO underpricing a ‘mystery’. Even though Ibbotson (1975) did not solve this ‘mystery’, 
he provided some possible scenarios and explanations, most of which were intuitive, for the 
later studies on IPOs.  
2.2.2 Initial Attempts to Explain IPO Underpricing 
After the underpricing anomaly was discovered in the 1970s, there have emerged 
numerous studies attempting to explain this phenomenon. Even though few of the early attempts 
withstood the empirical tests, some of them provided profound intuitions for the later 
development of the classic theories on IPO underpricing. The principal agency-based 
explanation by Baron (1982) was one of the very first attempts. He assumes that issuers are less 
informed about the demand of outside investors than their underwriters. Instead of looking at 
the actual underwriting process, he argues that it is in the advising and distribution services 
where issuers are less informed about the capital market. The issuers can neither control nor 
observe the efforts that the underwriters put into the IPO and in order to induce the underwriters 
to exploit their superior information in the advising and distribution process, which affects the 
demand for the unseasoned shares, they delegate the pricing to the underwriters and agree to a 
certain degree of underpricing as compensation for underwriters sharing their information. One 
basic assumption of this theory is that the issuers cannot control underwriters’ work during the 
marketing of their IPOs and that underwriters might push for a higher underpricing in their own 
interests. In order to test this model, Muscarella and Vetsuypens (1989) use a sample of 38 IPOs 
of investment banks, who are also the underwriters for their own IPOs, from 1970 to 1987. 
They argue that if Baron’s (1982) theory holds, in these ‘self-marketed’ IPOs where there is no 
                                                 
5 Other studies around the same period which have recorded this phenomenon include Stoll and Curley (1970), 
Logue (1973) and Reilly (1973). 




information asymmetry between issuers and underwriters, the offer price should fully reflect 
the market valuations. In other words, there should be no underpricing. However, the empirical 
result shows a significant underpricing too. Strangely, they find that those investment banks 
who are also underwriters for themselves experience even greater underpricing. Back then 
researchers were largely convinced by the findings in Muscarella and Vetsuypens (1989) and 
believed that Baron’s (1982) model did not hold. However, with a better understanding of the 
roles of underwriters in an IPO, we now know that Muscarella & Vetsuypens's (1989) simple 
test cannot reject Baron’s (1982) theory either. One possible explanation for the significant 
underpricing of investment banks’ IPOs is that the investment banks underprice their initial 
offers on purpose in order to ‘justify’ to the public that the underpricing of IPOs is an 
unavoidable cost (Ritter and Welch, 2002). By doing so, even though they lose out in a one–
time event, they profit from constant engagements in the future IPO businesses. A full picture 
of the roles of underwriters in the IPOs is gradually revealed throughout this chapter. 
2.2.3  ‘Hot Issue’ Market 
As the first study to examine the ‘hot issue’ markets, Ibbotson and Jaffe (1975) define 
hot issues as the unseasoned offerings whose stock prices increase from the offering prices to a 
level that is significantly higher than the average premium. They further theorise that the ‘hot 
issue’ markets are those periods in the market during which the unseasoned common–stock 
offerings experience unusually high short–run returns. (Ibbotson & Jaffe (1975) examine the 
first–month returns after listing.) Ritter (1984) studies the ‘hot issue’ market in the 1980s which 
confirms the finding of Ibbotson and Jaffe (1975) that there is serial correlation between 
monthly average returns. To be more specific, Ritter (1984) diagnoses three or four ‘hot issue’ 
markets from 1960 to 1982, during which the unseasoned new stocks have experienced 
abnormally high average monthly returns. For each of those ‘hot issue’ periods, there is a period 
following, which sees a significant increase in the numbers of IPOs. To study the time series 




behaviour of the ‘hot issue’ period, Brailsford et al. (2004) use monthly IPO data across 40 
years from 1960 to 2000 and identify significant momentum in the new issues market that there 
is autocorrelation in both the volume and level of underpricing of IPOs.  
2.3  Classic Theories on IPO underpricing 
Ritter & Welch (2002) point out that IPO short–run underpricing can neither be 
explained by the fundamental valuation approach nor the risk–return asset pricing approach. If 
it could be explained in a risk–return setting that the extremely high initial returns are the result 
of the investors requiring higher returns for extra risks associated with new issues, then similar 
returns should also be observed on the second trading day as the investors who buy IPO shares 
on the first trading day bear the same risk. However, such a pattern is not evident and 
underpricing exclusively describes the extreme premium from the offer price to the closing 
price of the first trading day. Therefore, Ritter & Welch (2002) emphasize that the key to solve 
the underpricing ‘mystery’ is to focus on the pre–listing pricing process of the new issues. 
Up to the present, the IPO literature has been quite established with abundant theories 
and models explaining the underpricing anomaly as well as empirical studies supporting those 
theories. As we mentioned earlier, we can generally divide the underpricing theories into two 
categories: the classic theories, and the behaviour arguments. The classic theories are mainly 
based on the pricing process, while the behavioural arguments focus more on the IPO 
participators’ behaviours. However, we need to be aware that there is also overlap between 
these two categories. There are also studies investigating IPO underpricing from slightly 
different angles that cannot be classified into any of those two mainstream categories. These 
studies often place a focus on the IPO pricing and/or allocation processes.  




2.3.1 Information Asymmetry Theory 
The information–asymmetry based theories, sometimes referred to as ‘classic’ or 
‘rational’ theories, are developed on the basis of the assumption that there exists a certain level 
of information asymmetry between different parties involved in an IPO event. Although there 
are quite a few parties involved in an IPO, the IPO outcome is mainly decided by three parties, 
namely issuers, underwriters, and investors. The classic theories assume that one of these three 
parties has superior information to the others about the valuation of the issuing company and 
underpricing is an inevitable cost resulting from the information asymmetry. In Baron's (1982) 
early attempt, we already see the assumption that the underwriters have more information than 
the issuer. It is Rock (1986) who systematically forms the information asymmetry theory in his 
PhD dissertation for the first time.  
Information asymmetry theory is still one of the most widely recognized explanations 
for IPO underpricing. Rock (1986) develops the theory based on the analysis of the demand-
price relation. He assumes that there is a group of investors in the market which has better 
information about the IPO companies’ value than the other investors, underwriters and the 
issuers themselves. He also assumes the existence of quantity rationing in the IPO share 
allocation. The better-informed investors will profit from purchasing underpriced shares by 
knowing whether the new issues’ prices are set lower or higher than the market value. At the 
same time, the demand for the underpriced offerings will be pushed up by the informed 
investors as they know for certain that they can profit. Once the demand is high, the rationing 
will happen. The uninformed investors who do not have such an information advantage will be 
forced into a situation where they cannot get the underpriced shares and are more likely to be 
rationed with the overpriced shares. As a result of this bias, the uninformed investors will 
become unwilling to participate in the primary market. As the issuers need uninformed investors’ 
participation to guarantee the proceeds that their IPOs can realize, issuers will deliberately 




lower the offer price to a certain level to compensate for their disadvantages due to information 
asymmetry. Rock (1986) believes in the existence of a better-informed group of investors for 
two reasons: first, in order to prove its quality to the public, a firm has to give up its advantages 
in obtaining and keeping some secret information; second, the issuer and its underwriters' 
information cannot win over the pooled talent of all the investors in the market. Even though 
Rock (1986) bases this model on ‘firm commitment’ IPOs, it is still effective when it is 
extended to the ‘best effort’ IPOs. In short, the offer prices are intentionally set at a discount by 
issuers and underwriters in order to attract the uniformed investors, a consequence of the 
information asymmetry between the issuers and some investors.  
2.3.2 Winner’s Curse Theory 
Rock’s (1986) work has implications for Beatty & Ritter (1986) who have developed 
one of the most prolonged explanations for IPO underpricing–winner’s curse theory. The 
‘Winner’s Curse’ theory is developed upon two crucial conditions. First, there exists the ex-
ante uncertainty which refers to the fact that the investors cannot be certain about the true values 
of the issuing companies even though the IPOs are averagely underpriced. This is due to the 
fact that some IPOs will actually suffer a decrease in the price by the end of the first trading 
day. The second essential condition is that there exists one of the most typical institutional 
features - quantity rationing. Following Rock (1986) who argues that the demand for the 
underpriced new issues will be driven up by the informed investors’ subscriptions, Beatty and 
Ritter (1986) further point out that the underwriters respond to the excessive demand with 
quantity rationing because the offering price cannot be adjusted according to investors’ demand 
once it is set. Therefore, knowing the existence of the average underpricing does not guarantee 
that the investors will profit from it. Beatty and Ritter (1986) conclude that the bias between 
informed and uniformed investors will eventually create the ‘winner’s curse’ risk.  They define 
the ‘winner’s curse’ risk as if an investor is allocated with the number of shares that he has 




subscribed to, he will be suspicious that those shares allocated to him are mispriced and 
unwanted by other investors. Therefore he will expect the initial returns of those shares that he 
has received be lower than the average initial return in the market (Beatty & Ritter 1986). In 
order to lower or avoid the ‘winner’s curse’ risk, the uninformed investors will only submit 
subscriptions when the offering prices are underpriced enough to compensate for their 
uncertainty about the true value of the IPO shares. This implies a positive relationship between 
the underpricing of new shares and the ex-ante uncertainty about the issuing company’s value. 
By using a sample of 1028 IPOs in the U.S. market from 1977 to 1982, Beatty and Ritter (1986) 
empirically test this potential relationship. In order to protect their business advantages and 
secrets, the issuing firms do not want to uncover too much specific information about how they 
are going to spend the proceeds that they raise from the IPOs. However, the SEC will require a 
certain amount of information about the use of proceeds to be revealed by the issuing company 
if the SEC is not so convinced about its stability and quality. This implies that the more 
information about the use of proceeds revealed in the IPO prospectus, the more uncertainty 
there is surrounding the company. Therefore, Beatty and Ritter (1986) use the number of the 
uses of proceeds reported in the prospectus plus one as a measure of the ex-ante uncertainty. In 
addition, according to the empirical evidence that small firms are harder to regulate than large 
firms, they also use the gross proceeds raised in the IPO as a second measure of the uncertainty, 
which has later become the most commonly used measure of information asymmetry. They find 
a positive relationship between the initial returns and the number of uses of the proceeds as well 
as a negative relationship between the initial returns and the gross proceeds, supporting their 
argument that the level of underpricing is positively related to the level of the ex-ante 
uncertainty about the issuing company. Beatty and Ritter (1986) further conjecture that it is the 
underwriters who are constantly balancing the underpricing equilibrium. They argue that the 
issuing companies have no motivation to leave money on the table to please the investors as the 




IPO is a one-time event. It is actually the underwriters who have strong incentives to please the 
investors in order to achieve and maintain their reputation in future IPO games. In other words, 
if the IPO underwriters could not underprice the offerings to the right level, either too high or 
too low, to reflect the degree of the ex-ante uncertainty, its reputation will be damaged. As a 
result, the underwriters would experience either a decrease in the underwriting fees or an 
increase in the distribution costs. In this sense, underpricing can also be regarded as a strategy 
used by the underwriters to avoid such situations. Beatty and Ritter (1986) create two time 
periods and regress the change in the market shares of each underwriter in the second time-
period on the extent of mispricing of the new issues underwritten by them in the first period. 
Although the results are not strongly significant, they do reflect that the investment bankers 
who have mispriced the new issues will suffer a decrease in their market shares following the 
IPO. This paper also presents an initial attempt to investigate the relationship between 
underpricing of IPOs and underwriters’ reputation which has since stimulated a lot of studies. 
2.3.3 Information Extraction Theory 
Following Beaty and Ritter (1986) who demonstrate the important role of underwriters 
in the IPO events, Benveniste and Spindt (1989) develop the information extraction theory, 
which is also essentially based on information asymmetry. It is slightly different from previous 
information–asymmetry based studies in that it focuses more on the underwriting process of an 
IPO. More specifically, they observe the ‘bookbuilding’ practice of the IPO underwriting 
process. Hence the information extraction theory is sometimes referred as ‘bookbuilding 
theory’. Bookbuilding is a very commonly-used practice by the underwriters in the presale 
market of IPOs. During the bookbuilding process the underwriters give a price range to 
potential investors instead of a fixed price.  Benveniste and Spindt (1989) argue that as 
underwriters are not the best informed party about the true value of the issuing company they 
will try to extract as much useful information from the informed investors as they can during 




the presale market and adjust the offer price and share allocation accordingly. Benveniste and 
Spindt (1989) assume the presale market as a single-price auction giving a price range, in which 
the underwriters receive the indications of interests in the IPO shares from potential investors. 
The indications are reflected in the unofficial ‘bidding’ prices and quantities. With the 
indications of the prices that the investors will be willing to pay and their demand for the new 
issues, the underwriters will have a better idea of the market value of the new shares. Eventually, 
the offer prices will be set accordingly. In addition, in the auction process, the underwriters 
presumably prefer the ‘good’ information revelation from investors, which will have a positive 
impact on the valuation, rather than the bad information. However, as Benveniste and Spindt 
(1989) point out, the difficulty in this ‘price discovery’ process is that the informed investors 
are unwilling to share  their superior information if they can profit from it. As a result, they 
might not give the ‘real’ price in their mind during the auction. In order to induce the investors 
to reveal good quality information in the presale market, underwriters will strategically take 
advantage of the fact that they run a repeated IPO business and they can easily form a coalition 
with those investors, who are willing to share their information, by giving them priority in the 
allocations in future IPOs. The implicitness of this coalition game is that even though investors 
might lose one IPO investment, they will always benefit from being constantly included by the 
underwriters in future IPO events. Those who are unwilling to share information will be 
excluded from the coalition and lose the present value of priorities in participating future IPOs. 
In this process, underwriters will then deliberately underprice the new shares in general to 
compensate those investors for giving up their information advantages. However, in terms of 
the issuers, the extent of underpricing will be relatively reduced and the efficiency of financing 
will be increased by the underwriters’ information extraction activities. In general, the 
underwriters use underpricing as a strategy to create a ‘win–win’ outcome for the issuers and 
investors, which is also beneficial to their own business. In this sense, the information extraction 




theory treats the underwriters as information intermediaries that can enhance the efficiency in 
the IPO valuation. This is one of the most empirically supported theories on IPO underpricing 
and particularly relevant to the hypothesis development in the first study, which will be 
elaborated on in Chapter 3.  
Using IPO as a setting, Chemmanur and Fulghieri (1994) actually generalize the role of 
underwriters as intermediaries or information producers in the equity market. They argue that, 
not just in an IPO event but in all equity selling events, underwriters set standards to evaluate 
the issuers and report the valuation back to investors. There exist three fundamentals in the 
intermediary business. First, setting very stringent standards could minimise the uncertainty 
about the valuation, but is costly. Second, these standards as well as the efforts that the 
underwriters put in are unobservable. What observable is the underwriters’ past performance. 
Third, underwriters have a more frequent interaction with the investors than the issuers, 
meaning their past performance matters more to the investors and their own future market value. 
With the above fundamentals, underwriters face a dynamic trade-off within which, Chemmanur 
and Fulghieri (1994, p. 58) conclude, that “the evaluation standard set by investment banks, 
their reputations, valuation of firms by investors, investment banking fees, and entrepreneurs' 
choice between underwritten and direct sales of equity emerge endogenously.” 
2.3.4 Partial Adjustment 
The information extraction process in Benveniste and Spindt (1989) suggests that the 
investors are motivated to reveal good quality information about the IPO company with a 
favoured allocation and underpriced shares, indicating a partial adjustment phenomenon which 
was first defined by Ibbotson et al. (1988). Instead of setting an offer price to fully reflect its 
fair value, Ibbotson et al. (1988) find that the initial returns for those IPOs with the final offer 
price adjusted upward above its initial file range are higher and they call this phenomenon 




‘partial adjustment’. Among many studies with findings supporting Benveniste and Spindt 
(1989), Hanley (1993) presents the most famous empirical study. With a sample of 1430 IPOs 
from 1983 to 1987, she finds an average initial return of 20.7% for IPOs with a final offer price 
above the file range, 10% for those with a final offer price within the file range and 0.6% for 
those priced below the file range. She finds that the extent of the change between the final offer 
price and the midpoint price of the file range has a positive effect on the level of underpricing, 
supporting the partial adjustment phenomenon indicated by Benveniste and Spindt (1989). On 
top of that, she finds that underwriters prefer to reward the investors who share their useful 
information in the presale events with a smaller number of heavily underpriced shares rather 
than a large number of slightly underpriced shares. She also finds that the price revisions are 
more likely to happen if the IPOs are managed by more experienced underwriters, as more 
experienced underwriters can extract more good quality information due to their stronger 
coalitions with the regular investors. This partial adjustment phenomenon is widely 
documented in international studies as well. For example, Minardi et al. (2015) find that the 
partial adjustment is one of the significant determinants of the IPO underpricing in Brazil.  
2.3.5 Signalling Model 
The signalling model, concurrently proposed by Allen and Faulhaber (1989), Grinblatt 
and Hwang (1989) and Welch (1989), assumes that the insiders/issuers have better information 
than the outsiders/investors. As a result, rational investors are concerned about the ‘lemon’ 
problem that companies with average IPO offer prices actually have below-average quality. In 
order to differentiate themselves from the ‘bad quality’ companies, the ‘good’ companies will 
deliberately underprice IPO shares in order to send a signal of ‘good quality’ to the public. Only 
the ‘good’ firms can afford this initial cost of underpricing because they know that the cost will 
be recouped in the future seasoned equity offerings (SEOs) after their good performance is 
known to the public, implying that more underpriced IPO companies will carry out the SEOs 




sooner and bigger. By signalling the ‘good’ quality with underpricing, the information 
asymmetry in the future SEOs is also decreased. The most significant difference between the 
signalling model and the other information-asymmetry-based theories, as Allen and Faulhaber 
(1989) point out, is that the signalling model does not emphasize the roles of underwriters in 
the IPO events. Among all the other possible methods of signalling, underpricing is favoured 
because it is the least costly with no monitoring required. In other words, the investors are the 
direct recipients of this signal, making it the most efficient method. Although the ‘low’ quality 
firms could underprice their IPO shares on purpose in order to pretend to be a ‘good’ firm, the 
increased costs of the deceptive signals stop them from doing so. Welch (1989) points out that 
the imitation costs also include the costs that the ‘bad’ firms must pay to imitate the real 
operation activities of the ‘good’ firms other than the signalling costs caused by underpricing. 
With a high probability that the imitation behaviour would be discovered by the investors during 
the period between the IPO and the first SEO, the ‘bad’ firms might not be able to recoup the 
costs in future SEOs. Therefore, they would rather stay as ‘low’ quality firms in the IPO events 
with little or no underpricing.  
2.3.6 Empirical Evidence on Classic Theories 
The above classic theories have been raised and supported by a large number of 
empirical studies not only in the U.S. but also across the world, and we are only able to name a 
few here. The size of the issuing company, often measured by the IPO offering size or IPO 
proceeds, is the most commonly used proxy for the level of information asymmetry of or 
uncertainty about the true value of the company. A lot of empirical studies have presented 
evidence that the bigger the company, the less asymmetric information there will be, leading to 
lower underpricing. Firm age is also a popular measure of the information asymmetry in that 
the older the company, the more information there will be available, hence less underpricing 
(Megginson and Weiss, 1991, Wasserfallen and Wittleder, 1994, Ljungqvist, 1997, Hameed 




and Lim, 1998, Mok and Hui, 1998, Jog and McConomy, 2003, Kim et al., 1993, Guo et al., 
2006, Arthurs et al., 2008, Dolvin and Jordan, 2008, Derrien, 2005). Some other characteristics 
are also found to be related to the uncertainty about the IPO valuation. For example, the longer 
the gap is between the issuing and listing dates of IPOs, the more uncertainty there will be, 
resulting in higher underpricing (Mok and Hui, 1998). According to Benveniste and Spindt 
(1989), bookbuilding is the most effective method to produce information during the IPO 
process. Therefore, IPOs with bookbuilding methods are found to experience lower 
underpricing (Hameed and Lim, 1998, Hill and Wilson, 2006). Technology companies are often 
considered to have more uncertainty surrounding the valuation and are associated with higher 
initial returns than other industries (Loughran and Ritter, 2004, Arthurs et al., 2008, Su and 
Bangassa, 2011, Dolvin and Jordan, 2008).  
Among the classic theories mentioned above, the signalling model has probably 
produced the most inconclusive empirical results. Slovin et al. (1994) find that companies with 
higher underpricing receive a less negative price response to their following SEO, supporting 
the signalling model. However, the underpricing cost is not fully recouped as the signalling 
model suggests. Although Jegadeesh (1993) finds that more underpriced companies tend to 
issue the SEOs sooner and that their first SEOs tend to be bigger in size, the economic 
significance is weak. Focusing on the total cash flows, Spiess and Pettway (1997) find no 
support for the signalling model and suggest that the total proceeds raised in a more underpriced 
IPO and its first following SEO are not bigger than those less underpriced issuing companies.  
In general, there is a trend in the literature that the information-asymmetry-based 
theories are built on top of classic finance theories under a western or developed market regime 
and supported with evidences drawn from western data. When it comes to developing countries 
where the regime is considerably different, it is natural to expect some extent of distortions in 




the efficiency of such classic theories. In fact, with a dynamic selection of datasets, this thesis 
presents evidence that information-asymmetry-based theories only play a weak role in the 
explanation of the extreme underpricing in emerging markets, especially when their special 
systems are taken into consideration.  
2.3.7 Underwriters 
Underwriters are arguably the most important party in an IPO event, alongside issuers 
and investors. To recall, Beaty and Ritter (1986) argue that it is the underwriters who balance 
the equilibrium of underpricing in order to maintain their reputation for future IPO business. 
Benveniste and Spindt (1989) later propose that underwriters act as an information producer in 
order to minimise the uncertainty about the IPO valuation by forming and maintaining a 
coalition with regular investors. All these arguments indicate a negative relationship between 
the underwriters’ reputation and the level of IPO underpricing.  
As Benveniste and Spindt (1989) imply, the pricing performance of the underwriters in 
the IPO events is the observable quality measure which, as proposed by Beaty and Ritter (1986), 
affects their future business. James (1992) confirms this implication with empirical evidence 
that underwriters who have settled a less-than-optimal offer price would be punished with 
decreasing subsequent market shares. To follow Beaty and Ritter (1986), Nanda and Youngkeol 
(1997) examine in detail how the pricing of the IPO shares is associated with the underwriters’ 
reputational capital. Specifically, they find that overpricing is indicative of a decreasing market 
share of the underwriters. However, for moderately underpriced IPOs, their underwriters are 
rewarded with an increase in the subsequent market share. However, this reputational gain 
shrinks with the increasing level of underpricing. This is consistent with the underpricing 
equilibrium argument by Beaty and Ritter (1986) and the information producer argument by 
Benveniste and Spindt (1989). This interesting result indicates that a certain level of 




underpricing might just be inevitable, like the direct costs. In the case where the IPO is jointly 
managed, Nanda and Youngkeol (1997) find that it is the lead-underwriter who primarily bears  
the punishment.  
Carter and Manaster (1990) have constructed one of the most widely used 
measurements of the underwriters’ reputation based on the U.S. market, allowing the following 
empirical studies to be able to test this relationship. The Carter-Manaster measure of the 
underwriter prestige ranking is based on the pecking order shown in the ‘tombstone’ 
announcements which is a list of the pending IPOs. In the announcement, there is a passage 
presenting the underwriting syndicate in a hierarchy with the lead and co-lead underwriters 
listed in the top section or section A. The other underwriters follow an order where the more 
prestigious ones are listed in a higher section with more underwriting shares, i.e. underwriters 
in section B have more prestige and underwrite more shares than those in section C. An integer 
of 0 to 9 is assigned to each underwriter with the ones in the top (lead or co-lead underwriters) 
assigned 9, those in section B assigned 8 and so on. The result of the first ‘tombstone’ 
announcement is used as a referencing point and the ranking is adjusted every time after 
reviewing another ‘tombstone’ announcement. After all the ‘tombstone’ announcements are 
reviewed, it eventually produces a ranking of 0 to 9 with rank 9 being the underwriters with the 
highest reputation and rank 0 being underwriters with the lowest reputation. By using this 
measure, they find that IPOs underwritten by more prestigious underwriters indeed have lower 
underpricing. 
Since the ‘tombstone’ announcements are not always applicable to other countries, the 
market-share measure of the underwriters’ reputation proposed by Megginson and Weiss (1991) 
has become equally popular. Megginson and Weiss (1991) assume that the quality of an 
underwriter is presented by the total market share by this underwriter. In other words, during a 




sample period, the underwriters’ quality is ranked by the percentage of the IPO size (proceeds) 
brought to the market by each underwriter of the total size of all the IPOs during this period. 
The higher the market share, the more prestige the underwriter has. With this measure, 
Megginson and Weiss (1991) also find a negative relationship between the underwriter quality 
and the level of underpricing.  
Carter et al. (1998) re-examine this relationship with an updated dataset. Consistent with 
previous studies, they find that IPOs brought to the market by underwriters with a better 
reputation result in a lower level of underpricing. Carter et al. (1998) also compare the Carter-
Manaster measure of the underwriters’ reputation with other measures. Although all the other 
measures have returned similar results, they find that the Carter-Manaster measure explains the 
greatest amount of the variation. By using the Carter-Manaster measure, Guo et al. (2006) also 
record a negative relationship between the underwriters’ reputation and the level of 
underpricing.  
Aside from the empirical findings supporting a negative impact of the underwriters’ 
reputation on the level of underpricing, a reverse relationship has also been documented in a 
number of studies.  Beaty and Welch (1996) are among the first to detect the reversed 
relationship where the IPOs managed by more reputable underwriters actually experience more 
underpricing, which supports the agency theory by Baron (1982). Based on a sample of 1475 
IPOs from 1988 to 1995, Logue et al. (2002) find no significant relationship between the 
underwriters’ ranking, using the Carter-Manaster measure, and the level of underpricing. 
Instead, pre-market activities by the underwriters, such as the partial adjustment, are the main 
determinants of the IPO initial returns. Loughran and Ritter (2004) provide mixed results 
depending on the sample periods. They divide the sample period into four sub-periods: 1980s, 
1990s, the internet bubble period (1999-2000) and the post-bubble period (2001-2003). They 




find that the negative relationship between the underwriters’ reputation and the level of 
underpricing was reversed in the 1990s and the internet bubble period. They argue that the 
reverse is likely due to the change of the policy of individual investment banks rather than the 
shifts in market shares.  
An interesting study by Gondat-Larralde and James (2008), which holds a neutral 
opinion on the role of underwriters, argues that the underpricing is simply a result of how the 
investment banks run the business. As better-informed investors can avoid the overpriced shares 
(which is called a ‘lemon dodge’), there is a downside risk of the initial returns. They assume 
that, with an aim to maximize the offer price and avoid the downside risk, the underwriters will 
form a coalition with the investors in order to stop the investors’ lemon-dodging behaviour. 
Specially, they ‘punish’ the lemon-dodging investors by excluding them from future IPO 
investment opportunities and ‘reward’ the investors who are willing to bear with the downside 
risk by involving them in future IPOs and guaranteeing a profit on average with block-booking. 
Therefore, they argue that the offer price is set by the underwriters to equalize the overall 
downside risk and the average coalition benefits.   
Although whether the impact is positive or negative remains inconclusive, following 
abundant studies, it has now become evident to us that underwriters play a significant role in 
the outcomes of U.S. IPOs, regardless of the mechanisms. However, when it comes to 
international studies, the role of underwriters remains an open question. For example, Kim et 
al. (1993) find the underpricing of South Korean IPOs, between 1988 and 1990, is negatively 
related to the underwriters’ reputation, measured by the market share.  Kirkulak and Davis 
(2005) find that, in Japan, the impact of underwriters’ reputation on the level of underpricing 
depends on the demand for IPOs. When the demand is low (high), there is a negative (positive) 
relationship between the underwriters’ reputation and the level of underpricing. Consistent with 




the agency theories, Dimovski and Brooks (2004) find that IPOs which employ underwriters 
actually leave more money on the table than those which do not employ underwriters, with a 
sample of 358 Australian IPOs between 1994 and 1999. To follow up this study, Dimovski et 
al. (2011) examine the Australian IPOs with an extended sample period from 1994 to 2004. By 
using the deviations of the underwriters’ reputation measure proposed by Megginson and Weiss 
(1991), they find further evidence that the underpricing is higher for IPOs involving more 
prestigious underwriters.  In emerging markets like China, Su and Bangassa (2011) find that 
underwriters’ reputation has no impact on the outcomes of IPOs.  
While the previous literature has a focus on the reputational value of the underwriters, 
other aspects of the underwriters have also been investigated. Ellis et al. (2000) reveal the dark 
side of the underwriting business. They find that the lead underwriters are usually the dominant 
market makers and their post-IPO trading profits are positively related to the level of 
underpricing, implying an incentive for the underwriters to push for higher underpricing. A 
recent study by Boeh and Dunbar (2016) investigates how an underwriter’s deal pipeline affects 
the IPO pricing decisions. For each IPO, they construct different measures for the pipelines of 
the bookrunners of this IPO, i.e. the change in the total capital in the pipeline managed by this 
bookrunner in a window between filling and issuance dates. In general, their results tally with 
the agency theories that underwriters push for higher initial returns by using shorter pipelines. 
They also find that, with both the Carter-Manaster and market-share measures, underwriters’ 
reputation positively affects the level of underpricing.  
2.3.8 Certification Role of the Venture Capitalists 
As another group of regular participants other than underwriters, the involvement of 
venture capitalists in the IPOs has also attracted plenty of research interest. Based on a sample 
of 433 IPOs between 1978 and 1987, Barry et al. (1990) conduct the first exploratory analysis 




of the role of the venture capitalists in the IPO event. They argue that venture capitalists actively 
engage in the management of the company in which they take considerable equity positions. 
This monitoring service provided by the venture capitalists sends out a good signal regarding 
the company’s quality to the investors at the time of IPOs. Therefore, the investors will require 
a lower level of underpricing. They further argue that venture capitalists’ ‘goodwill’ in 
improving the company is supported by the fact that they increase their equity holdings after 
the IPOs. The first systematic theory, as well as empirical test, comes from Megginson and 
Weiss (1991) where they follow the formal certificate hypothesis by Booth and Smith (1986) 
and find that venture capitalists play a certification role in the IPOs.  Megginson and Weiss 
(1991) argue that, as major investors of the company before going public, the existence of 
venture capitalists in an IPO company certifies that the IPO offer price reveals all the relevant 
information. By matching a sample of venture-backed IPOs to a sample of non-venture-backed 
IPOs, they find that the venture-backed IPOs experience significantly lower underpricing. They 
reinforce this argument with findings that venture capitalists attract more prestigious 
underwriters and auditors to the issuing company. Similarly to Barry et al. (1990), they also 
find that venture capitalists tend to retain significant amounts of holdings after the issuance, 
enhancing the credibility of their certification roles. Arthurs et al. (2008) study a more 
complicated agency environment where there are conflicts of interests between different 
agencies. The main conflicts in their setting exist between the venture capitalists and investment 
banks when the venture capitalists sitting on the managerial board, representing their own 
interests, will try their best to avoid leaving money on the table; meanwhile the investment 
banks who need to maintain a long-term relationship with their institutional investors, therefore 
representing the investors’ interests, will push for a higher underpricing. They find an inverse 
relationship between the venture capitalists’ ownership in the IPO company and the level of 
underpricing, which is also consistent with Megginson and Weiss (1991). More importantly, 




they find that when having ties with the underwriters before the IPOs, venture capitalists’ 
negative effect on the level of underpricing is weakened or even diminished. The strength of 
the certification role, however, depends on the maturity of the venture capitalists according to 
Gompers (1996) who finds that IPOs backed by young venture capitalists experience higher 
underpricing than those backed by more mature venture capitalists.  
However, the reverse relationship between the presence of venture capitalists and the 
level of underpricing has also been well documented in the literature. With a sample period 
over 19 years (1986-2004), Dolvin and Jordan (2008) find no significant relationship between 
the venture capital status and IPO underpricing. However, mixed results start to appear when 
the sample period is divided. For IPOs between 1990 and 1998, the venture-backed IPOs have 
significantly lower underpricing than the non-venture-backed ones. Between 1999 and 2000, 
the venture-backed IPOs actually experience more underpricing than the non-venture-backed 
ones. The positive effect of the venture capital status on the level of underpricing is also found 
in Guo et al. (2006), Boeh and Dunbar (2016) and Liu and Ritter (2011).  The “analyst-lust 
theory” by Liu and Ritter (2011) gives a possible explanation for this positive relationship. They 
argue that because the venture capitalists are more interested in the market price on the day 
when the shares are distributed to the limited shareholders, which usually happens after the 
lock-up periods, they have a great desire to attract the all-star analysts’ coverage which can 
affect that price, leading to a higher underpricing. In general, the role of venture capitalists in 
IPO outcomes remain inconclusive and need to be further explored.  
2.4 Behavioural Arguments on IPO Underpricing 
When classic theories seem inadequate to fully explain underpricing, academics turn to 
the behavioural approach. If underwriters intentionally underprice shares to serve the interests 
of their long-term clients (usually institutional investors) rather than the issuers that they are 




representing, then the most obvious behavioural puzzle is why the issuers do not get upset about 
leaving so much money on the table. The first behavioural model employed to answer this 
question is proposed by Loughran and Ritter (2002) which is based on the famous Prospect 
Theory by Kahneman and Tversky (1979). Based on the value function, the Prospect Theory 
suggests that, when facing related outcomes, an individual can choose to either integrate or 
segregate them, a result of ‘mental accounting’. When there are two value gains, the individual 
tends to treat them as two separated ‘wins’. When there are two value losses, the individual 
prefers to integrate the losses so they only experience one loss rather than two. When there is 
one gain and one loss, how the outcomes are processed depends on the absolute value gain or 
loss. When the value gain is bigger than the loss, the individual will integrate the outcomes and 
generally be happy about the absolute value gain, which applies to the IPO underpricing 
situation. For the issuers, the value of their holdings increases substantially after the first day 
of trading compared to the expected valuation based on the initial file range of the offer price. 
Compared to the value gain, the diluted wealth, or value loss, due to the underpricing seems 
neglectable. Therefore, the issuers do not get upset with the underpricing. To take advantage of 
this, Loughran and Ritter (2002) point out that the underwriters will only partially adjust the 
offer price. They find evidence that when the market performs well before the IPOs, measured 
by the three-month pre-IPO market return, the underwriters only adjust the price to a very 
limited extent and the underpricing is higher. Lowry and Schwert (2004) also find a significant 
relationship between the pre-IPO market return and the level of underpricing, supporting the 
argument by Loughran and Ritter (2002) that the public information is only partially adjusted. 
However, the economic significance is so small that they claim the public information is almost 
fully incorporated into the offer price. Most studies, however, record both statistically and 
economically significant relationships supporting Loughran and Ritter (2002) (Boeh and 




Dunbar, 2016, Derrien and Womack, 2003, Derrien, 2005, Hill and Wilson, 2006, Ljungqvist, 
1997, Su and Bangassa, 2011). 
Another behavioural approach to explain the underpricing anomaly was attempted by 
Ljungqvist et al. (2006). They assume that, apart from rational investors, there are ‘sentiment’ 
investors who have optimistic views about the valuation of the IPO companies. In order to 
maximise the overvaluation driven by the demand of the exuberant investors, the issuers and 
underwriters adopt an optimal strategy which is to sell the shares to the institutional investors 
who participate in IPO investments regularly (Ljungqvist et al. (2006) refer them as ‘regulars’). 
By holding the stocks in their inventory and releasing the stocks to the market/sentiment 
investors gradually, ‘regulars’ help to stabilize the price which would otherwise be depressed 
by a large number of shares flooding the market. The regulars, however, bear the risk that the 
behaviour of the sentiment investors is unpredictable and the excessive demand could die down 
at any minute. Therefore, issuers agree to a certain level of underpricing to compensate ‘regulars’ 
for this risk. The issuers still benefit from a relatively higher offer price driven by the exuberant 
investors. Based on a sample of French IPOs between 1999 and 2000, Derrien (2005) finds 
supporting evidence for the investor sentiment arguments. He finds that the individual investors 
are usually the sentiment investors whose demand significantly affects the initial returns of 
IPOs. With findings consistent with Benveniste and Spindt (1989), he concludes that the level 
of underpricing is a product of both the information extraction process before the IPO and the 
sentiment investors’ exuberant demand after the IPO.  
With a sample of Chinese IPOs, Chang et al. (2008) find evidence supporting the 
behavioural argument. By dividing the initial return into two parts from the opening price of 
the first trading day, they find that the aftermarket initial return, the difference between the 
closing and the opening prices of the first trading day, is significantly driven by ‘sentiment’ 




investor demand. By using the same method to divide the initial returns into pre- and after-
market initial returns, Gao (2010) finds similar results that the excessive after-market initial 
return is largely driven by ‘sentiment’ investor demand while he finds little explanatory power 
in the classic theories on the extreme underpricing in China, suggesting that, other than classic 
theories, behavioural arguments are more appropriate in emerging markets. In this thesis, the 
comparison between the classic and behavioural arguments is carried through three studies with 
different samples. When the same method is applied to the U.S. sample, Reber and Vencappa 
(2016) find that although the after-market initial return is related to the demand on the first 
trading day, it only accounts for a small part of the overall underpricing. The pre-market 
deliberate underpricing is the main component of the overall underpricing and it is still largely 
explained by the information-asymmetry-based classic theories. 
2.5 Other Theories and Empirical Studies of Underpricing 
In this section, we present a few other informative explanations for IPO underpricing 
other than the mainstream studies discussed above.  
Booth and Chua (1996) present the first study on the relationship between the issuers’ 
desire for ownership dispersion and IPO underpricing. They argue that underpricing is used by 
the issuers to attract oversubscription which in turn creates dispersed ownership, resulting in a 
lower required return. Underpricing is a price the issuers pay to compensate for the investors’ 
bearing more information cost increased by a broader initial ownership. Similarly, Brennan and 
Franks (1997) propose that the underpricing and rationing practice is used by the inside owners 
to retain control and to avoid block holdings/purchase in the offering. Supporting evidence is 
found on a sample of UK IPOs between 1986 and 1989. Boulton et al. (2010) extend this to a 
cross-country study where they examine how the country-level governance affects the 
underpricing. They find that in countries where the legal system gives more protection to 




outside investors than insiders, the issuers tend to underprice more in order to create a more 
dispersed ownership and retain more control.  However, in contrast to Booth and Chua (1996) 
and Brennan and Franks (1997), when the corporate governance associated with the ownership 
structure is taken into account, it has been recorded that the institutional investors are favoured 
in the IPO. Stoughton and Zechner (1998) justify the IPO underpricing with a ‘moral hazard’ 
argument. Inspired by the literature which documents that an optimal institutional ownership 
can maximise a firm’s value by offering better external monitoring, they argue that underpricing 
and rationing allow the underwriters, representing the issuers, to differentiate the classes of 
investors in order to favour the institutional investors in the offering as they offer better external 
monitoring management.  
Although underwriters are considered the most important practitioners in the IPO events, 
the auditing and accounting parts of an IPO event, like any other investment and finance 
activities, is not dismissible. Similar to the studies on the underwriters’ reputation, Beaty (1989) 
finds that the auditors’ reputation is negatively related to the level of underpricing. As 
underpricing damages the issuers’ wealth, the issuers will then try to disclose low ex-ante 
uncertainty information, indicating a possibility that some issuers might misrepresent. Beaty 
(1989) argues that auditing is one way to attest to the information quality, and the information 
disclosed in the reports is more reliable if they are audited by reputable auditors as they have 
more reputational capital to protect. As a result, the underpricing is reduced.  The most 
significant change in the financial accounting procedures around the world goes to the 
mandatory adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) around 2005. Hong 
et al. (2014) look at how the financial reporting procedure itself could affect IPO underpricing. 
More specifically, with a sample across 20 countries, they find that the adoption of the IFRS 
around 2005 reduced the IPO underpricing, on average, due to the enhanced quality of the 
reported financial information.  




Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933 protects the investors from any damages caused 
by neglected or falsely disclosed information in the U.S. Specifically, the investors can sue any 
party that has signed the financial reports. Based on this fact, Tinic (1988) argues that 
underpricing is an efficient way to insure against possible legal liabilities and, especially, the 
damages to the reputation of the issuers and underwriters.  
While the majority of the preceding theories are developed in the U.S. market, the 
explanatory power of these theories varies when they are applied to the emerging markets. As 
one of the biggest economic bodies in the world, China is a representative emerging market 
with its unique financial environment that has possibly attracted the greatest amount of research 
interest. Mok and Hui (1998) record a wildly high underpricing of 287% and find that the state-
ownership, i.e. owned by the Chinese Government, explains a significant amount of this 
underpricing. Chan et al. (2004) record an underpricing of 178% between 1993 and 1998. They 
find that the classic theories only account for a very limited amount of underpricing and the 
relationship between the level of underpricing and the state-ownership is also weak.  Fan et al. 
(2007) also document a positive relationship between the state-ownership and the level of 
underpricing in China. However, they find that IPO companies with politically connected CEOs 
actually experience less underpricing. Although this result is only weakly significant, it 
somewhat supports the Signalling Model that companies free from government intervention, 
which is otherwise brought in by the politically connected CEOs, have incentives to underprice 
more in order to signal this good quality to the outside investors. Tian (2011) records 247% 
underpricing on average for Chinese IPOs from 1992 to 2004. She finds evidence that 
government intervention is indeed a ‘bad’ signal where interventions like pricing and share 
supply regulations are significant drivers of the extremely high underpricing. An elaborated 
review of the IPO literature in China is presented in Chapter 4. 




2.6 Real Estate IPOs 
In previous sections, we have focused on the studies on the IPO performance of 
domestic industrial companies which excludes the financial institutions and real estate 
companies. In this section, we review the literature on real estate IPOs and in the next section 
we discuss the limited research on the international or cross-country IPOs.  
2.6.1 Special Characteristics of Real Estate Companies 
Real estate companies, especially real estate investment trusts (hereafter REITs), are 
often excluded from the general IPO studies because of their special structures of operation and 
management. Apart from holding real properties as the underlying assets, some of the unique 
features of REITs include their tax-exempt status and dividend pay-out policies.  Tax-exempt 
status means that they have no advantage to issue debt. In other words, equity issuing is 
relatively cheaper for REITs. REITs are required to pay out a certain amount of net income as 
dividends and this requirement is often set very high, i.e. the pay-out ratio is 95% in the U.S. 
and 90% in the UK. The tax-exempt status and the high dividend pay-out ratio indicate a strong 
need for REITs to raise capital externally.  
2.6.2 Real Estate IPO Performance and Attempted Explanations 
Unlike the industrial IPOs which are averagely underpriced, mixed first-day returns of 
REIT IPOs have been recorded. The pre-1990 studies in the U.S. record either overpriced or 
fair-priced REIT IPOs. Although most of the studies record significant underpricing of the post-
1990 REIT IPOs, the average initial return is still abnormally low compared to that of the 
industrial IPOs. If the underpricing of industrial IPOs is a puzzle, Chan et al. (2013) call this 
abnormal behaviour of REIT IPOs a ‘puzzle within the puzzle’.  
Wang et al. (1992) present the first study focusing on REIT IPOs and recording the 
overpricing phenomenon. Based on 87 U.S. REIT IPOs from 1971 to 1988, they observe an 




average initial return of -2.82%. With a mix of 58 mortgage, equity and hybrid REITs, Below 
et al. (1995) find neither underpricing nor overpricing and claim that REIT IPOs are fairly 
priced. As the classic theories are based on the assumption of information asymmetry, they are 
unable to explain the negative initial returns. Wang et al. (1992) propose that the fund-like 
structure, the low involvement of institutional investors and the holdings of underlying real 
assets might be what distinguishes REITs IPO performance from industrial companies. In 
particular, they argue that REITs are more similar to mutual funds, at least in the 1980s, which 
generally have low levels of underpricing. REIT IPOs before 1990 were also heavily allocated 
to the individual investors who were usually uninformed investors. In the end, they argue that 
abnormal IPO performance may be due to the fact that REITs hold a substantial amount of real 
properties which have different risk-return profiles compared to common stocks.  
We know that U.S. REITs went through several structural changes in the late 1980s. For 
example, the Tax Reform Act of 1986 eliminated the tax advantages of other real estate 
investments which has made REITs a preferred form of real estate investments. Also, the U.S. 
equity REITs have become more attractive to institutional investors due to the transformation 
to internal management in the late 1980s. By the 1990s, U.S. REITs become more like operating 
companies with a similar, if not higher, level of institutional involvement.  With a sample 
including all the REITs between 1984 and 1995, Chan et al. (1998) find that the institutional 
involvement in REITs has not only hugely increased compared to that before 1990, but also 
exceeded that in other common stocks. To examine the microstructure of REITs, Glascock et 
al. (1998) find that when asset structure, share price, trading volume, and return variance are 
controlled for, REITs and common stocks have similar bid-ask spreads, suggesting that REITs 
are not necessarily less liquid than common stocks.  




Following these changes in the U.S., the REITs IPO performance has also undergone 
change from being averagely overpriced to significantly underpriced. The market-adjusted 
average initial return of REIT IPOs between 1991 and 1994 is 3.6%, significantly above 0 (Ling 
and Ryngaert, 1997). With 123 REIT IPOs from 1982 to 2000, Akhigbe et al. (2004) find an 
underpricing of 4.28% with 73% of the sample IPOs returning positive initial returns. Hartzell 
et al. (2005) record an average initial return of 0.27% for 49 IPOs between 1980 and 1998, 
which is not significantly different from 0. However, they point out that this is simply due to 
the significant overpricing before and underpricing after 1990. With a longer sample period 
from 1980 to 1999 and more observations (197 REIT IPOs), Chen and Lu (2006) find 3% 
average underpricing on the full sample, 1.3% overpricing for pre-1990 IPOs and 4.3% 
underpricing for post-1990 IPOs. Similar findings are also recorded in Joel-Carbonell and 
Rottke (2009) who observe 4.3% underpricing for REIT IPOs between 1990 and 2007, and in 
Bairagi and Dimovski (2011) who observe an average initial return of 3.18% for 123 REIT 
IPOs from 1996 to 2010. 
Ling and Ryngaert (1997) attribute this reversal to the increased uncertainty about IPO 
valuation due to the increased institutional involvement in the REITs market which leads to the 
Winner’s Curse situation. However, this cannot explain the abnormally low underpricing of 
REIT IPOs compared to industrial ones.6 Based on the fact that REITs depend on external 
funding, i.e. SEOs, more than other industries do, Ghosh et al. (2000) think REIT IPOs a more 
suitable lab for testing the signalling model. They pair the IPOs issued between 1992 and 1995 
with their first SEOs and find results that generally support the signalling model which, if we 
recall, suggests that underpricing is used as a signal for good quality and that the cost will be 
recouped in the following SEOs. Specifically, Ghosh et al. (2000) find that more underpriced 
                                                 
6 According to Table 1 in Ritter (2017), the average underpricing for U.S. industrial IPOs from 1991 to 1994 was 
above 10%. 




REITs indeed issue their first SEOs sooner and their joint capital raised in the IPOs and the first 
SEOs is also higher, implying recognized good quality by the public. As the fund-like structure 
pre-1990 and the institutional involvement cannot account for the underpricing of REIT IPOs 
after the 1990s, the underlying property holding has naturally caught the research interest. Chan 
et al. (2001) adopt Hong Kong as a testing ground as the real estate companies there are actually 
operating companies that are just as attractive to the institutional investors as other industries. 
With a comparison analysis between 56 real estate and 343 non-real estate IPOs, they find that 
holding real properties does not differentiate the IPO performance of real estate companies from 
that of other industries. However, the real estate companies included in this study are not all 
exactly REITs, which have more strict definitions, making the inferences drawn from this 
sample very limited. Although no direct relationship between the real asset holding and the IPO 
valuation is found, the result is inconclusive to eliminate all the other indirect influences that 
the underlying assets might have on REIT IPO valuations. Hartzell et al. (2005) conduct a more 
specific study on the role of the underlying real estate assets in REIT IPOs based on the U.S. 
market. Although they do not determine the mechanism through which the effect is transmitted, 
overall they find that both the IPO volume in a period and the average initial return are affected 
by the conditions of the underlying real asset market, or in other words, the private real estate 
market. Specifically, they find that the demand for REITs is negatively related to and the private 
market performance is positively related to the initial returns.  
Similar to the ‘hot issue’ market studies on industrial IPOs, Buttimer et al. (2005) 
investigate the REIT IPO waves around 1985, from 1993 to 1994 and from 1997 to 1998. With 
a sample period across 22 years, from 1980 to 2001, they find that the average initial return is 
not significantly different from 0 which is consistent with some of the previous studies. They 
argue that the Capital Demand Hypothesis is the most appropriate to explain the first two waves. 
When the economic environment of the REITs changes, their need for capital might be 




increased, leading to a cluster of IPO issuance. The wave around 1985 was a response to the 
tax reform that was officially introduced in 1986. The increased demand for REITs in the early 
1990s and the development of UPREIT triggered the second wave of IPO issuance between 
1993 and 1994. However, the Capital Demand Hypothesis seems incapable of explaining the 
third wave as no significant economic changes have been identified around that time.  
When it comes to other countries, Londerville (2002) finds small but significant 
underpricing based on just 13 Canadian REIT IPOs issued in 1998, which is similar to the U.S. 
market in the 1990s. Brounen and Eichholtz (2002) study the real estate IPO performance in 
the UK, France and Sweden with 54 property investment companies that went public during 
1984 and 1999. The average underpricing is 2.55% across three countries, a figure that is largely 
contributed to by the significant underpricing in the UK which is 4.07%. Interestingly, they find 
that specialized companies, defined as holding more than 80% of the assets in one property type, 
have returned higher initial returns than diversified companies. This relationship and the 
rationale behind it has been further explored in one of the three empirical studies in this thesis 
(see Chapter 5). In Australia, Dimovski and Brooks (2006) also find low but significant 
underpricing for the property unit trust IPOs. They find that investor sentiment about the REITs 
market is particularly important to the IPO performance which is consistent with the 
behavioural arguments. They also find evidence supporting the Winner’s Curse theory that 
institutional investors tend to receive more underpriced shares while individual investors tend 
to receive more overpriced shares. Ooi (2009) examines the REIT IPO performance from a 
different angle. He argues that the REIT structure makes it possible to pay higher management 
fees but this might affect the IPO valuation. He finds a positive relationship between the 
management fees of a REIT and its IPO initial returns. In other words, the market charges more 
for the IPO if the REIT is structured to pay out more management fees. Particularly, he finds 
that REITs with management fees above the industry median experience an average 




underpricing of between 19.81% and 23.24% while the REITs with management fees below 
the industry median experience an average overpricing of between 3.86% and 4.12%. While 
there is no proper REIT market in China, Chinese real estate companies are usually both 
developers and investment companies. With a sample of 57 real estate companies that went 
public between 1992 and 2008, Wong et al. (2013a) find evidence supporting the signalling 
model that the ‘good’ companies signal their quality by choosing to be listed in Hong Kong, a 
more transparent and efficient market, instead of Mainland China. Real estate IPOs listed in 
Mainland China have a significant underpricing of 4.96% while those listed in Hong Kong have 
an average initial return that is not significantly different from 0, which is different from the 
study by Chan et al. (2001) which finds indifferent initial returns between real estate and 
industrial IPOs in Hong Kong.  
Chan et al. (2013) conduct the first cross-country study on REIT IPOs using a sample 
of 370 REITs from 14 countries. Using univariate tests, they identify several factors related to 
REITs IPO performance. However, the univariate tests are not robust enough to disentangle the 
underlying dynamics of real estate IPO pricing. Furthermore, as all previous arguments seem 
to be insufficient to explain REIT IPO performance, they argue that the deadweight cost model 
proposed by Chan et al. (2009) is the most suitable explanation. This model does not require an 
assumption of information asymmetry and it actually works together with the fund-like 
structure and the underlying real asset holding arguments. The deadweight cost model argues 
that when underlying real estate assets can be sold with low costs in the private market at a 
price similar to the ‘true’ IPO price (the price that reflects the true value of the company), issuers 
should have less incentive to underprice shares to attract investors, if not taking the chance to 
overprice. Should the IPO fail, they could sell the properties efficiently in the private market. 
This results in low, or negative, initial returns of REIT IPOs. When U.S. REITs became more 
like operating companies in the late 1980s, the deadweight costs also increased and this may 




explain the shift from negative to positive initial returns of REIT IPOs. However, the 
deadweight cost theory lacks empirical support.  
We can see that U.S. REITs seem to be the only group which has experienced significant 
IPO overpricing pre-1990. Although the overall underpricing of real estate IPOs in most 
countries tends to be much lower than that of the industrial IPOs, it is still significant and offers 
a very attractive return to the IPO investors, as pointed out by Brounen and Eichholtz (2002). 
The literature on real estate IPOs remains incomplete and a lot of the empirical studies 
mentioned above suggest further investigations into the roles of the underlying real assets, a 
lead that the studies in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 of this thesis follow and develop. Specifically, 
as the classic theories and other unique features of the real estate industry have failed to explain 
the performance of real estate IPOs, Chapter 4 and 5 further investigate the role that the 
underlying real assets of real estate companies play in the IPO valuation.  
2.7 Cross-country IPOs 
Another less-explored area in the IPO literature is the cross-country IPO variations. 
Cross-country studies are not new in corporate finance literature. However, it is not until quite 
recently that cross-country studies on IPOs have started to come to our attention. This stream 
of literature usually looks at how much the country-level institutional settings and the legal 
environment could account for the variation in IPO underpricing on top of the traditional firm- 
and issuing-level characteristics. Naturally, an overlap between these cross-country IPO studies 
and the law and finance literature is presented.   
In general, the seminal papers in the law and finance literature by La Porta et al (1997, 
1998, 2000, 2002) establish that the legal system in one country affects the development of its 
financial market and, at a micro level, affects the corporate finance and governance in this 
country, with significant economic consequences. In the law and finance literature, many 




aspects of corporate finance and governance, such as ownership structure, external financing 
and dividend policy, have been re-examined under the legal institutions. As early as in the study 
by La Porta et al. (1997), they have identified a positive relationship between the number of 
IPOs and the quality of the legal environment, specifically, investors’ rights, legal origin and 
legal protection.  
The empirical studies on the relationship between the legal institutions and the well-
known corporate finance anomaly—IPO underpricing—do not appear until after the 2010s. 
These studies argue that the legal system in one country could affect the ex-ante uncertainty 
about the IPO valuation on top of the firm- and issuing-related factors (Banerjee et al., 2011, 
Engelen and Essen, 2010, Hopp and Dreher, 2013). Specifically, they argue that issuing 
companies in a weaker legal environment would face higher uncertainty about their valuation 
than those in a stronger legal environment. In addition, a better legal system should also reduce 
the uncertainty surrounding the distribution of the issuing company’s value during and after the 
IPO. For example, in a country where the legal protection of the investors is strong, the 
managers, insiders and big institutional investors will have less opportunities to ‘bully’ the 
individual investors. On the other hand, when the legal protection of investors, especially 
minority investors, is weak, the individual investors become reluctant to participate in the IPOs, 
thus more underpricing is needed. Overall, IPOs in a country with better legal institutions 
should experience less underpricing, which is supported by the empirical findings in these 
cross-country studies. Specifically, legal protection for investors, public enforcement, rule of 
law, corruption and English Common Law legal origin are found to be negatively related to the 
level of underpricing (Banerjee et al., 2011, Engelen and Essen, 2010, Hopp and Dreher, 2013).  
When it comes to country-level institutional settings, the transformation that they have 
been undergoing due to the financial globalization process in the last few decades cannot be 




neglected. This change has been examined specifically in the corporate finance context and the 
general argument has been raised that financial globalization is weakening the influences of 
country institutions on corporate finance activities. This strand of literature is particularly 
relevant to the development of the first study presented in Chapter 3 where a detailed review is  
also presented.    




Chapter 3 : International Financial Integration and Cross-country 
IPO Underpricing 
A cross-country study is presented in this chapter to identify a macroeconomic factor—
international financial integration—which partly drives the IPO short-run performance, as well 
as its interactions with the country-level institutional settings.  
3.1 Introduction 
Even if the cross-country variation of IPO underpricing is a well-known phenomenon 
(Loughran et al., 1994, updated in 2015), the institutional settings of a country (hereafter 
‘country institutions’) have become less important for the decision of going public domestically 
or abroad due to the increased integration of financial markets (Doidge et al., 2013). Initially, a 
growing stream of literature examined the impact of country institutions such as legal 
frameworks on the cross-country variation in IPO underpricing, after controlling for firm- and 
issuing-specific factors (Banerjee et al., 2011, Engelen and Essen, 2010, Hopp and Dreher, 
2013). More recently, Doidge et al. (2013) and Caglio et al. (2016) follow the studies on the 
impacts of financial globalization on stock performance, corporate finance and governance, and 
show how it also positively supports the development of IPO markets (number and size of 
listings) as well as reducing the impacts of country institutions on IPO decisions. In this chapter, 
the study is to extend this literature by assessing how the increasing financial exposure to the 
global market at country level reduces IPO underpricing and weakens the impact that country 
institutions have on the cross-country variation of this phenomenon. 
To our knowledge, this study represents the first attempt to link IPO underpricing with 
financial integration and the main contribution to the literature is threefold. First, we argue that 
international financial integration of one country directly increases both the importance and 




efficiency of its financial intermediation process via tradable securities (including IPO 
underwriting), which in turn negatively impacts the level of IPO underpricing. The inverse 
relationship between the financial intermediation efficiency and the level of underpricing is 
empirically supported by extensive evidence following the information extraction theory by 
Benveniste and Spindt (1989) as elaborated in Chapter 2 (Carter et al., 1998, Carter and 
Manaster, 1990, Chemmanur and Fulghieri, 1994, Nanda and Youngkeol, 1997, Tinic, 1988). 
During the financial integration process, the focus of the banking business shifts away from the 
traditional depositary business to that of a financial intermediation via tradable securities, e.g. 
IPO and SEO underwriting services. An investment bank’s market share of underwriting is 
affected by the efficiency of their previous underwriting performance measured by the level of 
underpricing as first proposed by Beaty and Ritter (1986). Meanwhile the international financial 
integration process reduces the competitive advantage of domestic banks through the presence 
of an increased number of foreign banks in domestic markets and increased opportunities for 
domestic companies to finance in foreign markets. To respond to the increased importance of 
the financial intermediation business, the overall quality of financial services will be improved 
through a spillover effect, where less competitive domestic players try to learn from foreign 
banks and institutions with better financial systems. Consequently, the efficiency of the 
financial intermediation process in a specific country should improve due to the increasing level 
of financial integration with the global markets. And, in line with this expectation, it is found 
that international financial integration reduces IPO underpricing. 
The second argument is that international financial integration also works as a 
moderation effect, weakening the explanatory power of country institutions in the cross-country 
variation of IPO underpricing. In fact, international financial integration allows companies to 
access finance in the foreign markets and to borrow from foreign institutions. As a result, we 
find that the boundaries between capital markets in different countries fade away and the impact 




of country institutions on IPO underpricing is weakened, which is consistent with the popular 
argument in the law and finance literature that the increasing globalization in general weakens 
the roles of country institutions in corporate finance (Doidge et al., 2007, Doidge et al., 2013, 
Kho et al., 2009, Stulz, 1999, Stulz, 2009). These two sets of results on the impact of 
international financial integration on IPO underpricing also indicate that the process of financial 
integration with the global market may improve the efficiency of primary markets 
internationally by driving the convergence of institutional quality across countries. The results 
also help us to understand the regional conditions for foreign IPO investment opportunities 
better as they provide issuers and underwriters with an insight into the economic effects of 
country institutions on IPO underpricing in a wider context of financial globalization. 
Finally, from a methodological standpoint, a hierarchical linear modelling is applied to 
a large cross-country dataset that has a clustering structure, using a mixed-effects model. 
Moving away from a simple OLS estimation commonly used in the IPO literature, we are able 
to test the country-level effects and correct for the country clustering structure at the same time, 
which cannot be realized by a fixed effect model. 
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows: the next section develops the research 
hypotheses and briefly summarizes the relevant literature other than that discussed in Chapter 
2. Section 3.3 presents the data collection process and variable constructions as well as the 
methodology. Section 3.4 discusses the main results and a variety of robustness checks, while 
the last section concludes this study. 
3.2 Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
To briefly recall, it is discussed in Chapter 2 that the mainstream literature on IPO 
underpricing focuses on pre-market activities following the information-asymmetry-based 
theories, or the aftermarket demand-driven behavioural arguments, with some other studies 




focusing on the agency problems and allocation process of the IPO. Although the focus in 
previous literature has been on firm- and issuing-specific variables, more recent international 
studies show that country institutions are also important to explain the cross-country variation 
in IPO underpricing (Banerjee et al., 2011, Engelen and Essen, 2010, Hopp and Dreher, 2013, 
Doidge et al., 2013, Caglio et al., 2016). This study extends this branch of literature with a focus 
on the roles of international financial integration processes of a country in its IPO performance.  
3.2.1 Impact of International Financial Integration on IPO Underpricing 
IPOs represent complex financial deals where company information is not fully 
disclosed and the involvement of several independent institutions (i.e. issuer, investors and 
underwriters) makes the financial intermediation process highly relevant to understand the 
pricing dynamics as extensively studied in the literature. The most empirically supported 
theoretical setting is the information extraction theory by Benveniste and Spindt (1989). In short, 
they identify that the efficiency of the information extraction process, conducted by the 
underwriters, is critical to the level of underpricing.7 As both the standards and the effort they 
put in this process is unobservable, the past performance of the IPOs that they have underwritten 
becomes a measure of the underwriters’ reputation and quality. As a consequence, when 
underwriters either overprice or heavily underprice, their subsequent market share decreases, 
indicating the incentives of the investment banks to increase the efficiency of the financial 
intermediation process in order to set an appropriate offer price (Beaty and Ritter, 1986, Carter 
et al., 1998, Carter and Manaster, 1990, Chemmanur and Fulghieri, 1994, Nanda and 
Youngkeol, 1997, Sherman, 2005, Tinic, 1988).  
There are different definitions of financial integration. Overall, it represents the level 
integration of a country’s financial market with the global financial markets which is reflected 
                                                 
7 For a detailed review on the Information Extraction Theory, please refer to Section 2.3.3 in Chapter 2. 




in all aspects of finance activities, such as the ease of capital flows in and out of a country, the 
barriers to the domestic capital market and the restrictions on cross-border investments. As the 
financial integration process is associated with the domestic financial development and the 
quality of country institutions, a branch of literature has documented its influence on firm-level 
finance and governance activities. As to IPOs, financial integration affects the IPO valuation 
via the underwriting process. In particular, international financial integration impacts on the 
underwriting process because a market’s financial openness to the rest of the world can 
“increase the depth and breadth of domestic financial markets and lead to an increase in the 
degree of efficiency of the financial intermediation process” (Agénor, 2003, pp.1095-1096). 
International financial integration significantly enhances the competition of the banking system 
through different mechanisms. Firstly, it increases the competition for domestic banks by 
raising the number of foreign banks operating in local markets (Caprio and Honohan, 1999) 
and allowing companies to access more affordable financing opportunities in foreign markets.  
As far as IPOs are concerned, financial integration reduces the costs and improves the 
likelihood of domestic companies going public abroad to access better institutional settings. 
International financial integration is found by Doidge et al. (2013) to increase the number of 
global IPOs. A recent study by Caglio et al. (2016) finds that more IPOs are actually 
underwritten by foreign banks when the home country has higher international financial 
integration. In general, financial integration also induces the shift of banks from the traditional 
loans and depository business to business in financial intermediation via securities (Hausler, 
2002). 
In response to the higher competition introduced by international financial integration, 
domestic banks learn from foreign banks and other institutions and tend to develop a better 
banking system (Caprio and Honohan, 1999). As a result, we expect domestic banks to become 
more effective information producers in the IPO process, improving the financial 




intermediation process. According to the information extraction theory, the more effective the 
underwriting process is, the more information about the true value can be extracted from the 
informed investors at a lower cost, leading to a lower level of underpricing. 
Finally and strictly for IPOs, Caglio et al. (2016) and Doidge et al. (2013) point out that 
world financial globalization increases the likelihood and reduces the cost of domestic 
companies going public abroad.  Caglio et al. (2016) point out that companies are likely to use 
foreign IPOs as a means to escape from poor institutional environment in their home countries. 
Caglio et al. (2016) further show that a foreign IPO tends to choose a global underwriter, instead 
of a domestic one, if its home country has lower financial integration with the rest of the world. 
These further indicate the increasing incentives for underwriters to improve the intermediation 
process under the financial globalization process in order to stay competitive and maintain 
market shares.  
As a more efficient underwriting process is associated with lower underpricing, all the 
above arguments indicate a negative relationship between the level of international financial 
integration and IPO underpricing and hence we form the first hypothesis as: 
 
H1: International financial integration reduces the cross-country variation of IPO 
underpricing. 
 
3.2.2 Moderation Effect of International Financial Integration 
Alongside a direct relationship between international financial integration and IPO 
underpricing, we also argue that there is an indirect mechanism. Previous cross-country studies 
document that country-level institutional settings can also affect IPO activities and add to the 




explanation on underpricing. Particularly, legal settings, such as the protection for minority 
investors, law enforcement, rule of law quality, corruption level and legal origin of a country 
are found to significantly affect the ex-ante uncertainty of the IPO valuation in a similar way as 
the firm- and issuing-level characteristics do (Banerjee et al., 2011, Engelen and Essen, 2010, 
Hopp and Dreher, 2013).8 
However, a rise in the level of international financial integration weakens the 
importance of country institutions on corporate finance activities. Generally, this argument 
arises from the fact that financial integration allows greater flexibility as companies can choose 
the most suitable country institutions to which they are willing to be subjected by using the 
foreign markets. A strong but also implicitly reasonable argument is made by Stulz (2009, p. 
350): “In a fully integrated world, we would expect national capital markets to be irrelevant”. 
He argues that the advantages of country institutions for domestic firms gradually disappear 
with international financial integration lowering the costs of international investments and 
capital raising, allowing firms to choose better institutions in a foreign market (Stulz, 1999, 
Stulz, 2009). Similarly, Kho et al. (2009) find a decreasing importance of country institutions 
for the level of home bias of the U.S. investors towards other countries over time. Doidge et al. 
(2007) argue that the impact of country institutions on corporate governance activities is 
weakened by more accessible global capital markets, while Doidge et al. (2013) show that 
international financial integration increases the number of global IPOs and weakens the effects 
of country institutions on the number and size of both domestic and global IPOs. Following this 
line of research, we extend the literature by examining the role of international financial 
integration as a moderation effect that weakens the roles that the country institutions play in 
                                                 
8 For a more detailed review, please refer to Section 2.7 in Chapter 2. 




explaining the cross-country variation of IPO underpricing. Our second hypothesis is formed 
as: 
 
H2: International financial integration of one country weakens the effects of its 
institutions on IPO underpricing.  
 
3.3 Data and Methodology 
3.3.1 Sample and Variables 
This study includes worldwide IPOs from January 1995 to December 2011. The data is 
collected from Thomson One New Issues Database, while the market-level data is sourced from 
Thomson Reuters DataStream Professional. Initially, we only include IPOs with information 
on both offer and first-trading-day closing price which is essential to measure the level of IPO 
underpricing. In line with previous studies, we exclude companies in the finance, insurance and 
real estate industries (SIC code between 60 and 67) and companies with missing observations. 
From a total of 9,958 deals, we apply a filtering process to obtain a final full sample of 8,954 
IPOs from 37 countries by removing: IPOs with abnormal initial returns below -67% and above 
2,000% (147) which is likely due to miscalculation or wrong data input9; IPOs using a private 
placement (279); IPOs listed in countries recognised as tax-haven non-sovereign 
jurisdictions—e.g. Bermuda and British Virgin Islands (263); outliers of IPO initial returns in 
the top and bottom 1st percentiles (235); and deals in countries with fewer than 5 IPOs during 
the overall sample period (80). 
                                                 
9 This selection criterion is used by Banerjee et al. (2011). 




The firm-level IPO underpricing is the dependent variable and is measured by the initial 
return (𝐼𝑅𝑖) on the first day of trading which is the percentage difference between the offer price 









This is the commonly used measure in the literature: the higher the initial return, the 
higher the IPO underpricing. A few studies adjust the IPO initial returns by the market 
performance. Many others adopt the unadjusted measure, as the average IPO underpricing is 
extremely high and the overall market performance is unlikely to affect the underpricing. 
Therefore, we keep the original form of IPO underpricing. Instead, we will control for the pre-
IPO market performance in different specifications. 
The main variable of interest in this study is the level of financial integration with the 
global markets for a country where the IPO is listed (or of which the IPO company is subjected 
to the institutional settings). Kose et al. (2010) compare several proxies of financial 
globalization and argue that the volume-based measure of international financial integration 
firstly proposed by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2003) is the most appropriate. This measure is 
also used by Doidge et al. (2013) and we similarly define the level of international financial 
integration in country 𝑗 in year 𝑡 as the ratio between the sum of external assets and liabilities 
of a country in that year and its annual GDP, as in Equation 2.10 
 
                                                 
10 Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007) further update the dataset of external assets and liabilities by nation as well as 
the international financial integration based on the measurement by Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2003). 












Moreover, in the robustness check section, we also present four alternative measures of 
financial integration showing that our results are not driven by the choice of this measure. As 
Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2003) argue, the level of financial globalization can be driven by a 
relaxation of policy restrictions, capital account liberalizations, an increase in goods trade and 
output per capita, domestic financial developments, privatization process, tax policy, etc. We 
also further separate financial integration from the overall market development by controlling 
for market returns and turnover, which also show a low level of correlation with financial 
integration.  
The impact that the financial integration has on IPO underpricing is tested after 
controlling for firm- and issuing-level characteristics. In particular, IPO size (the product of the 
offer price and the number of shares offered) is used to proxy for the ex-ante uncertainty about 
the issuing company, as proposed by Beaty and Ritter (1986), and two dummy variables are 
created to capture whether the IPO is venture-capital-backed, and/or uses a bookbuilding 
method (factors reducing underpricing thanks to a process of information revelation). We also 
control for market-related variables. As we have discussed in Chapter 2, according to Loughran 
and Ritter (2002) and Ljungqvist et al. (2006), market return represents the market sentiment 
and is positively related to underpricing. We follow the literature and include the three-month 
cumulative market return before the IPO issuing date. We also control for markets with a 
relatively high number of deals during the year. Particularly, we define the VOLUME variable 
as the ratio between the number of IPOs in a specific year in one country divided by the total 




number of IPOs in the same country during the sample period11. We also include the market 
turnover to further control for the market development, and the data is collected from 
DataStream. 
As far as the second hypothesis is concerned, we include five country-level institutional 
variables that the previous empirical studies found significant in explaining IPO underpricing 
(Banerjee et al., 2011, Engelen and Essen, 2010, Hopp and Dreher, 2013). All country 
institutions are cross-sectional variables held constant for each country during the sample 
period.12  
The Investor Protection Index (IPI) measures the level of minority investor protection 
in a country and has a negative impact on underpricing (Banerjee et al., 2011, Engelen and 
Essen, 2010). In countries where minority investors are not sufficiently protected, they tend to 
have less monitoring power over managers and big institutional investors and suffer from 
inappropriate managerial activities (e.g. self-dealing activities). In IPO events, the higher 
uncertainty around the company valuation makes investors reluctant to participate as they might 
become the minority investors. As a result, higher underpricing is required to attract these 
investors. Therefore, we expect a negative relationship between the level of minority investors’ 
protection in a country and its IPO underpricing. Different from Banerjee et al. (2011) and 
Engelen and Essen (2010) who use the anti-self-dealing index constructed by Djankov et al. 
(2008) to capture the level of minority investor protection, we use the Investor Protection Index 
(IPI) which is the most recent data on the level of minority investor protection reported as part 
of the Doing Business project by the World Bank. The data is collected from the Doing Business 
                                                 
11 This variable is calculated based on the IPOs recorded in the database before we apply any of the filtering criteria. 
12 This is a standard approach in the literature, also considering that there is very little (and insignificant) time-
variation. 




website13 and ranges from 0 to 10 where higher values represent better protection of minority 
investors. 
By dividing a country’s legal system into ‘law in books’ (written laws) and ‘law in 
action’ (the effectiveness of legal enforcement), Engelen and Essen (2010) find that when the 
‘law in books’ is relatively weak in protecting investors from controlling insiders and unjust 
deals, strong legal enforcement (i.e. effective police force or courts) can to some extent make 
up for the weak investor protection. Therefore, we expect a lower level of uncertainty about the 
IPO valuation associated with more efficient pubic enforcement. We obtain the Public 
Enforcement Index (PEI) as a proxy for the effectiveness of the legal enforcement from La 
Porta’s website. The index ranges from 0 to 1, with higher values representing more effective 
legal enforcement. 
Furthermore, we also include the Rule of Law Index (RLI) and the Corruption 
Perception Index (CPI) to proxy for the overall quality of a country’s legal system (Engelen 
and Essen, 2010) and expect that better overall legal system is associated with less IPO 
uncertainty, thus lower underpricing. We use the Rule of Law Index constructed by the World 
Justice Project14, ranging from 0 to 1 with higher values representing better overall legal 
systems. The Corruption Perception Index, provided by Transparency International15, measures 
the level of corruption ranging from 0 (most corrupted environment) to 100 (least corrupted 
environment). 
Finally, ENGLISH is a dummy variable that captures the status of a country’s legal 
origin. It equals 1 if its legal system is originated from the English Common Law system and 0 
                                                 
13 Doing Business project website: http://www.doingbusiness.org/ 
14 For more details about how the rule of law index is constructed, please refer to the World Justice Project website. 
http://worldjusticeproject.org/ 
15 Transparency International is an independent organization, which monitors the level of corruption in the world. 
Regarding the construction of the corruption perception index, please refer to their website. 
https://www.transparency.org/ 




otherwise. The data on legal origin is collected from La Porta et al. (1998). La Porta et al. (1998) 
and La Porta et al. (2000) point out that the legal protection is generally better in common law 
countries (i.e. USA and UK) than in civil law countries (i.e. German, French and Scandinavian 
law systems). Hence, following the literature, we expect a lower level of underpricing in 
countries with an English Common Law system. 
3.3.2 Summary Statistics 
Table 1 defines the variables adopted in this study with corresponding data sources and 
summary statistics. The high level of underpricing (average initial return of 26.62%), associated 
with a large standard deviation (45.47%), suggests the relevance of such phenomenon and its 
variation (both over time and across companies). This evidence is important, as we want to 
correct for several cross-sectional and time-varying phenomena to isolate the effect that 
financial integration has on IPO underpricing across countries and over time. 
Table 2 is the summary of the average IPO underpricing by country from 1995 to 2011. 
We notice a large variation in the level of underpricing as well as in the number of IPOs across 
countries. In our sample, the United States has most observations with 3,383 IPOs, while China 
and Australia follow with 1,390 and 798 IPOs respectively. This dataset, in terms of IPOs and 
countries, is by far one of the largest in cross-country underpricing studies.16 As we can see, all 
37 countries experience different levels of underpricing over the sample period. China has the 
highest level of underpricing at 50.0% with Japan following with 40.3%, while Norway has the 
lowest one at 2.58% based on 54 IPOs. Brazil has an average underpricing of 8.01% in our 
sample and it differs from the 33.10% which is recorded in Loughran et al. (1994, updated in 
2015). We explain this difference arguing that the sample period in Loughran et al. (1994, 
                                                 
16 The ranking of the underpricing by country in this study is highly correlated (0.6) with the one reported in Jay 
Ritter’s website, but single average figures are slightly different due to the use of different sample periods. Most 
of Jay Ritter’s country IPO data go back to the 1970s, while ours start in the 1990s. The representativeness of our 
sample is also confirmed by the high correlation (0.7) of our underpricing figures with Banerjee et al. (2011).  




updated in 2015) ranges from 1979 to 2011 which is considerably different from our sample 
size. Moreover, a recent study by Minardi et al. (2015) reports an average underpricing of 4.5% 
for Brazilian IPOs from 2004 to 2012 (similar to our sample period). Therefore, we believe that 
the underpricing for Brazil in our sample would not affect our results.17 
In the second part of the analysis, we test the moderation effect that financial integration 
plays on the explanatory power of country institutions on underpricing. Table 3 presents the 
summary statistics of the variables used to proxy for different country-level institutional 
settings. Firstly, the correlation of different proxies is encouraging as it shows similar patterns 
across countries. The Investor Protection Index finds financially dominated countries/districts 
such as Hong Kong and Singapore among the highest ranked, while developing countries such 
as the Philippines and China are among the worst in protecting the minority investors, which is 
consistent with our expectation. To our surprise, Luxembourg shows a relatively low protection 
and the U.S., Germany and Sweden are only positioned around the average (even if still ranked 
above many other countries we would expect to have a lower protection). We find an 
explanation of this puzzle in the next index which measures the effectiveness of legal 
enforcement (PEI). In fact, the countries mentioned above show the highest value of legal 
enforcement, alongside Canada, Sweden and others, which makes up the relatively weak 
investor protection. The U.S. however, still remains a puzzle, which is solved when the overall 
legal system is considered (RLI). In fact, the U.S. is ranked top with other more efficient markets 
such as Australia, Canada, Hong Kong, Japan, Singapore, Scandinavian countries and the UK. 
Similar results are also found for the Corruption Perception Index, which shows a very high 
correlation (0.97) with the Rule of Law Index. Finally, we find that 34% of the countries in our 
study are originated from the English Common Law system. 
                                                 
17 As a robustness check, we have run the models excluding IPOs from Brazil and the results do not change much. 




3.3.3 Hierarchical Linear Modelling  
We do not use OLS estimation which is a widely-adopted method in the IPO literature 
(even if we provide results with this methodology as a robustness check). Since our data clearly 
shows a hierarchical structure with IPOs nesting within the same country sharing similar 
patterns, Hierarchical Linear Modelling (HLM) (Raudenbush and Bryk, 1992) allows us to test 
the country institutions and control for the country effect at the same time, without violating 
the independence assumption of residuals. This methodology is also used by Engelen and Essen 
(2010). As Garson (2013) points out, in the presence of a nesting or clustering structure, 
observations from the same group are not independent and the standard errors of the predicted 
parameters by an OLS regression are underestimated. As a result, wrong or imprecise inferences 
might be made. 
Particularly, we use a two-level HLM, where levels 1 and 2 represent respectively 
individual IPOs and countries which are treated as a random sample from a wider population. 
As a rule of thumb, a good HLM estimation needs at least 20 observations at level 2, and our 
dataset meets this requirement with 37 countries included. Among the different specifications 
of an HLM, we use a random intercept model, which allows for the level 1 intercept to shift 
between countries (i.e. the random factor is the country variable where correlated errors are 
created and slopes are parallel lines between countries).18 In the random intercept model, the 
intercept of the IPO performance at level 1 is then modelled as a random effect of the relative 
country at level 2.  The specification for hypothesis one is as follows: 
 
H1: 𝑈𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐼𝐹𝐼𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡 + 𝜇𝑗 + 𝑖𝑗𝑡 Equation 
3 
                                                 
18 The other model is the random slope model, which allows the slope to differ across countries. In order to choose 
between these two models, we use a likelihood ratio test and the random intercept model is more appropriate. 





Where 𝑈𝑖𝑗𝑡  is the underpricing level for IPO 𝑖  in country 𝑗  in year 𝑡 ; 𝐼𝐹𝐼𝑗𝑡  is the level of 
international financial integration for country 𝑗 in year 𝑡; 𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡 represents a vector of the control 
variables; 𝜇𝑗 is the random country effect shifting the regression line between countries; and 
𝑖𝑗𝑡 is the overall error term at level 1.
19 
As mentioned in the data section above, we include five different country-level 
institutional variables to test the second hypothesis. In order to test the moderation effect, we 
follow the method used in Doidge et al. (2013) and use the interaction between international 
financial integration and each of the five institutional variables in order to capture that effect. 
As Baron and Kenny (1986) suggest that the specification should also include the two main 
effects in the interaction term, the specification for the second hypothesis is as follows:  
 
H2: 𝑈𝑖𝑗𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐼𝐹𝐼𝑗𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐼𝑗 + 𝛽3(𝐼𝐹𝐼𝑗𝑡 × 𝐼𝑗) + 𝛽4𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑡
+ 𝜇𝑗 + 𝑖𝑗𝑡 
Equation 4 
 
where 𝐼𝑗  is the institutional variable for country 𝑗 ; the variable of interest—
(𝐼𝐹𝐼𝑗𝑡 ∗ 𝐼𝑗)—is the interaction term between the level of international financial integration of 
country j and the country j institutional variable; all other variables are the same as in Equation 
(3). 
We start with a two-level null model to partition the variance in level 1 and level 2. For 
reasons of economy, and also considering that the model is simple, we do not report the 
                                                 
19 Note that the random effect μj and the overall error term 𝑖𝑗𝑡 are independent of each other. 




intermediate results. The model shows a between-country variance at 95.87 and a level 1 
variance at 1935.45. Therefore, the between-country differences could explain about 5% of the 


































Obs Mean StD Min Max 
       
IR 
Initial Return (%), which measures the level of underpricing: difference 
between the offer price and the closing price of first trading day. Source: 
Thomson One 
8954 26.62 45.47 -34.58 890 
VB 
A dummy variable that equals 1 if the IPO is venture capital backed; 0 
otherwise. Source: Thomson One 
8954 0.26 0.44 0 1 
BB 
A dummy variable that equals 1 if the IPO method is bookbuilding; 0 
otherwise. Source: Thomson One 
8954 0.68 0.47 0 1 
LSIZE Natural log of the total proceeds of the IPOs. Source: Thomson One 8954 3.29 1.79 -6.91 9.72 
VOLUME 
For each country-year companion, it is one year's number of IPOs in this 
country divided by the total number of IPOs throughout the sample period in 
this country, expressed in 100%. Source: Thomson One. 
8954 6.92 3.01 0.4 31.23 
MRETURN 
Market return: 3-month cumulative market return before the IPO date, based 
on the market index in DataStream. Source: DataStream 
8954 3.81 9.71 -40.46 80.16 
TURNOVER 
Stock market turnover: annual turnover by value in the year of IPO. Source: 
DataStream 
8954 937.69 466.45 4.17 4227.25 
IFI 
International financial integration: a country's total external assets and 
liabilities divided by its GDP, expressed in 100%. This volume-based 
method is firstly recorded in Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2003), and further 
explored and updated in Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007). For each company, 
the IFI of the country where it is first listed has been included. The most 
updated data is directly collected from Professor Philip R. Lane’s website.  
































Table 1 Variables Description (Continued)  
Variable Description 
Statistics 
Obs Mean StD Min Max 
       
IPI  
Investor Protection Index: measures the level of the legal protection of 
minority investors in one country; it ranges from 0 to 10 with higher values 
representing better protection. For each company, the IPI of the country 
where it is first listed has been included. This data is directly collected from 
the website of the Doing Business project by the World Bank. 
8548 6.499 0.936 4.2 8.2 
PEI 
Public Enforcement Index: measures the effectiveness of one country's legal 
enforcement, i.e. court enforcement; it ranges from 0 to 1 with higher values 
representing more effective legal enforcement (Djankov et al., 2008). For 
each company, the PEI of the country where it is first listed has been 
included. This data is directly collected from Professor Rafael La Porta’s 
website. . 
8548 0.181 0.338 0 1 
RLI 
Rule of Law Index: measures the overall quality of the legal framework, 
with higher values representing better legal systems. This data is 
constructed by the World Justice Project and collected from their website. 
For each company, the RLI of the country where it is first listed has been 
included.  
8095 0.694 0.109 0.45 0.88 
CPI 
Corruption Perception Index: measures the level of the overall corruption, 
with 0 representing the most corrupted system. This data is constructed by 
Transparency International and collected from their website. For each 
company, the CPI of the country where it is first listed has been included.  
8539 68.29 14.85 34 92 
ENGLISH 
A dummy variable, which equals 1 if the country’s legal system originates 
from the English Common Law system. It is recorded in La Porta et al. 
(1998). For each company, the ENGLISH dummy of the country where it is 
first listed has been included.  
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Table 2 IPO Underpricing by Country, 1995-2011 
Country  Mean Std N Min Max 
Argentina 29.58 41.11 6 0.38 108.19 
Australia 19.54 38.07 798 -29.05 265.31 
Austria 6.46 12.73 10 -8.57 27.78 
Belgium 8.03 11.48 39 -2.93 45.45 
Brazil 8.01 26.50 36 -12.5 153.94 
Canada 24.95 41.68 286 -25.64 219.32 
China 50.03 58.18 1390 -28.42 281.08 
Cyprus 10.26 11.29 6 2.50 32.84 
Denmark 11.07 18.45 9 -11.29 51.35 
Finland 9.60 28.78 9 -26.71 80.72 
France 3.29 10.10 237 -26.26 40.13 
Germany 24.75 112.17 83 -16.00 890.00 
Greece 17.88 43.31 49 -34.58 183.33 
Hong Kong 14.80 33.85 332 -29.13 235.55 
India 21.99 41.51 80 -29.14 213.82 
Indonesia 21.94 32.04 79 -24.00 169.57 
Israel 17.20 25.38 68 -14.93 99.05 
Italy 4.67 8.24 57 -5.45 38.50 
Japan 40.32 48.06 259 -29.01 241.15 
Luxembourg 6.59 9.75 10 -8.00 25.40 
Malaysia 28.15 47.01 251 -29.08 267.24 
Mexico 8.51 12.59 9 -5.45 37.86 
Netherlands 11.80 27.64 29 -9.45 137.19 
New Zealand 12.43 17.35 30 -28.96 55.70 
Norway 2.58 9.11 54 -23.19 40.30 
Philippines 8.66 19.04 18 -17.44 50.27 
Poland 22.74 33.79 28 -12.70 131.26 
Singapore 22.38 40.30 183 -25.98 208.09 
South Africa 24.36 40.86 11 -0.57 143.09 
Spain 5.29 8.89 10 -3.09 19.10 
Sweden 20.69 53.97 26 -22.17 230.00 
Switzerland 9.46 14.11 25 -10.14 45.83 
Taiwan 22.78 39.10 449 -11.40 233.36 
Thailand 22.32 39.10 156 -26.60 184.38 
Turkey 7.97 13.23 7 -4.66 31.03 
United Kingdom 16.55 29.07 442 -26.16 276.09 
United States 25.37 42.73 3383 -29.17 281.71 
Total 26.62 45.47 8953 -34.58 890 
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Table 3 Institutional Variables by Country 
Country IPI PEI RLI CPI ENGLISH 
Argentina 5.80 0.00 0.50 34.00 0 
Australia 5.70 0.50 0.80 80.00 1 
Austria 6.30 1.00 0.82 72.00 0 
Belgium 6.20 0.50 0.76 76.00 0 
Brazil 6.30 0.50 0.54 43.00 0 
Canada 7.30 1.00 0.78 81.00 1 
China 4.50 0.00 0.45 36.00 0 
Cyprus 6.80 / / / 0 
Denmark 6.80 0.75 0.88 92.00 0 
Finland 5.60 0.00 0.84 89.00 0 
France 6.80 0.50 0.74 69.00 0 
Germany 5.90 1.00 0.80 79.00 0 
Greece 5.80 0.50 0.59 43.00 0 
Hong Kong 8.10 0.00 0.76 74.00 1 
India 7.30 0.50 0.48 38.00 1 
Indonesia 6.10 0.00 0.52 34.00 0 
Israel 7.10 1.00 / 60.00 1 
Italy 6.70 0.00 0.63 43.00 0 
Japan 6.30 0.00 0.78 76.00 0 
Luxembourg 4.70 1.00 / 82.00 0 
Malaysia 7.40 1.00 0.58 52.00 1 
Mexico 5.80 0.50 0.45 35.00 0 
Netherlands 5.20 0.00 0.83 83.00 0 
New Zealand 8.20 0.00 0.83 91.00 1 
Norway 7.00 1.00 0.88 86.00 0 
Philippines 4.20 0.00 0.50 38.00 0 
Poland 6.30 1.00 0.67 61.00 0 
Singapore 8.00 1.00 0.79 84.00 1 
South Africa 6.80 0.00 0.55 44.00 1 
Spain 6.40 1.00 0.67 60.00 0 
Sweden 6.30 1.00 0.85 87.00 0 
Switzerland 5.50 0.75 / 86.00 0 
Taiwan 6.40 0.00 / 61.00 0 
Thailand 6.60 0.00 0.52 38.00 1 
Turkey 6.90 0.00 0.50 45.00 0 
United Kingdom 7.80 0.00 0.78 78.00 1 
United States 6.60 0.00 0.71 74.00 1 
Mean 6.35 0.43 0.66 61.71 0.31 
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3.4 Results and Robustness Tests 
3.4.1 Tests on the Direct Effect of Financial Integration 
Table 4 reports the main results for the first hypothesis and the following discussion is 
focused on the coefficients reported in column 1, which is the base model using International 
Financial Integration (IFI). Consistent with the expectation, the finding shows that international 
financial integration at the country level reduces the IPO underpricing, improving the valuation 
certainty through a more efficient intermediation process. It also supports the argument in law 
and finance literature that the cost of external financing caused by information asymmetry and 
agency costs is reduced by increasing financial globalization (Stulz, 1999). With a standard 
deviation of 45.47 and 500.62 for initial returns and international financial integration 
respectively (see Table 1), a coefficient of -0.015 on IFI means that one standard deviation 
increase in IFI results in a 0.17 standard deviation decrease in the level of IPO underpricing. It 
also suggests that a 66% increase in IFI results in a 1% decrease in the level of underpricing, 
holding other variables constant. Using Taiwan as an example, financial integration doubled 
from 2002 (160%) to 2007 (320%) which would reduce the underpricing by over 3% on average. 
Considering the average size of an IPO and the money it leaves on the table, the result suggests 
an economically significant impact of international financial integration on the average 
underpricing.  
Firm- and issuing-level control variables generally show expected signs which are 
consistent with most of the previous empirical findings. If we recall the detailed review on the 
roles of venture capitalists in IPO events in Chapter 2, many of the early studies based on the 
U.S. market find a negative relationship between the venture-capital status and the level of 
underpricing, supporting the certification role of venture capitalists proposed by Megginson 
and Weiss (1991). However, the reversed relationship has also been widely documented (Boeh 
and Dunbar, 2016, Guo et al., 2006, Liu and Ritter, 2011), supporting the analyst-lust theory by 
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Liu and Ritter (2011) who argue that venture capitalists have a great desire to attract the all-star 
analysts’ coverage which can affect that price on the day when the shares are distributed to the 
limited shareholders, leading to a higher underpricing. We find a positive effect of the venture-
capital status on the level of underpricing which further supports the analyst-lust theory. 
As we have mentioned, bookbuilding status and company size are commonly-used 
measures for the ex-ante uncertainty about the valuation where the bookbuilding technique or 
big company size is associated with a lower level of information asymmetry. The findings of 
the negative effects of the bookbuilding technique and the size of the company on IPO 
underpricing further supports this argument and are in line with the majority of the empirical 
studies supporting the classic theories (Beaty and Ritter, 1986, Benveniste and Spindt, 1989, 
Reber and Vencappa, 2016, Rock, 1986). 
We find a 0.5% reduction in IPO underpricing for each percentage point increase in the 
cumulative market return during the three months prior to the deal (MRETURN), which supports 
the ‘hot issue’ period argument by Ritter (1984) and the behavioural arguments that higher pre-
IPO market return indicates higher sentiment demand from exuberant  investors which leads to 
higher initial returns (Ljungqvist et al., 2006, Loughran and Ritter, 2002, Reber and Vencappa, 
2016). 
A positive relationship between VOLUME and underpricing is also identified in that we 
find that the IPOs issued in a year with a relative higher volume of IPO deals experience lower 
underpricing. This actually supports the information revelation argument by Altı (2005) who 
points out that there is an unknown common factor about the IPO valuation. This private 
information about the common factor is gradually revealed by the outcomes of previous IPOs 
because the IPO offer price is set according to the indications of the participating investors’ 
interests. 
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Table 4 Direct Effect of Financial Integration on Underpricing (HLM) 
Dependent Variable 
Underpricing 
Hierarchical Linear Modelling 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 De facto    De jure 
 IFI Mixed-KOF FOI 
  EGI Actual Restrictions  
VB 8.547*** 8.926*** 8.778*** 9.029*** 9.250*** 
 1.168 1.219 1.219 1.223 1.176 
BB -13.58*** -19.38*** -20.73*** -18.21*** -13.94*** 
 -1.522 -1.774 -1.798 -1.799 -1.636 
LSIZE -1.018*** -1.104*** -1.048*** -1.047*** -1.418*** 
 -0.332 -0.356 -0.356 -0.358 -0.339 
VOLUME -0.772*** -0.356** -0.303* -0.339* -0.645*** 
 -0.164 -0.178 -0.177 -0.179 -0.168 
MRETURN 0.499*** 0.529*** 0.520*** 0.521*** 0.573*** 
 0.048 0.054 0.054 0.055 0.05 
TURNOVER -0.008*** -0.007*** -0.006*** -0.008*** -0.009*** 
 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
FG -0.015*** -0.464*** -0.355*** -0.243*** -10.74*** 
 -0.001 -0.082 -0.059 -0.082 -0.679 
Constant 44.20*** 71.11*** 60.71*** 56.43*** 55.40*** 
 2.885 6.665 4.893 7.341 3.444 
var(c.country) 121.9*** 102.5*** 97.38*** 131.4*** 185.4*** 
 33.75 29.8 28.15 36.69 52.87 
var(e.ir) 1,742*** 1,807*** 1,806*** 1,811*** 1,724*** 
 26.69 29.29 29.29 29.36 27.12 
Observations 8,546 7,630 7,630 7,630 8,114 
Number of groups 37 37 37 37 37 
This table presents the regression results of the IPO underpricing from 1995 to 2011, by multi-level modelling. IPO 
underpricing is firstly modelled on firm level and then on country level. A random intercept model is assumed that the intercept 
shifts between countries due to the random country effect. Models (1) to (5) present the results using different measures of 
financial globalization (FG). The baseline model is Model (1) which uses a de facto measurement of financial globalisation-
International Financial Integration (IFI). International Financial Integration is the percentage of total external assets and 
liabilities of one country to its GDP. Model (1) uses the full sample of 8546 observations from 37 countries. For the efficiency 
of the calculation, we choose countries which have a minimum number of IPOs equal or larger than 6. Model (2) uses a mixed 
measurement of financial globalization—the KOF Economic Globalization Index (EGI). The KOF Economic Globalization 
Index is the average of the actual flows and the restricted flows. Model (3) and (4) use the KOF actual flows (Actual) and the 
KOF restricted flows (Restrictions) separately. Model (5) uses the de jure measurement of financial globalization—Financial 
Openness Index (FOI) by Chinn and Ito (2006). It measures the country’s capital account openness based on its restrictions on 
the cross-border financial transactions. The dependent variable is Underpricing which is the initial return between the first-
trading day closing price and the IPO offer price, expressed as a percentage. VB captures the venture-backed status of the IPO 
firm and equals 1 if the IPO is venture capital-backed. BB is a dummy variable and equals 1 if the IPO uses book-building as 
an issuing technique. LSIZE is the offer size of the IPO, expressed in logarithm. VOLUME, for each country-year companion, 
is the number of IPOs in a certain year in one country divided by the total number of IPOs throughout the sample period in this 
country. MRETURN is the 3-month cumulative market return before the IPO, based on the country market index in DataStream. 
TURNOVER is the stock turnover by value recorded in DataStream which is the value of the shares traded divided by the 
average market capitalization. The figures below each coefficient are the standard errors. Significance at 10%, 5% and 1% 
levels are marked with *, **, and *** respectively. 
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 De facto    De jure 
 IFI Mixed-KOF FOI 
  EGI Actual Restrictions  
VB 9.301*** 7.896*** 7.553*** 11.37*** 13.32*** 
 1.175 1.237 1.225 1.209 1.176 
BB -10.70*** -19.40*** -24.76*** -8.438*** -2.545** 
 -1.291 -1.506 -1.818 -1.407 -1.260 
LSIZE 1.154*** 0.352 1.063*** 0.404 -0.503* 
 0.301 0.319 0.32 0.325 -0.298 
VOLUME -0.534*** -0.236 -0.05 -0.328** -0.657*** 
 -0.146 -0.157 -0.154 -0.161 -0.149 
MRETURN 0.439*** 0.538*** 0.470*** 0.563*** 0.593*** 
 0.064 0.071 0.073 0.074 0.064 
TURNOVER -0.002** -0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 
 -0.009 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
FG -0.009*** -0.957*** -0.519*** -0.601*** -8.677*** 
 -0.001 -0.059 -0.038 -0.049 -0.480 
Constant 34.48*** 101.3*** 65.93*** 75.91*** 42.66*** 
 1.785 5.215 3.535 4.716 2.033 
Observations 8546 7630 7630 7630 8114 
R-squared 0.035 0.069 0.052 0.051 0.079 
This table presents the OLS regression results of the IPO underpricing from 1995 to 2011. Models (1) to (5) present the results 
with five different measures of financial globalization (FG). Model (1) uses a de facto measurement of financial globalisation-
International Financial Integration (IFI). International Financial Integration is the percentage of total external assets and 
liabilities of one country to its GDP. Model (1) uses the full sample of 8546 observations. Model (2) uses a mixed measure of 
financial globalization—KOF Economic Globalization (KOF). The KOF Economic Globalization Index is the average of the 
actual flows and the restricted flows. Model (3) and (4) use the KOF actual flows (Actual) and the KOF restricted flows 
(Restrictions) separately. All indices are log-transformed. Model (5) uses the de jure measurement of financial globalization - 
Financial Openness Index (FOI). It measures the country’s capital account openness based on its restrictions on the cross-
border financial transactions. The dependent variable is Underpricing which is the initial return between the first-trading day 
closing price and the IPO offer price, expressed as a percentage. VB captures the venture-backed status of the IPO firm and 
equals 1 if the IPO is venture capital-backed. BB is a dummy variable and equal to 1 if the IPO uses book-building as an issuing 
technique. LSIZE is the offer size of the IPO, expressed in logarithm. VOLUME, for each country-year companion, is the 
number of IPOs in a certain year in one country divided by the total number of IPOs throughout the sample period in this 
country. MRETURN is the 3-month cumulative market return before the IPO, based on the country market index in DataStream. 
TURNOVER is the stock turnover by value recorded in DataStream which is the value of the shares traded divided by the 
average market capitalization. The figures below each coefficient are the standard errors. Significance at 10%, 5% and 1% 
levels are marked with *, **, and *** respectively. 
 
 
We also compare the HLM estimates with simple OLS estimates. Results are presented 
in Model (1) in Table 5. According to Garson (2013), even though the second level random 
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factor should have no effect on the means of individual observations in the first level, it can 
change the covariance structure and hence make the estimates inefficient, reducing standard 
errors. All the results remain similar in the OLS estimation, with the exception of offer size that 
would seem to have a positive impact on underpricing, contrary to previous studies and our 
main HML approach. Moreover, the OLS model underestimates the effect of financial 
integration on underpricing by approximately 50%. The differences in our results are due to the 
random factors at level 2 which are not explicitly modelled in an OLS estimation. We also test 
for model preference using a likelihood ratio, which indicates that HLM, accounting for the 
country random effect, is to be preferred to an OLS estimation. Notwithstanding the normal use 
of simple OLS models in international IPO studies, we find overall confirmation that an HML 
structure should be adopted to research a micro-level phenomenon (underpricing) using a 
macroeconomic country-level argument.  
3.4.2 Tests on the Moderation Effect of International Financial Integration 
The baseline results on the second hypothesis are presented in Table 6. Models (1) to 
(5) include each of the country-level institutional variables respectively. Overall, the inclusion 
of country institutions in our models does not alter the significant and negative impact of 
international financial integration on IPO underpricing. At the same time, we find that a better 
legal protection of minority investors (IPI), a higher-quality legal framework (RLI), a more 
effective public enforcement (PEI), a lower level of corruption (CPI) and the existence of an 
English common law-based system (ENGLISH) in a country reduce the uncertainty of the ex-
ante IPO valuation and hence level of underpricing, consistent with the other cross-country IPO 
studies mentioned above. These results provide further support to the recent development in the 
IPO literature which suggests that classic theories are not sufficient to account for the IPO 
outcomes and other factors, such as macroeconomic conditions, could also affect the IPO 
activities.   
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Table 6 Indirect Effect of Financial Integration on Cross- country IPO Underpricing 
Dependent Variable 
Underpricing 
Hierarchical Linear Modelling 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 IPI PEI RLI CPI ENGLISH 
VB 8.810*** 8.488*** 9.107*** 9.108*** 8.871*** 
 1.159 1.166 1.180 1.161 1.163 
BB -11.75*** -14.52*** -14.36*** -11.01*** -11.44*** 
 -1.512 -1.531 -1.635 -1.542 -1.54 
LSIZE -1.612*** -1.050*** -1.441*** -1.322*** -1.202*** 
 -0.332 -0.333 -0.341 -0.332 -0.333 
VOLUME -0.946*** -0.750*** -0.642*** -0.927*** -0.935*** 
 -0.163 -0.164 -0.168 -0.165 -0.165 
MRETURN 0.532*** 0.497*** 0.585*** 0.539*** 0.529*** 
 0.047 0.047 0.050 0.047 0.047 
TURNOVER -0.010*** -0.008*** -0.007*** -0.011*** -0.011*** 
 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
IFI -0.087*** -0.016*** -0.220*** -0.069*** -0.040*** 
 -0.027 -0.001 -0.054 -0.019 -0.008 
Institution -17.37*** -20.47*** -165.5*** -1.091*** -33.20*** 
 -1.425 -4.122 -15.28 -0.102 -3.749 
Interaction 0.012*** 0.015*** 0.287*** 0.001*** 0.036*** 
 0.003 0.004 0.071 0.000 0.008 
Constant 156.7*** 50.04*** 153.6*** 112.4*** 63.54*** 
 9.913 3.065 10.80 7.298 4.146 
var(c.country) 104.7*** 103.3*** 184.5*** 249.2*** 165.7*** 
 34.10 30.22 56.50 73.95 50.58 
var(e.ir) 1,711*** 1,738*** 1,722*** 1,710*** 1,722*** 
 26.23 26.63 27.13 26.22 26.39 
Observations 8546 8546 8093 8537 8546 
Number of groups 37 37 37 37 37 
This table presents the regression results of the IPO underpricing from 1995 to 2011, by multi-level modelling. IPO 
underpricing is firstly modelled on firm level and then on country level. A random intercept model assumes that the intercept 
shifts between countries due to the random country effect. Models (1) to (5) present the results including five different country-
level institutional variables respectively. The dependent variable is Underpricing which is the initial return between the first-
trading day closing price and the IPO offer price, expressed as a percentage. VB captures the venture-backed status of the IPO 
firm and equal to 1 if the IPO is venture capital-backed. BB is a dummy variable and equal to 1 if the IPO uses book-building 
as an issuing technique. LSIZE is the offer size of the IPO, expressed in logarithm. VOLUME, for each country-year companion, 
is the number of IPOs in a certain year in one country divided by the total number of IPOs throughout the sample period in this 
country. MRETURN is the 3-month cumulative market return before the IPO, based on the country market index in DataStream. 
TURNOVER is the stock turnover by value recorded in DataStream which is the value of the shares traded divided by the 
average market capitalization. IFI is the International Financial Integration which is the percentage of total external assets and 
liabilities of one country to its GDP. Institution represents each of the five country-level institutional variables from Model (1) 
to (5). IPI is the Investor Protection Index, which measures the level of legal protection of minority investors in one country; 
it ranges from 0 to 10 with higher values representing better protection. PEI is the Public Enforcement Index which measures 
the effectiveness of one country's legal enforcement, i.e. court enforcement; it ranges from 0 to 1 with higher values representing 
more effective legal enforcement. RLI is the Rule of Law Index, which measures the overall quality of the legal framework; it 
ranges from 0 to 100 with higher values representing a better legal system. CPI is the Corruption Perception Index, which 
measures the level of the overall corruption; it ranges from 0 to 100 with 0 representing the most corrupted system. ENGLISH 
is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the country’s legal system originates from the English Common Law; 0 otherwise. The 
variable of interest here is Interaction, which is the interaction term between each of these institutional variables and IFI, i.e. 
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Interaction in Model (1) is equal to IPI*IFI. The figures below each coefficient are the standard errors. Significance at 10%, 
5% and 1% levels are marked with *, **, and *** respectively. 
 
 
However, the significantly positive coefficient of the interaction term (IFI x Institutions) 
signals that international financial integration acts as a moderation effect, reducing the extent 
to which country institutions affect the level of IPO underpricing. In other words, in a country 
which is more financially integrated with the global markets, institutional characteristics show 
a weaker effect on the IPO underpricing. This finding supports our second hypothesis and the 
argument in law and finance literature that financial globalization weakens the influences of 
country institutions in corporate finance activities. It is also consistent with Doidge et al. (2013) 
who find that financial globalization reduces the impact that country institutions have on the 
IPO issuances (size and numbers). 
Particularly, in Model (1), the negative relationship between the level of minority 
investor protection (IPI) and the level of IPO underpricing is consistent with Banerjee et al. 
(2011), Engelen and Essen (2010) and Hopp and Dreher (2013), who argue that more 
underpricing is required to compensate the minority investors in a country where the investor’s 
protection is insufficient. We show that this effect is weakened by improvements in the level of 
international financial integration. Models (2), (3), (4) and (5) also show a reduction in the 
direct negative relationship between underpricing and the level of Public Enforcement Index 
(PEI), the Rule of Law Index (RLI), the Corruption Perception Index (CPI) and the English 
common law dummy (ENGLISH) due to higher levels of international financial integration. 
Finally, we find that the results on the control variables do not change significantly compared 
to Model (1) in Table 4. 
The interpretation of the interaction term between two continuous variables is not as 
straightforward as the one between categorical variables. For example, in Model (5) the high 
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absolute value of ENGLISH indicates that the average IPO underpricing in English common 
law countries is 33.2% lower than elsewhere. However, the positive coefficient of the 
interaction term indicates that this prominent impact is somewhat weakened by the increase in 
the level of international financial integration. When the level of international financial 
integration increases by 100%, the decrease in the average underpricing caused by the English 
common law system is reduced by 3.6%. However, the interpretation of the interaction term 
between two continuous variables, as in Models (1), (2), (3), and (4) in Table 6, requires more 
caution. Therefore, we estimate the models in which we re-centre international financial 




𝐼𝐹𝐼_𝐿𝑜𝑤 = 𝐼𝐹𝐼 − (𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛𝐼𝐹𝐼 − 1𝑠𝑑) Equation 5 
 
𝐼𝐹𝐼_𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ = 𝐼𝐹𝐼 − (𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛𝐼𝐹𝐼 + 1𝑠𝑑) Equation 6 
 
This procedure allows us to hold the international financial integration constant at ‘high’ 
(IFI_Low in Equation 6) and ‘low’ (IFI_High in Equation 5) values and compute the slopes of 
the country institutional variables under these two scenarios.  
With financial integration assuming a value of zero, 𝛽2  in Equation (4) simply 
represents the overall impact of country institutions (I) on IPO underpricing. However, the level 
of international financial integration is unlikely to reach a value of zero or below as there are 
hardly any countries showing zero financial contact with the rest of the world. Hence, by 
subtracting (𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛𝐼𝐹𝐼 − 1𝑠𝑑) or (𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛𝐼𝐹𝐼 + 1𝑠𝑑) from IFI respectively, a value of zero for 
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the newly constructed international financial integration is made meaningful. For example, 
𝐼𝐹𝐼_𝐿𝑜𝑤 can take the value of zero when international financial integration is held constant at 
one standard deviation below its mean ((𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛𝐼𝐹𝐼 − 1𝑠𝑑)). The interpretation of 𝛽2 becomes 
straightforward as it simply represents the effect of country institutions on the level of 
underpricing, given a constant low/high level of financial integration (one standard deviation 
below/above the mean). Therefore, comparing the slopes on country institutional variables 
when international financial integration moves from a low to a high value, we expect the slope 
to flatten (i.e. the absolute value of the 𝛽2 coefficient to decrease). 
Estimation results are reported in Table 7 with Models (1) to (4) presenting estimations 
for four different country institutions: IPI, PEI, RLI and CPI. Under each model, we report two 
equations for international financial integration held at low (a) or high (b) values respectively. 
Interaction_Low and Interaction_High are the interaction terms between each of the country 
institutions and IFI_Low and IFI_High respectively. All the results on the control variables 
remain similar to the baseline results. As expected, Model (1) shows that the absolute value of 
the coefficient for Institution (IPI) decreases when international financial integration moves 
from low (Model (1a)) to high (Model (1b)) values. More specifically, a one unit increase in 
the level of investor protection results in a 18.99% decrease in the average underpricing when 
international financial integration is held at one standard deviation below its mean. However, 
the drop is reduced to 7.07% when international financial integration is increased by two 
standard deviations or held at one standard deviation above its mean. The same pattern is found 
on the remaining country institutional variables. The impact falls from 22.49% to 7.62% for 
law enforcement (PEI) and 1.21% to 0.30% for the corruption level (CPI). The only 
unconventional result is obtained with the rule of law index, which shows a positive (albeit 
insignificant) coefficient when international financial integration is high (see Model (3b)). This 
result indicates that international financial integration might not only decrease the impact of 
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country institutions on IPO underpricing, but also change the direction of their impact. Overall, 
the empirical results reported in Table 7 further support our second hypothesis and reinforce 
the evidence of the moderation effect of international financial integration in the relationship 
between the country institutions and the firm-level IPO underpricing. Further robustness tests 
are reported in the next section. 
3.4.3 Robustness Tests 
To test that our results are not driven by the choice of the financial integration measure, 
we use alternative measures to estimate models for the first hypothesis. Since international 
financial integration is a de facto measure, we then use a de jure measure and a mixed measure 
instead. Firstly, we employ the KOF Index of Globalization20 and, similarly to Doidge et al. 
(2013), focus on one of its three components: Economic Globalization Index (EGI). This 
measure is constructed using an equally weighted combination of actual flows (de facto 
measure) and economic restrictions (de jure measure). We also test our models adopting these 
two components separately. The de facto measure of the actual flows is made by trade (22%), 
foreign direct investment (27%), portfolio investment (24%) and income payments to foreign 
nationals (27%), all as a percentage of GDP. The de jure measure of restrictions is computed 
using hidden import barriers (23%), mean tariff rate (28%), taxes on international trade (26%) 
and capital account restrictions (23%). Results reported in Models (2) to (4) in Table 4 are very 
similar to the baseline results in Model (1). A 1% increase in EGI results in a 0.46% reduction 
in the level of IPO underpricing. This impact reduces to 0.35% and 0.24% in Model (3) and (4), 
indicating that the actual flows of globalisation seems to have a stronger impact than the 
globalization measured by restrictions. As a further robustness check we adopt a de jure 
measure of financial integration constructed by Chinn and Ito (2006)—Financial Openness 
                                                 
20 The KOF index is constructed by the KOF Swiss Economic Institute and is updated annually. The overall index 
consists of 36% economic globalization, 37% social globalization and 27% political globalization. The data and 
details on the index construction are available on the website: http://globalization.kof.ethz.ch/. 
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Index (FOI). The Financial Openness Index (FOI) measures a country’s capital account 
openness based on its restrictions on cross-border financial transactions.21  Restrictions are 
reported in the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions 
(AREAER). Consistent with previous findings, we confirm the significant effects of the 
international financial integration on IPO underpricing.  
We also use all these alternative proxies for financial integration in the OLS estimations, 
reporting results in Models (2) to (5) in Table 5. As not much changes, they further confirm the 
main findings.  
In the previous section, we strengthen the inference of our second hypothesis 
(moderation effect) by holding the international financial integration (IFI) constant at high and 
low levels, as in Table 7. We further test the robustness of the results replacing the measure of 
international financial integration with the Financial Openness Index in Table 8. The results on 
FOI, country institutions, interaction terms and control variables are not significantly different 
from the baseline results presented in Table 6. 
  
                                                 






























Table 7 Interpretation of the Moderation Effect: Constant Low/High Value of IFI  
Dependent Variable 
Underpricing 
Hierarchical Linear Modelling 
(1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) (3a) (3b) (4a) (4b) 
 IPI PEI RLI CPI 
 Low High Low High Low High Low High 
VB 8.810*** 8.810*** 8.488*** 8.488*** 9.107*** 9.107*** 9.108*** 9.108*** 
 1.159 1.159 1.166 1.166 1.18 1.18 1.161 1.161 
BB -11.75*** -11.75*** -14.52*** -14.52*** -14.36*** -14.36*** -11.01*** -11.01*** 
 -1.512 -1.512 -1.531 -1.531 -1.635 -1.635 -1.542 -1.542 
LSIZE -1.612*** -1.612*** -1.050*** -1.050*** -1.441*** -1.441*** -1.322*** -1.322*** 
 -0.332 -0.332 -0.333 -0.333 -0.341 -0.341 -0.332 -0.332 
VOLUME -0.946*** -0.946*** -0.750*** -0.750*** -0.642*** -0.642*** -0.927*** -0.927*** 
 -0.163 -0.163 -0.164 -0.164 -0.168 -0.168 -0.165 -0.165 
MRETURN 0.532*** 0.532*** 0.497*** 0.497*** 0.585*** 0.585*** 0.539*** 0.539*** 
 0.047 0.047 0.047 0.047 0.050 0.050 0.047 0.047 
TURNOVER -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.011*** -0.011*** 
 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
IFI_Low -0.087***  -0.016***  -0.220***  -0.069***  
 -0.027  -0.001  -0.054  -0.019  
IFI_High  -0.087***  -0.016***  -0.220***  -0.069*** 
  -0.027  -0.001  -0.054  -0.019 
Institution -18.99*** -7.070*** -22.49*** -7.616*** -204.6*** 83.20 -1.215*** -0.304 






Table 7 Interpretation of the Moderation Effect: Constant Low/High Value of IFI (Continued)  
Dependent Variable 
Underpricing 
Hierarchical Linear Modelling 
(1a) (1b) (2a) (2b) (3a) (3b) (4a) (4b) 
Interaction_Low 0.012***  0.015***  0.287***  0.001***  
 0.003  0.004  0.071  0.000  
Interaction_High  0.012***  0.015***  0.287***  0.001*** 
  0.003  0.004  0.071  0.000 
Constant 168.6*** 81.25*** 52.27*** 35.91*** 183.5*** -36.40 121.8*** 52.61*** 
 12.15 20.54 3.103 3.090 16.04 42.30 8.629 15.49 
var(c.country) 104.7*** 104.7*** 103.3*** 103.3*** 184.5*** 184.5*** 249.2*** 249.2*** 
 34.10 34.10 30.22 30.22 56.50 56.50 73.95 73.95 
var(e.ir) 1,711*** 1,711*** 1,738*** 1,738*** 1,722*** 1,722*** 1,710*** 1,710*** 
 26.23 26.23 26.63 26.63 27.13 27.13 26.22 26.22 
Observations 8546 8546 8546 8546 8093 8093 8537 8537 
Number of groups 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 37 
This table presents the regression results of the IPO underpricing from 1995 to 2011, by multi-level modelling, when the moderator variable—international financial integration (IFI)—is held constant 
at low and high values for each institutional variable. IPO underpricing is firstly modelled on firm level and then on country level. A random intercept model assumes that the intercept shifts between 
countries due to the random country effect. Model (1) to (4) presents the results including four continuous country-level institutional variables respectively. The dependent variable is Underpricing 
which is the initial return between the first-trading day closing price and the IPO offer price, expressed as a percentage. VB captures the venture-backed status of the IPO firm and equals 1 if the IPO 
is venture capital-backed. BB is a dummy variable and equals 1 if the IPO uses book-building as an issuing technique. LSIZE is the offer size of the IPO, expressed in logarithm. VOLUME, for each 
country-year companion, is the number of IPOs in a certain year in one country divided by the total number of IPOs throughout the sample period in this country. MRETURN is the 3-month cumulative 
market return before the IPO, based on the country market index in DataStream. TURNOVER is the stock turnover by value recorded in DataStream which is the value of the shares traded divided by 
the average market capitalization. Under each model, there are two models – (a) and (b) - where IFI is held constant at low (IFI_Low) and high (IFI_High) values. IFI_Low is the international financial 
integration held constant at 1 standard deviation below the mean, and IFI_High is the international financial integration held constant at 1 standard deviation above the mean. International Financial 
integration is the percentage of total external assets and liabilities of one country to its GDP. Institution represents each of the four country-level institutional variables from Model (1) to (4). IPI is the 
Investor Protection Index, which measures the level of the legal protection of minority investors in one country; it ranges from 0 to 10 with higher values representing better protection. PEI is the 
Public Enforcement Index which measures the effectiveness of one country's legal enforcement, i.e. court enforcement; it ranges from 0 to 1 with higher values representing more effective legal 
enforcement. RLI is the Rule of Law Index, which measures the overall quality of the legal framework; it ranges from 0 to 100 with higher values representing better legal system. CPI is the Corruption 
Perception Index, which measures the level of the overall corruption; it ranges from 0 to 100 with 0 representing the most corrupted system. Interaction_Low and Interaction_High is the interaction 
term between each institutional variable and IFI_Low and IFI_High respectively; i.e. Interaction_Low in Model (1a) is equal to IPI*IFI_Low. The statistics shown under each coefficient are the 
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Table 8 Indirect Effect of Financial Openness Index on Cross-country IPO Underpricing 
Dependent Variable 
Underpricing 
Hierarchical Linear Modelling 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 IPI PEI RLI CPI ENGLISH 
VB 9.211*** 9.176*** 9.149*** 9.279*** 9.309*** 
 1.177 1.174 1.178 1.173 1.176 
BB -13.01*** -13.73*** -14.14*** -14.25*** -13.43*** 
 -1.641 -1.65 -1.639 -1.634 -1.624 
LSIZE -1.525*** -1.471*** -1.489*** -1.437*** -1.593*** 
 -0.337 -0.338 -0.339 -0.338 -0.339 
VOLUME -0.727*** -0.692*** -0.670*** -0.653*** -0.746*** 
 -0.167 -0.167 -0.168 -0.168 -0.167 
MRETURN 0.592*** 0.586*** 0.583*** 0.582*** 0.594*** 
 0.050 0.050 0.050 0.050 0.050 
TURNOVER -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.008*** -0.009*** -0.008*** 
 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
FOI -32.41*** -11.86*** -36.01*** -32.92*** -13.22*** 
 -5.104 -0.723 -6.962 -4.660 -1.188 
Institution -11.40*** -35.53*** -151.6*** -1.296*** -28.41*** 
 -1.521 -5.534 -25.11 -0.221 -4.111 
Interaction 4.522*** 13.98*** 56.55*** 0.567*** 13.40*** 
 0.827 2.377 12.01 0.097 2.107 
Constant 116.4*** 62.51*** 131.9*** 107.1*** 63.66*** 
 8.816 3.513 13.60 10.13 3.270 
var(c.country) 90.88*** 145.9*** 136.7*** 161.3*** 106.3*** 
 29.63 43.26 41.36 47.48 35.24 
var(e.ir) 1,717*** 1,717*** 1,722*** 1,715*** 1,717*** 
 -27.00 -27.00 -27.11 -27.00 -27.01 
Observations 8114 8114 8093 8105 8114 
Number of groups 37 37 37 37 37 
This table presents the regression results of the IPO underpricing from 1995 to 2011, by multi-level modelling, when the 
volume-based international financial integration is replaced with the de jure measure—Financial Openness Index (FOI). IPO 
underpricing is firstly modelled on firm level and then on country level. A random intercept model assumes that the intercept 
shifts between countries due to the random country effect. Models (1) to (5) present the results including five different country- 
level institutional variables respectively. Financial Openness Index (FOI) measures the country’s capital account openness 
based on its restrictions on the cross-border financial transactions. The dependent variable is Underpricing which is the initial 
return between the first-trading day closing price and the IPO offer price, expressed as a percentage. VB captures the venture-
backed status of the IPO firm and equals 1 if the IPO is venture capital-backed. BB is a dummy variable and equals 1 if the IPO 
uses book-building as an issuing technique. LSIZE is the offer size of the IPO, expressed in logarithm. VOLUME, for each 
country-year companion, is the number of IPOs in a certain year in one country divided by the total number of IPOs throughout 
the sample period in this country. MRETURN is the 3-month cumulative market return before the IPO, based on the country 
market index in DataStream. TURNOVER is the stock turnover by value recorded in DataStream which is the value of the 
shares traded divided by the average market capitalization. Institution represents each of the five country-level institutional 
variables from Model (1) to (5). IPI is the Investor Protection Index, which measures the level of the legal protection of minority 
investors in one country; it ranges from 0 to 10 with higher values representing better protection. PEI is the Public Enforcement 
Index which measures the effectiveness of one country's legal enforcement, i.e. court enforcement; it ranges from 0 to 1 with 
higher values representing more effective legal enforcement. RLI is the Rule of Law Index, which measures the overall quality 
of the legal framework; it ranges from 0 to 100 with higher values representing a better legal system. CPI is the Corruption 
Perception Index, which measures the level of the overall corruption; it ranges from 0 to 100 with 0 representing the most 
corrupted system. ENGLISH is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the country’s legal system originates from English Common 
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Law; 0 otherwise. The variable of interest here is Interaction, which is the interaction term between each of these institutional 
variables and FOI, i.e. Interaction in Model (1) is equal to IPI*FOI. The figures below each coefficient are the standard errors. 
Significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels is marked with *, **, and *** respectively. 
 
 
Table 9 Interaction between Mean-centred Financial Integration and Country Institutions 
Dependent Variable 
Underpricing 
Hierarchical Linear Modelling 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 Cen_IPI Cen_PEI Cen_RLI Cen_CPI Cen_ENGLISH 
VB 8.810*** 8.488*** 9.107*** 9.108*** 8.871*** 
 1.159 1.166 1.18 1.161 1.163 
BB -11.75*** -14.52*** -14.36*** -11.01*** -11.44*** 
 -1.512 -1.531 -1.635 -1.542 -1.540 
LSIZE -1.612*** -1.050*** -1.441*** -1.322*** -1.202*** 
 -0.332 -0.333 -0.341 -0.332 -0.333 
VOLUME -0.946*** -0.750*** -0.642*** -0.927*** -0.935*** 
 -0.163 -0.164 -0.168 -0.165 -0.165 
MRETURN 0.532*** 0.497*** 0.585*** 0.539*** 0.529*** 
 0.047 0.047 0.050 0.047 0.047 
TURNOVER -0.010*** -0.008*** -0.007*** -0.011*** -0.011*** 
 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
Cen_IFI -0.010* -0.014*** -0.020*** -0.007*** -0.040*** 
 -0.005 -0.001 -0.006 -0.003 -0.008 
Cen_Institution -13.03*** -15.05*** -60.70*** -0.759*** -20.20*** 
 -1.410 -3.280 -21.17 -0.099 -2.920 
Interaction 0.012*** 0.015*** 0.287*** 0.001*** 0.036*** 
 0.003 0.004 0.071 0.000 0.009 
Constant 40.22*** 41.36*** 31.44*** 35.35*** 49.10*** 
 2.790 2.820 3.772 3.552 3.396 
var(c.country) 104.7*** 103.3*** 184.5*** 249.2*** 165.7*** 
 34.10 30.22 56.50 73.95 50.58 
var(e.ir) 1,711*** 1,738*** 1,722*** 1,710*** 1,722*** 
 26.23 26.63 27.13 26.22 26.39 
Observations 8546 8546 8093 8537 8546 
Number of groups 37 37 37 37 37 
This table presents the regression results of the IPO underpricing from 1995 to 2011, by multi-level modelling, when the 
International Financial Integration and institutional variables are mean-centred before interacting them. IPO underpricing is 
firstly modelled on firm level and then on country level. A random intercept model assumes that the intercept shifts between 
countries due to the random country effect. Models (1) to (5) present the results including five different mean-centred country-
level institutional variables respectively. The dependent variable is Underpricing which is the initial return between the first-
trading day closing price and the IPO offer price, expressed as a percentage. VB captures the venture-backed status of the IPO 
firm and equals 1 if the IPO is venture capital-backed. BB is a dummy variable and equals 1 if the IPO uses book-building as 
an issuing technique. LSIZE is the offer size of the IPO, expressed in logarithm. VOLUME, for each country-year companion, 
is the number of IPOs in a certain year in one country divided by the total number of IPOs throughout the sample period in this 
country. MRETURN is the 3-month cumulative market return before the IPO, based on the country market index in DataStream. 
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TURNOVER is the stock turnover by value recorded in DataStream which is the value of the shares traded divided by the 
average market capitalization. Cen_IFI is the mean-centred International Financial Integration. International Financial 
Integration is the percentage of total external assets and liabilities of one country to its GDP, expressed in logarithm. Institution 
represents each of the five mean-centred country-level institutional variables from Model (1) to (5). Cen_IPI is the mean-
centred Investor Protection Index, which measures the level of the legal protection of minority investors in one country; it 
ranges from 0 to 10 with higher values representing better protection. Cen_PEI is the mean-centred Public Enforcement Index 
which measures the effectiveness of one country's legal enforcement, i.e. court enforcement; it ranges from 0 to 1 with higher 
values representing more effective legal enforcement. Cen_RLI is the mean-centred Rule of Law Index, which measures the 
overall quality of the legal framework; it ranges from 0 to 100 with higher values representing better legal system. Cen_CPI is 
the mean-centred Corruption Perception Index, which measures the level of the overall corruption; it ranges from 0 to 100 with 
0 representing the most corrupted system Cen_ENGLISH is the mean-centred dummy variable which equals 1 if the country’s 
legal system originates from the English Common Law; 0 otherwise. The variable of interest here is Interaction, which is the 
interaction term between each of the mean-centred institutional variables and the mean-centred IFI, i.e. Interaction in Model 
(1) is equal to Cen_IPI*Cen_IFI. The figures below each coefficient are the standard errors. Significance at 10%, 5% and 1% 
levels is marked with *, **, and *** respectively. 
 
 
Furthermore, a general concern linked to the inclusion of an interaction term is the 
increased multicollinearity, which might affect the precision of the inferences. To test for the 
impact of increased collinearity on our estimation, we follow Aiken and West (1991) and 
Jaccard and Turrisi (2003) and mean-centre the two variables before interacting them in order 
to minimise the collinearity caused by interactions, as showed by Equation 7 in the following: 
 
𝐶𝑒𝑛_𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 = (𝐼𝐹𝐼 − 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛_𝐼𝐹𝐼) ∗ (𝐼 − 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛_𝐼) Equation 
7 
 
where 𝐼𝐹𝐼  is the level of international financial integration; 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛_𝐼𝐹𝐼  is its mean 
across all observations; 𝐼 represents a country-level institutional variable; and 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛_𝐼 is its 
mean across countries. We expect no big changes in the results as the significant impacts should 
not be driven by the slightly increased collinearity due to interactions. Results are presented in 
Table 9 where Models (1) to (5) present different country institutions as in Table 6. Consistent 
with our expectation, all models show that the centred variables have different coefficients but 
the same significance, signalling that our results are not driven by an increased collinearity 
induced by the interaction term between financial integration and home institutions. 
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We have also run other robustness checks, the results of which are not fully reported in 
this paper for reasons of economy. For example, results are also robust to the introduction of 
year dummies, with coefficients showing values and statistical significance in line with the 
main models. A further two tests are conducted in order to confirm that the financial integration 
reduces the IPO underpricing for not only foreign IPOs but also domestic ones. Firstly, we 
exclude all foreign IPOs and estimate the main model (with both HLM and OLS) using a 
reduced sample of domestic IPOs only and find no significant differences in our results. 
Secondly, we include a dummy variable indicating foreign IPOs which is then interacted with 
financial integration. All the main results on financial integration, country institutions and their 
interactions remain similar to the initial results. While most of the specifications have returned 
insignificant coefficients of the interaction term between financial globalization and foreign 
IPO dummy, some weakly suggest that foreign IPO might experience greater impact from 
financial integration. In other words, while both domestic and foreign IPOs experience a 
decrease in underpricing when financial globalization increases, the scale of the decrease in 
foreign IPO underpricing is greater. Both tests strengthen the findings and eliminate the 
concerns that international financial integration of a country only impacts on foreign IPOs. 
Although the average underpricing of Brazil in our sample is similar to more recent studies, it 
still might arouse concern as it is significantly smaller than what is reported on Ritter’s website, 
as mentioned earlier. We then estimate the models excluding Brazilian IPOs and the results still 
hold. Overall, the results stand through all the above robustness checks and support both 
hypotheses.  
3.5 Summary 
By using a hierarchical linear modelling with nearly 9,000 IPOs from 37 countries, this 
study presents evidence that IPO underpricing decreases when the IPO listing country is more 
financially integrated with the rest of the world. Particularly, we argue that a direct effect is 
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firstly obtained through an improved efficiency of the financial intermediation process because 
of the increased external competition by financial integration. Therefore, financial integration 
improves the efficiency of IPO pricing for both domestic and foreign IPOs. As the underpricing 
is reduced in both domestic and foreign IPOs, this effect could have two possible explanations: 
firstly, companies going public domestically benefit from a higher competition in the home 
market which decreases the information asymmetry, making the pricing process more 
transparent. Secondly, foreign IPOs may benefit from listing countries with an improved 
efficiency. Importantly, we find that this relationship is not altered by the use of both de jure 
and de facto measures of financial integration and it does not represent a phenomenon that is 
restricted to a specific period or part of the business cycles.  
We further identify an indirect channel where financial integration impacts on IPO 
underpricing by diminishing the roles that country institutions play in the development of 
financial markets. Once financial integration is accounted for, we find that the impact of country 
institutions on IPO underpricing weakens. Hence, we argue that financial integration has a 
moderation effect that reduces the explanatory power of country institutions in IPO 
underpricing.  
The findings in this study also support previous literature in international corporate 
finance, providing extra evidence that financial integration not only lowers the cost of external 
financing but also weakens the roles of country institutions on corporate finance decisions. By 
identifying the effects of financial integration, this work does not only add to the literature with 
new explanation on IPO underpricing (especially cross-country variation), but it also presents 
a macroeconomic approach to investigate corporate finance activities. The findings provide 
issuers, underwriters and investors with some insights into the roles that country institutional 
settings play in IPO markets and how these roles can be altered by improvements in financial 
integration, which are of particular use to the policy makers in the emerging markets which are 
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more prone to the globalization process and the practitioners of foreign IPOs which have been 
growing popular thanks to the financial globalization. 
If we recall the detailed literature review in Chapter 2, we know that the information-
asymmetry-based theories argue that the IPO initial return arises from the pre-IPO pricing while 
the behavioural arguments believe that it is after-market investor driven. The findings in this 
study generally support both the classic theories and the behavioural arguments, implying that 
both the pricing of IPO shares and the investor-trading after the listing explain the abnormally 
high initial returns. However, we cannot rule out the possibility that the significant effects are 
driven by a larger portion of western data in the sample rather than being “universal”. As a 
matter of fact, the following chapters with single country datasets tell a different story regarding 
the efficiency of classic and behavioural theories on IPO short-run outcomes.   
Finally, we envisage the scope of this work to develop in two main directions. Firstly, 
as we argue that the direct effect is transmitted through the financial intermediation process, 
this mechanism could be further tested by examining how the gross spread and market share of 
investment banks is affected.  Secondly, as this work uses a static cross-sectional measure of 
legal systems, the impact and role of the dynamic development of legal systems and its 
interaction with improvements in financial integration may be tested in relation to the IPO 
underpricing phenomenon, subject to data availability. 
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Chapter 4 : Urban Economic Openness and IPO Underpricing 
In the previous chapter, we have identified the impact of country-level financial 
integration on firm-level IPO performance and its interactions with the country-level 
institutional settings. In this chapter, we extend the scope to a domestic regional study which 
examines how regional economic openness can also affect the IPO valuation, with a unique 
sample of Chinese real estate companies.  
4.1 Introduction 
The underpricing of IPOs in emerging markets is extremely high and previous research 
applying models used in developed markets has failed to explain this phenomenon and its cross-
sectional variation (Mok and Hui, 1998, Chan et al., 2004, Gao, 2010, Tian, 2011). As discussed 
in Chapter 2, classic theories which argue that firm-specific features (e.g. size and age) reflect 
the level of uncertainty of the firm’s valuation and behavioural arguments which believe that 
market sentiment also drives the first-day return have long been the main explanations for IPO 
underpricing, at least in developed markets. Over the last two decades a new stream of literature 
has shown that the level of trade openness (or integration with the global markets) experienced 
by a region affects the pricing of assets located in that region. Hence, it is reasonable to expect 
that the openness (or integration) of the region where a company operates should impact on its 
IPO pricing. This study is developed on top of this evidence and combines these two research 
streams to explain the IPO underpricing in emerging markets using a macroeconomic approach.  
Trade openness can affect IPO performance in several ways. In particular, we examine 
urban economic openness (UEO), which is defined as the degree of trade a certain region or 
urban area within a country has with foreign countries. The UEO of a company would then be 
measured as the relative degree of trade between the regions where the issuing company invests 
and their foreign counterparties. The effect of UEO on a company’s IPO valuation can be 
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transmitted through different channels. Firstly, a city with higher trade openness should 
experience a more pronounced growth in productivity and output. As a consequence, the 
demand for real estate increases. Given the short-term inelastic housing supply, property prices 
increase, driving the valuation of companies up. Secondly, a company operating in a city with 
higher UEO can benefit from the increase in local real estate prices through the Balassa-
Samuelson effect. For the first time, Balassa (1964) and Samuelson (1964) explore the 
connection between trade openness and the market of non-tradable goods. When the 
international trade increases, the tradable sector experiences a greater productivity increase than 
the non-tradable sector due to the more efficient information spillover, bigger market size and 
faster technology development, leading to a higher output in the tradable sector. However, as 
labour is mobile across regions and industries, the average wage should equally increase 
(Samuelson, 1964, Dollar, 1992, Sachs and Warner, 1995, Edwards, 1998, Miller and 
Upadhyay, 2000). As a result, there will be an increase in the relative prices of non-tradable 
goods as compared to tradable goods. Considered as the largest non-tradable asset, it is 
reasonable to expect that real estate prices should increase in areas with higher UEO, leading 
to a rise in the profitability of real estate companies.22 Thirdly, an increase in the UEO of a city 
can also lead to a rise in property prices by fostering an increase in the foreign (and domestic) 
real estate investments in more open regions, due to an easier flow of capital—Baltagi et al. 
(2009), Basu and Morey (2005), Beck (2002), Law (2008), and Svaleryd and Vlachos (2002). 
Finally, companies could increase their profitability not only indirectly through the change in 
their asset price, but also directly through the increase in the overall productivity in regions with 
high UEO (Demsetz, 1973, Peltzman, 1977, Eilon, 1985, Jovanovic, 1982, Stierwald, 2010).23 
                                                 
22 The Balassa-Samuelson effect is supported by empirical studies showing that the productivity growth in real 
output would finally increase the relative price of non-tradable goods—see De Gregorio et al. (1994) and Deloach 
(2001). 
23 Please refer to Dollar (1992), Sachs and Warner (1995), Edwards (1998), and Miller and Upadhyay (2000) for 
the impact of trade openness on productivity. 
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Overall, the above mechanisms demonstrate how UEO can decrease the uncertainty about the 
company’s future earnings, leading to a more accurate firm valuation. According to the classic 
theories that lower uncertainty about the IPO valuation is associated with lower underpricing, 
we expect a negative relationship between the UEO and IPO underpricing.  
While it is methodologically difficult to empirically identify this relationship, we 
believe that the Chinese real estate sector presents a suitable laboratory. Firstly, since the IPO 
underpricing in this sector is high and varies across companies, the significant variation of 
openness across Chinese regions may be related to a different geographical investment focus 
of issuing firms. China is a developing country with cities rich with development opportunities 
and almost all real estate companies include a significant development portfolio (reported as 
inventory or intangible asset in financial reports along with buildings held as investments). The 
land is owned by the central government and each company bids for land-use rights, the value 
of which is reported in the IPO prospectus. Secondly, because companies need to bid for the 
land-use rights from local governments, most real estate firms tend to concentrate their 
businesses in one area where they believe they have informational advantages. This might be 
caused by future development opportunities in a city, as well as connections with local 
governments and institutions to obtain land-use rights. In fact, Miao and Zhu (2005) show that 
Chinese real estate markets are still very much localised (with varying regional policies and 
regulations). As a consequence, the barriers to enter a new market are so high that most real 
estate companies prefer to remain focused in one region and compete with other local real estate 
companies than to diversify geographically. Finally, even if some companies operate across 
regions (normally two main areas representing a significant proportion of the overall portfolio) 
the real estate business (investing in physical immobile assets, i.e. buildings and land) allows 
us to identify the exact portfolio of locations where the business is operated. Consequently, an 
index of urban economic openness can be constructed at a company level based on the locations 
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where the company hold real estate assets and the level of trade openness each location 
experiences.  
In this study, we collect data of Chinese real estate IPOs from 1992 to 2013 and find 
that, after controlling for firm- and issue-specific characteristics, UEO significantly and 
negatively affects IPO underpricing. Companies operating in cities with higher UEO experience 
less underpricing when they go public and this result remains robust once we account for the 
IPO location, ownership structure and other market conditions. The findings of this study help 
issuers, underwriters and investors to better understand the dynamics of IPO markets in 
emerging markets and their relation to the wider economy. They also provide policy 
implications with regard to the ties between the local economy and the performance of regional 
firms and implications for state-owned companies going public. The finding that the urban 
economic openness reduces the extremely high initial returns of IPOs also acts as further 
evidence supporting the idea that the openness improves the financial development. By using 
the real estate sector as a testing ground, this study sheds some light on the underpinning of the 
underlying real assets in real estate IPO valuation. In the end, although focusing on the Chinese 
market, our results could also apply to other countries and sectors with similar market structures.  
The rest of this study is structured as follows: the next section presents the hypothesis 
development and a brief review of the relevant literature other than that in Chapter 2. Section 
3.3 describes the data and the methodology. Empirical results and robustness tests are discussed 
in Section 3.4, while main conclusions are presented in the last section.  
4.2 Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
As mentioned above, the hypothesis is that the urban economic openness has a negative 
impact on IPO underpricing of Chinese real estate companies whose businesses are in this 
region, which is developed in the following strands of literature.  
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On the one hand, a large number of empirical studies focusing on developed markets 
find confirmation of the mainstream theories or models elaborated on in Chapter 2; on the other 
hand, they are less successful in explaining the extremely high underpricing in emerging 
markets. Relying solely on firm- and issuing-specific characteristics may yield weak and 
distorted results because underdeveloped institutional features of the emerging markets would 
be missed. In China for example, the average underpricing of all IPOs between 1990 and 1993 
was 289% according to Mok and Hui (1998), and 178% between 1993 and 1998 according to 
Chan et al. (2004). Tian (2011) also finds extremely high underpricing of 247% in a sample of 
1377 IPOs from 1992 to 2004 and argues that information asymmetry is far from being a major 
determinant. Similarly, Gao (2010) finds no significant relationship between the initial returns 
and proxies for information asymmetry, contrary to the classic theories.  
With regard to real estate IPOs in particular, Chan et al. (2001) show that US REITs 
IPOs experience abnormally low underpricing compared to IPOs in other industries. One 
possible explanation rests in the presence of more individual and fewer institutional investors 
in REITs than in other industries as this may reduce the impact of informed investors. On the 
other hand, REITs may also behave more similarly to funds than to operating companies, and 
they generate low uncertainty leading to a low IPO underpricing (a common characteristic of 
funds in general). Finally, the characteristics of underlying assets of real estate companies might 
also represent a further explanation (please refer to Section 2.6 in Chapter 2 for a detailed 
review). The institutional ownership and fund-like structure characteristics are not represented 
in Chinese real estate companies because the property market has received enough attention 
from institutional investors and the majority of companies are operating companies (including 
developments in their portfolio). As this study presents an analysis of IPO performance from a 
‘non-tradable goods perspective’, we believe that Chinese real estate IPOs offer an adequate 
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laboratory in which to test the relationship between urban economic openness and IPO 
underpricing.  
The final stream of literature relevant to this work is related to globalisation and the 
linkages between openness and markets of non-tradable goods. Empirical studies find that a 
country’s foreign trade exposure leads to greater productivity growth—see Dollar (1992), 
Edwards (1998), Miller and Upadhyay (2000) and Sachs and Warner (1995). Following the 
evidence that productivity is a major determinant of company’s profitability—Demsetz (1973), 
Eilon (1985), Jovanovic (1982), Peltzman (1977) and Stierwald (2010)— Miller and Upadhyay 
(2000) use a panel data to assess the determinants of total factor productivity. By using a 
deviation of the classic National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) calculation of trade 
openness (total export as a share of GDP), they find a positive effect of trade openness on total 
productivity. Moreover, in a sample of 29 provinces in China between 1981 and 2005, Jiang 
(2011) finds that UEO has direct positive effects on Chinese regional productivity growth, 
consistent with previous country-level studies. In recent years, research has also shown that 
trade openness has an impact on the financial market development. According to Rajan and 
Zingales (2003), an increase in both cross-country trades and capital flows leads to an increase 
in the degree of financial development. Beck (2002), Svaleryd and Vlachos (2002) and Kim et 
al. (2012) find a reverse causal effect between trade openness and financial development (i.e. 
the increase in trade openness occurs following an increase in financial development). Finally, 
Law (2008) and Baltagi et al. (2009) find that trade openness and capital account openness 
jointly and positively affect financial development in both the banking sector and the stock 
market. Law (2008), in particular, shows that the effect of trade openness on financial 
development is greater than that of capital account openness in Malaysia. Moreover, the effect 
of trade openness is significant in both the banking sector and stock market, while the effect of 
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capital account openness is less so. By using panel data, Kukeli (2012) finds that trade openness 
is one of the most important determinants of a country’s capital formation.  
Within this stream, a group of studies examines the relationship between openness and 
stock market performance in emerging markets. Li et al. (2004) employ an openness approach 
to explain the increased firm-specific variation in the 1990s and find that capital market 
openness positively affects the firm-specific variation while trade openness positively affects 
the market variation. Basu and Morey (2005) argue that, once a country opens up its trade to 
the world, stock prices start to follow a random path whilst they were serially correlated 
beforehand. Following an increase in trade openness, the development in technology will be 
captured by stock prices in equilibrium leading to a decrease in excess returns and, eventually, 
an increase in stock market efficiency. Lim and Kim (2011) show that trade openness boosts 
firms’ future profitability and reduces uncertainty. As a result, investors react faster to the 
information on the market. Therefore, the trade openness finally enhances the informational 
efficiency of the stock market. However, they also find that the de facto measure, i.e. classic 
NBER measure, has a significantly negative impact on stock return serial correlations, but the 
alternative de jure measure, i.e. a country’s international trade freedom index constructed 
according to a country’s trade policy, does not show any significance. As the de facto measure 
reflects real output and there is no de jure measure at city level in China, we use the de facto 
measure in the following empirical analysis.  
Being the biggest asset of the non-tradable goods market, real estate and its links with 
trade openness have also been explored. Initially, Bardhan et al. (2004) empirically test the 
relationship between trade openness and real estate rents using monthly data for 46 countries. 
For the measurement of openness, standard NBER indices are used. Results show that wage 
levels, population, and trade openness positively affect rents, supporting the Balassa-Samuelson 
effect. This research has then been extended to a regional level study by Wang et al. (2011) 
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who analyse trade openness and real estate prices at the urban level. The study focuses on China, 
as it represents a good example of an emerging market with an urbanization rate increasing 
from 30% in 1998 to 46% in 2008. With a sample covering 35 cities from 1998 to 2006, they 
find that real estate prices increase by 2.82% when UEO increases by 10%. To appreciate its 
importance, between 1998 and 2006, 16% of the increase in Chinese real estate prices is 
attributed to the increase of UEO alone. Bardhan et al. (2008) then examine the effects of 
country-level trade openness on the returns of securitized real estate by using a sample of 946 
listed real estate companies from 16 countries. They find that trade openness has a significantly 
negative impact on the excess returns of real estate stocks, controlling for global and domestic 
variables. Case et al. (1999) point out that even though country-level factors are driving real 
estate performance, regional output is a more important determinant.  
4.3 Data and Methodology  
The sample in this study includes IPOs of Chinese real estate companies from 1992 to 
2013. The Shanghai Stock Exchange was founded in 1990 and the Shenzhen Stock Exchange 
was founded in 1991. So, our sample traces back to almost the very beginning of the stock 
markets in China in order to capture the changes in IPO performance throughout the economic 
cycles. The main IPO data is obtained from Thomson One New Issues Database. Due to the 
incomplete records of Chinese IPOs, especially those in the early years of our sample, most 
data have been manually collected from various local sources, such as the websites of Shanghai 
Stock Exchange, Shenzhen Stock Exchange, Hong Kong Stock Exchange, Singapore Stock 
Exchange, as well as financial websites (e.g. jrj.com and sina.com). Firm-specific data (e.g. age, 
state ownership, land reserves, income and real estate assets) are manually extracted from the 
issuers’ IPO prospectus, which are obtained from different sources including Thomson One, 
the Hong Kong Exchange HKExnews (a designated website providing regulatory filings and 
disclosure of listed companies) and companies’ websites (with the majority of prospectuses 
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being in Chinese). Economic data (e.g. foreign trade volume and GDP) is extracted from the 
City Annual Statistical Reports, obtained from the China National Knowledge Infrastructure 
(CNKI) database. City Annual Statistical Reports are the official annual governmental reports 
of the local annual economic performance. CNKI is a key national e-publishing project in China 
that was started in 1996, approved by the Press and Publications Administration of the People’s 
Republic of China (PRC) and backed by Tsinghua University.  
In total, there are more than 150 listed Chinese real estate companies in the database. 
However, some of them were not predominantly real estate companies when they went public 
and some others went public through a ‘back-door listing’, whereby the company goes public 
by acquiring an already publicly listed company. Hence, there are 70 IPOs meeting the selection 
criteria of being listed as a real estate IPO and having the full set of information for all the 
variables of interest.24 
The dependent variable (𝐼𝑅𝑖) represents the initial return of company 𝑖, and is measured 
as in Equation 1 in Chapter 3. Again, the market return is negligible compared to the level of 
underpricing and we do not adjust for it in line with most of the empirical studies in the literature. 
We also estimate models with the market-adjusted measure but results do not change and hence 
we do not report them.  
The main variable of interest is urban economic openness (UEO), which is measured by 
the city-level trade openness. As discussed above, we adopt the de facto measure by NBRE, 
which is computed as the sum of imports and exports as a percentage of GDP. Since most 
studies focus on a country-level analysis and use the NBER definition, we adjust the formula 
                                                 
24 As we mentioned above, we focus on real estate IPOs as a testing laboratory because other industries hardly 
show a localised business and a regional composition of the investment portfolio is not available. This is the reason 
why we cannot extend our sample to other industries or form a control sample to test the impact of UEO at firm 
level.  
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as required by our single country study to compute the city-level measure by using total annual 








The amount of foreign trade of a city is recorded in the City Annual Statistical Reports 
by the local government and is expressed in U.S. dollars. The total sum of imports and exports 
is converted into Chinese Yuan (RMB) by using the average annual U.S. Dollar to Chinese 
Yuan exchange rate in the same year.  
Most Chinese real estate companies focus their businesses in one area—usually one 
city—while some of them have businesses in several cities (often geographically close). Only 
a very few big real estate companies run businesses widely spread across China, mainly 
focusing on big developed cities such as Shanghai or Beijing. As these big cities usually share 
a similar level of trade openness, this should not affect the estimation results. For companies 
operating in more than one city, we obtain the UEO measure for a given company as the 
weighted average of the individual UEO measures of the cities in which the company holds real 
estate investments (𝑈𝐸𝑂𝑗𝑖). The weights are constructed as the ratio between the available land 
with land-use rights company 𝑖 has in city 𝑗 (𝐿𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑗𝑖) and the overall land with land-use rights 
company 𝑖 owns (𝐿𝑎𝑛𝑑𝑖 ). The information regarding the locations of investments for each 
company and the land-use rights are manually extracted from IPO prospectuses and the 
financial reports before IPO. The UEO for company 𝑖 is then computed as follows:  
 












The pie chart of Figure 1 is to better show the regional pattern of the real estate business 
in China. We can see that 50% of companies in the sample operate real estate assets locally in 
one city. The UEO for these companies does not require weighting and is simply the annual 
city-level foreign trade as a share of the annual city-level GDP. For the remaining companies, 
the majority is based in two different cities and 21% of companies have more than 50% and 
less than 100% of their businesses focused in one city. Overall, 90% of companies in our sample 
locate at least 30% of their businesses in one city. As a robustness check, we also split the 
sample into companies operating in one city and companies operating in more than one city. 
Separate estimations are run and no significant difference is found. Therefore, we present and 
discuss only the results obtained with the overall sample.  
In the remaining part of this section we present other variables normally included in 
related works and used here as control variables:  
LNLAG is the natural logarithm of the time lag between the IPO issuing and listing dates. 
According to the information-asymmetry-based theories discussed in Section 2.3, the longer 
the time lag is, the higher the underpricing is due to the increased uncertainty. Therefore, we 
expect a positive relationship between LNLAG and underpricing. The issuing dates are extracted 
from the prospectus and the listing dates are taken from the stock exchanges.  
LSIZE is the same measure of firm size used in Chapter 3, which captures the ex-ante 
uncertainty about IPO company. As there is usually lower uncertainty associated with larger 
companies, we expect a negative relationship between the firm size and underpricing.  
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ROREA measures the return on real estate assets for the year preceding the IPO. The 
return on assets (ROA) has often been used to examine the effect of a company’s earnings 
performance prior to the IPO on its IPO valuation. To better capture the real estate characteristic, 
we use the return on real estate assets instead. The earnings from the real estate business are 
usually reported separately in the prospectus. The data of the real estate asset size for each 
company is manually collected and computed as the sum of the accounts of property, plant and 
equipment, investment properties, prepayment for the rent of the land and property, property 
held for sale, property under development and land reserves in the financial report before the 
IPO. 
Figure 1 Regional Patterns of the Local Real Estate Businesses in China, 1992-2013 
 
 
LNAGE is the natural logarithm of the firm age, i.e. time (years) elapsed between its 
foundation and the IPO dates. It is also a proxy for the level of uncertainty about the IPO 
valuation. As there is more information available about a long-established company, we expect 






100% in one city
100%>businesses in one city>50%
50%>businesses in one city>40%
40%>businesses in one city>35%
35%>businesses in one city>30%
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STATEO is a dummy variable denoting state ownership. It equals 1 if the real estate 
company is state-owned before the IPO and 0 otherwise. It is commonly used in Chinese IPO 
studies as it reflects the influence of the special political system.  
CHINA is a dummy variable denoting the IPO location. It equals 1 if the company is 
listed in Mainland China, 0 otherwise. Note that in our study we refer to Chinese real estate 
companies as listed real estate companies whose businesses are in Mainland China, even if 
some of them might decide not to be listed on stock exchanges in Mainland China. In our sample, 
33 companies were listed in Mainland China, 35 in Hong Kong and 2 in Singapore. According 
to Wong et al. (2013a), Chinese real estate companies going public in Hong Kong experience 
much less underpricing than those listed in Mainland China due to a better market transparency 
and corporate governance reducing the information asymmetry.  
MR30 and MR60 represent the market performance in the 30 and 60 days before the 
IPO. 30-day pre-IPO market return is commonly used to proxy for market sentiment prior to an 
IPO. To quickly revisit, the behavioural arguments believe that the market momentum reflects 
the investor sentiment and causes aftermarket investor-driven high initial returns. MR30 is 
essentially the same measure as MRETURN in Chapter 3. The findings in Chapter 3 suggest a 
positive relationship between the 30-day market return prior to the IPO and the IPO 
underpricing, consistent with most of the empirical studies. However, an alternative measure—
60-day market return prior to the IPO—is also included in this study. As the Chinese stock 
market is far from being mature and there are many ‘noise’ traders, it is reasonable to expect 
that market momentum is likely to last longer.25  
DAY30 and DAY60 represent the numbers of other IPOs within the 30- or 60-day period 
preceding the IPO as shares of the total numbers of IPOs during the sample period, a proxy for 
                                                 
25 If the market is less efficient, the time that investors need to adjust their a priori assumptions is longer. 
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the IPO volume. DAY30 is the same measure as VOLUME in Chapter 3 and DAY60 is included 
for the same rationale behind MR60.  
Table 10 contains the description and summary statistics of the main variables. Chinese 
real estate IPOs are strongly underpriced with an average initial return of 103.85% over our 
sample period. There is also a significant variation in initial returns, with values ranging from 
-7.3% to 980%, consistent with previous studies. As expected, UEO differs significantly across 
companies, ranging between 3.06% and 551.8%. This implies the existence of significant 
heterogeneity in the level of trade openness across Chinese cities. The variation comes from 
exports and imports with foreign countries, while city-level GDP growth rates usually follow 
the country-level figures very closely and show a greater homogeneous pattern across cities. 
The state ownership of the issuing company has been a popular approach to explain the 
extreme IPO initial returns in China. The political system in China is different from that in 
developed countries and there exists strong government intervention in the financial market. 
Therefore, researchers argue that state ownership represents a negative signal of a firm’s 
independent governance, indicating low transparency due to a higher possibility of 
manipulation and corruption within the firm. Therefore, state-owned companies are expected 
to experience higher underpricing than privately owned ones. Following this   argument, we 
summarize our data by state ownership. The first two rows in Panel B of Table 10 report the 
statistics of IPOs of state-owned and non-state-owned companies. Consistent with the 
arguments above, the average IPO initial return, standard deviation and interval of non-state-
owned companies is much smaller than the ones of state-owned companies. Wong et al. (2013a) 
study the influence of IPO location on IPO underpricing of Chinese developers, arguing that 
the IPO location (Mainland China vs Hong Kong) represents a signal for developers’ quality 
and levels of transparency. Since our sample includes developers as well as investors, we have 
access to firms listed in three different stock exchanges: Mainland China (35 companies), Hong 
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Kong (33 companies), and Singapore (2 companies only). The last two rows in Panel B of Table 
10 report the statistics of initial returns by IPO location. Our results are consistent with the 
findings by Wong et al. (2013) as the initial returns of the IPOs listed in Mainland China are 
indeed much higher than those listed outside.26 
However, since the state-ownership and IPO location variables are highly correlated 
(0.72) as they may proxy for the same factor (i.e. companies listed in Mainland China tend to 
have state ownership while companies listed outside tend to be privately owned), we decide to 
use them alternatively in our estimations and we explain the listing preference of different 
ownership structures as follows: stated-owned companies are more likely to choose to be listed 
in Mainland China because they can use their political connections more efficiently than in 
other countries/markets, while private companies try to avoid the political manipulation in 
Mainland China and choose more competitive and transparent markets like Hong Kong and 
Singapore. As a robustness check, we also estimate the model including both variables and the 
results for the variable of interest (UEO) do not change significantly, hence we do not report 
them.  
Although a large number of empirical studies support the negative relationship between 
the underwriters’ reputation and the level of IPO underpricing, the reversed relationship has 
also been documented not only in the U.S. market but also in other developed markets, as 
discussed in Chapter 2.  
If we consider Chinese IPOs where the market is far more exposed to the political 
system, the role of the underwriters’ reputation seems to be less significant. The special regime 
in China and its constant-changing nature means that the underwriting process cannot be treated 
                                                 
26 As there are only two IPOs listed in Singapore and the previous literature controls for the negative effects 
associated with the Chinese government and the undeveloped nature of the market, we decided to differentiate 
between Mainland China and non. However, we have also estimated models with a sample excluding the two IPOs 
listed in Singapore and the results do not change.  
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exactly the same as in western countries. The striking difference is the intervention from the 
government on the IPO market, which has only begun to die down after the late 2000s. The 
intervention mainly exists in two ways. Firstly, the central government controls the supply of 
IPOs by restricting the quota of IPOs in each province or municipal area, leading to a short 
supply given the high demand from investors. Secondly, the government had always set a 
restriction on the IPO offer price in reference to either the book value or the P/E ratio of the 
issuing company. From 2005, China has started to populate the bookbuilding method with an 
aim to bring down the extremely high underpricing. However, even after a decade, the 
bookbuilding process today is still not fully market-driven and constantly influenced by the 
changing government policies and market reforms.  
While the majority of IPO studies in China have ignored the underwriters’ influence, 
Su and Bangassa (2011) follow the classic theories to systematically examine the effects of the 
underwriters’ reputation on IPO underpricing in China and find little influence. Despite the lack 
of information on Chinese investment banks, unlike Stoll and Curley (1970) and many other 
studies on underwriters’ reputation, the sample in this study includes IPOs from more than one 
market, with IPOs listed in Mainland China often using Chinese investment banks and those 
listed in Hong Kong and Singapore often using international investment banks. This nature 
makes the ranking of the underwriters difficult and means that the measurement of reputation 
very much correlated with state ownership and the dummy on the IPO location. Hence, we do 
not include this variable in our study.27 According to the above studies, we believe that this 
does not affect the tests on the hypothesis. 
                                                 
27 This also represents a reason why cross-country studies do not normally control for underwriters’ reputation.  
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4.4 Results and Robustness Tests 
4.4.1 Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) Estimations 
We first test to what extent UEO affects IPO underpricing by using an ordinary least 
squares (OLS) regression. The specification is as follows:  
 
𝐼𝑅𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽𝑈𝐸𝑂 × 𝑈𝐸𝑂𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖 × 𝑋𝑖 + 𝑖 Equation 10 
 
where 𝑋𝑖  is a vector of other explanatory variables and 𝛽𝑖  are the coefficients to be 
estimated. Firstly, we check for homoscedastic error terms by using the Breusch-Pagan test. As 
we reject the null hypothesis that the variance of the error term is constant across observations, 
the standard errors presented below the coefficients are corrected for heteroscedasticity.   
 
 
Table 10 Variables Description: Firm-, Issuing- and Macroeconomic Factors (Chapter 4)  
Panel A: Variable Definition 
Variable Description Statistics 
  Mean StD Min Max 
IR Initial Return (%): difference between the offer price and the closing price of the first trading day 103.85 167.47 -7.23 980 
UEO 
Urban Economic Openness (%): total import and export as a percentage of GDP at city level, 
weighted by the land-use right that a company owns in one city as a share of its overall land-use 
right (NBER approach) 
98.63 90.71 3.06 551.8 
LNLAG Time Lag: time difference between issuing and listing dates 3.62 1.24 1.39 6.4 
LSIZE Natural Logarithm of Total Proceeds of the IPO 6.52 1.49 2.89 9.47 
ROREA 
Return on Real Estate Asset (%): ratio between income from the real estate businesses and the 
value of real estate assets 
63.39 106.11 8.4 713.87 
LNAGE Natural Logarithm of Firm Age (years between incorporation and IPO date) 2.29 0.53 0.69 3.04 
STATEO State Ownership: dummy variable that equals 1 if it is state-owned and 0 otherwise 0.41 0.5 0 1 
CHINA 
IPO Location: dummy variable that equals 1 if the company is listed in Mainland China and 0 
otherwise 
0.47 0.5 0 1 
MR30 Market performance in the 30 days before the IPO 2.01 13.32 -28.74 37.06 
MR60 Market performance in the 60 days before the IPO 5.87 20.83 -36.01 90.64 
DAY30 
Number of IPOs within the 30 days before the IPO as a share of all the IPOs across sample 
period 
16.57 12.78 0 51 
DAY60 
Number of IPOs within the 60 days before the IPO as a share of all the IPOs across sample 
period 
33.90 24.16 3 96 
Panel B: Initial Returns for IPOs: State- vs. Non-state-owned and Listed in vs outside Mainland China 
Variable Mean StD Min Max 
State ownership 216.39 206.89 -7.23 980 
   Non-state ownership 24.25 52.36 -5.81 292.89 
Mainland China 211.7 193.98 7.14 980 
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Table 11 UEO and IPO Underpricing (OLS) 
Dependent Variable 
Underpricing 
A1 A2 B1 B2 
 
    
UEO -0.256** -0.299** -0.273** -0.308** 
 -2.05 -2.35 -2.13 -2.42 
LNLAG 44.573*** 49.076*** 35.356*** 39.792*** 
 2.76 3.06 2.79 3.27 
LSIZE -45.863** -34.772* -44.582** -33.790* 
 -2.55 -1.70 -2.65 -1.81 
ROREA 0.299* 0.279* 0.264 0.242 
 1.76 1.74 1.38 1.32 
LNAGE -14.287 -15.796 -15.470 -16.912 
 -0.50 -0.55 -0.56 -0.62 
STATEO 78.967**  71.735**  
 2.48 
 2.26  
CHINA  109.131***  104.665*** 
 
 2.67  2.78 
MR30 3.049* 2.910   
 1.79 1.61 
  
DAY30 -1.236 -1.313   
 -1.33 -1.47 
  
MR60   2.574*** 2.542*** 
 
  3.10 2.95 
DAY60   -1.062* -0.994* 
 
  -2.00 -1.86 
Constant 261.959*** 165.063 303.102*** 203.061* 
 2.90 1.47 3.04 1.71 
 
    
Observations 70 70 70 70 
Adj R-squared 0.567 0.592 0.619 0.645 
This table presents the Ordinary Least Squares estimation for a cross-section of Chinese real estate IPOs that have taken place 
between 1992 and 2013. Group A regressions control for the 30-day market return and IPO numbers prior to the IPO while 
group B regression controls for the 60-day variables. The dependent variable is Underpricing which is the initial return between 
the first-trading day closing price and the IPO offer price, expressed as a percentage. UEO is the weighted average of the urban 
economic openness which is the sum of the city-level imports and exports as a share of this city’s GDP. The land-use right that 
a company owns in one city as a share of its overall land-use right is used as the weight. LNLAG is the natural logarithm of the 
time lag between issuing and listing dates. LSIZE is the natural logarithm of the IPO proceeds. ROREA is the return on the real 
estate assets of a company. LNAGE is the natural logarithm of the period of time for which the firm has been running as a real 
estate company before the IPO. STATEO is equal to 1 if the company is state-owned, 0 otherwise. CHINA is equal to 1 of the 
company is listed in Mainland China, 0 otherwise. MR30 and MR60 are 30- and 60-day market returns prior to the IPO. DAY30 
and DAY60 are the numbers of IPOs which have taken place 30 or 60 days prior to the IPO as a share of all the IPOs across 
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Table 12 State Ownership vs IPO Location and Variance Inflation Factors  
Panel A: Chow Test 
 A1 A2 B1 B2 
Prob > F 
    
STATEO 0.5724 
 0.4046  
CHINA   0.9239   0.3117 
 
    
Panel B: Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) 
 A1 A2 B1 B2 
UEO 1.25 1.27 1.25 1.27 
LNLAG 1.15 1.09 1.15 1.10 
LSIZE 1.56 1.98 1.55 1.94 
ROREA 1.10 1.10 1.11 1.11 
LNAGE 1.31 1.31 1.31 1.30 
STATEO 1.71 
 1.67  
CHINA 
 1.98  1.98 
MR30 1.07 1.07 
  
DAY30 1.28 1.23 
  
MR60 
  1.07 1.06 
DAY60 
  1.27 1.25 
Mean VIF 1.30 1.38 1.30 1.38 
 
 
The main results are presented in Table 11, which includes two sets of OLS 
regressions—Group A (A1 and A2) controls for 30-day market variables and Group B controls 
(B1 and B2) for 60-day market variables. As expected, the coefficients for urban economic 
openness are negative throughout all specifications and they are significant at the 5% level. A 
10% increase in the UEO results in a 2.56% to 3.16% decrease of IPO initial returns depending 
upon the specifications. This supports our research hypothesis that real estate companies with 
investments in more trade-open areas have less incentive to underprice their IPOs. Holding 
other factors constant, a real estate company would experience 2.56% to 3.08% less IPO 
underpricing if it runs its real estate businesses in a city where the level of trade with foreign 
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countries is 10% higher. The greater regional trade openness increases the future profitability 
and reduces the valuation uncertainty, a key determinant of the level of IPO underpricing. 
According to the Balassa-Samuelson effect, trade openness will eventually increase the prices 
of non-tradable products including real estate assets. Besides, trade openness positively affects 
productivity which is an important determinant of a company’s profitability. In addition, the 
demand for real estate could rise as a direct consequence of the increase in foreign and domestic 
investments into real estate, given an improvement in capital flows. Therefore, investors in 
companies operating in areas with higher UEO tend to be more confident about the local real 
estate market and the company’s future profitability, which leads to less uncertainty about the 
company’s valuation. As a result, issuers will have less incentive to underprice the IPO shares. 
Consistent with the majority of IPO studies, we find that the time lag between issuing 
and listing dates (LNLAG) positively affects the initial returns of IPOs, i.e. the longer it takes 
to reach the listing after the issuing date, the more uncertainty and the higher IPO underpricing 
we expect. As the time lag is log-transformed, holding other explanatory variables constant, the 
expected return difference of an IPO between two periods in time (𝑡1, 𝑡2) is represented as 
follows:  
 






From Equation 11 it becomes clear that the relative change of the time lag affects the 
initial returns regardless of the baseline of time. If 𝛽𝐿𝑁𝐿𝐴𝐺𝐴 is equal to 44.573 as shown in 
specification A1, then a 10% increase in the time gap between the issuance and the listing 
(around 4 days considering the average time of 37 days—see Table 10) will result in a 4.25% 
increase in the underpricing.  
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Unlike some of the previous Chinese IPO studies, the results in this table are in line with 
the information asymmetry theory: the larger the firm, the smaller the uncertainty and therefore 
the lower the underpricing. The coefficients on LSIZE are significant throughout all regressions 
at 95% or 90% confidence level. In specification A1, a 10% increase in the proceeds leads to a 
4.37% decrease in IPO underpricing. Interestingly, we find that the return on real estate assets 
(ROREA) positively affects the IPO underpricing at a 10% significant level (see specification 
A1 and A2), with a 2.79% to 2.99% increase in the IPO initial returns when ROREA increases 
by 10%. In fact, when the return on real estate assets of an IPO company is relatively high, 
investors read this information as a signal of ‘good’ firm quality and hence they are more willing 
to participate in the IPO with a higher after-market bidding price.  
Contrary to previous research in developed countries, we also find no significant 
relationship between the firm age and the underpricing, hence once again indicating that the 
classic information asymmetry theory may be weakened by the more ‘immature’ Chinese 
market, supporting Gao (2010) and Tian (2011).  
Models A1 and B1 include state ownership (STATEO) and control for 30-day and 60-
day pre-IPO market conditions respectively. The coefficients for state ownership are both 
significant and positive suggesting that state-owned companies experience significantly higher 
IPO underpricing than private companies. This is consistent with the majority of Chinese IPO 
studies which blame the extremely high underpricing on the political connections and 
government interventions—see Tian (2011). For example, Chan et al. (2004) find that the state 
ownership, including government and legal entity ownership, is positively related to IPO 
underpricing. Chang et al. (2008) argue that the Chinese government decides the IPO supply 
and sets the price-to-income limit for offering shares, with both regulations leading to a high 
level of underpricing. With regard to post-IPO stock returns, Fan et al. (2007) show that 
companies with more political connections actually underperform those which are loosely 
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connected. Specifications A2 and B2 include the IPO location (China) instead of state 
ownership status and coefficients are significantly positive, consistent with Wong et al. (2013a), 
where listing in Mainland China (i.e. market less transparent) leads to a much higher 
underpricing.  
Consistent with the behavioural arguments, we find that investor sentiment (proxied by 
market returns) positively affects the IPO initial returns. When we pass from a 30- to 60-day 
period, the coefficient becomes more significant (99% in model B1 from 90% in model A1) 
and hence we find support for the assumption about the weak efficiency of Chinese markets 
and that the 60-day market return is a better measure. The number of IPOs during the period 
preceding the IPO listing date show a negative effect on IPO underpricing for both periods (30 
and 60 days), but the coefficient is only significant when a 60-day window is used, supporting 
Altı (2005) who argues that the unknown common factor about IPO valuation will be revealed 
by previous IPOs, resulting in less underpricing. Note that the results on market variables are 
also similar to those presented in Chapter 3. 
Furthermore, consistent with Wong et al. (2013a), we find a significant impact of the 
listing location (CHINA) on IPO initial returns. Companies listed in Mainland China experience 
significantly higher IPO underpricing than those listed in Hong Kong or Singapore. Wong et al. 
(2013a) argue that low underpricing is a form of reward to a company who chooses to go public 
in a more competitive, yet more informationally transparent, market and it signals ‘good’ firm 
quality. It could then be argued that the characteristics of companies listed in Mainland China 
(a) are systematically different from those listed outside (b). The same argument may be applied 
to the ownership structure of state-owned (a) versus private (b) companies. Hence, we 
investigate the need to estimate separate models by using a Chow test. Firstly, we split the 
sample by IPO location or state ownership, and estimate the two following regressions:  
 
Chapter 4  Economic Openness and Underpricing 
 114 












Secondly, we compare these results with the ones obtained estimating the pooled model 
from Equation 10, which assumes that the coefficients are the same across the two groups. The 













where 𝑅𝑆𝑆 = ∑ 𝑖
2𝑁
𝑖  is the residual sum of the squares, i.e. the variation unexplained by the 
regression model28. Results reported in Panel A,  
Table 12, indicate that we do not need to separate the sample in both cases.  
4.4.2 Two Stage Least Squares (2SLS) Estimations 
Since UEO is a company-level variable constructed by using macroeconomic factors 
(trade openness of Chinese cities), it is reasonable to check that it is not correlated with other 
unobserved economic factors which might also affect the individual IPO performance. In fact, 
if UEO is correlated with the error term  in Equation 10, the exogeneity assumption of OLS 
                                                 
28 If the difference in the combined residual sum of the squares of the two separate models and the residual sum of 
the squares of the pooled model is significant, we should then consider estimating the model separately by IPO 
location.  
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estimators is violated and we are presented with an omitted variable bias. As a result, the OLS 
estimation would be inconsistent with: 
 




A common method to correct for endogeneity is the use of instrumental variables (IVs), 
which are correlated with the endogenous variable (UEO in this case) but uncorrelated with the 
error term ε. Previous studies find a significant relationship between the exchange rate volatility 
and foreign trade volumes. However, Gu and Gao (2007) find that the exchange rate volatility 
does not significantly affect foreign trade volume in China because, being a developing country, 
trades may be mainly driven by domestic demand. Hence we expect disposable household 
income to have a positive relationship with the trade volumes, which is unlikely to be related 
with IPO initial returns. Therefore, we use the natural logarithm of disposable household 
income per capita (LNDINC) as an instrument for UEO in the estimation. As a robustness check, 
we also use a second instrument to create an over-identified case and find that results do not 
change (see details in the following robustness check section). 
The regional disposable household income per capita is collected from the City Annual 
Statistical Reports. We use a two stage least squares estimation (2SLS). In the first stage, we 
estimate the predictions of the endogenous variable UEO by using the instrumental variable:  
 
𝑈𝐸𝑂 = 𝛿0 + 𝛿1𝑥1 + ⋯ + 𝛿𝑘−1𝑥𝑘−1 + 𝜃𝐿𝑁𝐷𝐼𝑁𝐶 + 𝑣𝑈𝐸𝑂 Equation 16 
 
In the second stage, fitted values of UEO are used to replace the actual regressor and 
the following model is estimated: 
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𝐼𝑅 = 𝛼0 + 𝛼1 + ⋯ + 𝛼𝑘−1𝑥𝑘−1 + 𝜆𝐿𝑁𝐷𝐼𝑁𝐶 + 𝜂 




Results on the 2SLS estimations are presented in Table 13. They show that the effect of 
UEO on IPO initial returns remains negative and significant throughout the different 
specifications, with significance levels reduced to 10% and impact enlarged. A 10% increase 
in UEO leads to a decrease between 10.50% and 20.40% in IPO underpricing. As expected, the 
efficiency in a 2SLS specification is reduced while standard errors are not significantly different 
from OLS models. The effect of the time lag remains positive and strongly significant and the 
60-day pre-IPO market performance is still preferred to a 30-day market return. Durbin and 
Wu-Hausman estimates—which include the estimated error term from the first stage in the 
2SLS estimation as an additional variable—are performed to test for the endogeneity of UEO. 
Under the null hypothesis that all the variables are exogenous, the coefficients on the error term 
from the first stage should be insignificant in the Durbin and Wu-Hausman tests (otherwise, we 
should reject the null hypothesis and treat UEO as endogenous). The Durbin and Wu-Hausman 
tests are performed for each 2SLS regression and statistics are reported at the bottom of Table 
13. Apart from the Wu-Hausman statistic in regression D2 (with IPO location and 60-day 
market variables), all other statistics are significant at least at a 90% confidence level, 
suggesting that we indeed need to treat UEO as endogenous. 
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Table 13 : UEO and IPO Underpricing (2SLS) 
Dependent Variable 
Underpricing  
C1 C2 D1 D2 
     
UEO -2.040* -1.217** -1.792* -1.050* 
 -1.75 -2.05 -1.72 -1.90 
LNLAG 54.500*** 55.895*** 46.675*** 46.922*** 
 2.80 4.21 2.60 3.79 
LSIZE -24.480 -19.456 -26.855 -22.228 
 -1.09 -1.15 -1.37 -1.49 
ROREA 0.244 0.242 0.212 0.212 
 1.14 1.62 1.12 1.59 
LNAGE -95.460 -57.441 -84.495 -50.399 
 -1.37 -1.39 -1.37 -1.34 
STATEO 141.700**  126.483**  
 2.06  2.07  
CHINA  153.207***  138.356*** 
  3.07  3.12 
MR30 1.399 2.020   
 0.18 1.58   
DAY30 -3.986 -2.732*   
 -1.55 -1.75   
MR60   1.896* 2.213*** 
   1.83 3.17 
DAY60   -2.355* -1.611** 
   -1.92 -2.13 
Constant 472.800** 232.299* 481.101*** 259.749** 
 2.30 1.81 2.65 2.23 
     
     
Durbin (score) chi2(1) 7.2886 4.0682 5.8687 2.7783 
 (p = 0.0069) (p = 0.0437) (p = 0.0154) (p = 0.0956) 
Wu-Hausman F(1,60) 6.9735 3.7022 5.4907 2.4798 
  (p = 0.0105) (p = 0.0591) (p = 0.0225) (p = 0.1206) 
     
This table presents 2SLS estimation with one instrument, where group C regressions control for the 30-day market return and 
30-day IPO numbers prior to the IPO while group D regressions control for the 60-day variables. The dependent variable is 
Underpricing which is the initial return between the first-trading day closing price and the IPO offering price, expressed as a 
percentage. UEO is the weighted average of the urban economic openness which is the sum of the city-level imports and exports 
as a share of this city’s GDP. The land-use right that a company owns in one city as a share of its overall land-use right is used 
as the weight. The instrumental variable for UEO is the natural logarithm of the disposable household income per capita 
(LNDINC). LNLAG is the natural logarithm of the time lag between issuing and listing dates. LSIZE is the natural logarithm of 
the IPO proceeds. ROREA is the return on real estate assets of a company. LNAGE is the natural logarithm of the period of time 
for which it has been running as a real estate company before the IPO. STATEO is equal to 1 if the company is state-owned, 0 
otherwise. CHINA is equal to 1 of the company is listed in Mainland China, 0 otherwise. MR30 and MR60 are 30- and 60-day 
market return before the IPO. DAY30 and DAY60 are the numbers of IPOs which have taken place 30 or 60 days prior to the 
IPO as a share of all the IPOs across the sample period respectively.  Z-statistics are in parentheses for 2SLS regressions. ***, 
**, * denote significance at 1%, 5% or 10% respectively. 
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Table 14 First-stage Regression of 2SLS 
Model: C1 C2 D1 D2 
     
LNDINC Coef. 44.7867 67.0882 44.3146 64.3094 
P-value 0.076 0.013 0.08 0.018 
     
R-squared 0.2408 0.2917 0.2400 0.2798 
F test 3.2474 6.5615 3.1755 5.9370 
Prob > F 0.0765 0.0129 0.0797 0.0178      
 
 
As there is no clear definition of or test for the weakness of an instrument, we at least 
report the results of the first-stage regression (Table 14), where the statistical significance of 
the instrumental variable that is used to explain the endogenous variable (UEO) is reported. The 
coefficients of LNDINC are significant throughout the four specifications, confirming a positive 
relationship between the disposable household income per capita and UEO. The R-squared is 
between 0.24 and 0.29 while the F statistic ranges from 3.25 to 6.56. However, it is noted that 
the F-test strongly relies on the number of endogenous variables and the number of instruments 
so that the more additional valid instruments used, the greater the F statistic of the joint 
significance of the instruments will be. Overall, the results suggest that the chosen instrument 
is appropriate for the model. 
4.4.3 Robustness Tests 
Multicollinearity  
In cross-sectional studies, variance inflation factors (VIF) are usually calculated to test 
for the presence of multicollinearity, which could lead to biased estimators. We report the VIFs 
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of our estimations in Panel B of Table 12. Following Chatterjee and Hadi (2006)29, since no 
VIF is larger than 10 and the average is not considerably larger than 1, we conclude that the 
estimation is not significantly affected by multicollinearity.   
Urban Economic Openness vs. Wider Economy  
As economic variables are usually highly correlated with each other, there may be 
concerns that the significant impact of UEO is actually associated with economic factors other 
than regional trade openness. Therefore, we control for the effect of the wider economy to 
determine whether foreign trade openness rather than the overall economic performance affects 
IPO underpricing. China is a developing country that has maintained a fast rate of economic 
growth for the last three decades and the difference in the GDP growth rates across regions and 
time is very small. Therefore, GDP levels instead of growth rates are used as they potentially 
capture other effects such as the size of the region or the developing scale. Since the city-level 
GDP also includes foreign trade volumes, we deduct the net exports from the local GDP to 
exclude the foreign trade contribution and take the natural logarithm form of it (LNNGDP). 
Once we obtain this measure at the city level, we then compute a weighted average to obtain 
the measure at company level following the same procedure used for UEO. As state ownership 
(STATEO) and IPO location (CHINA) can be considered alternative proxies and show similar 
results, in this part of robustness checks only results including state ownership are reported. 
Firstly, we use LNNGDP to replace UEO in the OLS regressions to estimate the impact of net 
regional GDP on IPO underpricing (columns E1 and E2 in Table 15), with Group 1 and 2 
controlling for 30- and 60-day market variables respectively. 
  
                                                 
29 They show that multicollinearity exists when there are VIFs larger than 10 and the average of all VIFs is larger 
than 1. The majority of the literature also argues that collinearity only starts to become an issue when there is a 
VIF larger than 30.  
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Table 15 shows that, in support of our expectation, the coefficients of LNNGP are 
negative but the relationship with IPO initial returns is not significant—with all other 
coefficients being similar to the results in Table 11. As LNNGDP excludes foreign trade, the 
correlation with UEO is low (0.11) and we therefore estimate an OLS model including both 
UEO and LNNGDP (F1 and F2). Coefficients and statistical significance of UEO are similar to 
the ones obtained in the baseline regressions (A1 and B1 in Table 11) and the net GDP is still 
not significant. This finding confirms that it is the regional trade openness rather than the wider 
economy which affects IPO underpricing of Chinese real estate companies. Finally, we estimate 
a 2SLS model controlling for LNNGDP. Compared to baseline models (C1 and D1 in Table 
13), results still hold. The economic effect of UEO is even stronger and the efficiency is 
improved (95% confidence level in both models G1 and G2), while we find no significant effect 
of LNNGDP on IPO initial returns, further confirming the robustness of the results.  
Market Changes and Time Dummies  
This study includes real estate IPOs from 1992 to 2013, which was a dynamic period 
during which the Chinese market underwent several stock market reforms. Therefore, it is 
reasonable to consider whether the relationship between UEO and real estate IPO underpricing 
has changed and whether the results remain robust. To control for the general changes in the 
Chinese market, we create four time dummies, each covering a five-year period (results 
presented in Table 16). With this approach, we only use four additional variables instead of 21 
year dummies and this allows us to save some degrees of freedom—very important considering 
the small sample size. This approach also seems reasonable because macroeconomic variables 
already reflect time variation and hence changes in the market dynamic. 
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 E1 E2 F1 F2 G1 G2 
 
      
UEO   -0.256** -0.273** -1.815** -1.534** 
 
  -2.02 -2.14 -2.05 -2.03 
LNNGDP -8.754 -8.856 -8.618 -8.827 -7.791 -8.695 
 -0.62 -0.67 -0.62 -0.67 -0.36 -0.47 
LNLAG 41.97** 32.13** 43.43** 34.17** 52.22*** 43.59*** 
 2.50 2.40 2.61 2.59 2.92 2.76 
LSIZE -45.39** -44.18** -42.37** -41.00** -24.01 -26.33 
 -2.32 -2.37 -2.29 -2.38 -1.14 -1.46 
ROREA 0.301* 0.267 0.293 0.258 0.245 0.215 
 1.72 1.38 1.63 1.28 1.25 1.27 
LNAGE -1.655 -2.086 -13.309 -14.504 -84.38 -71.86 
 -0.06 -0.07 -0.46 -0.52 -1.46 -1.45 
STATEO 67.76** 59.42* 76.79** 69.27** 131.8** 114.8** 
 2.15 1.87 2.49 2.26 2.20 2.23 
MR30 3.287*  3.050*  1.608  
 1.79 
 1.77  0.94  
DAY30 -0.785  -1.180  -3.590*  
 -0.90 
 -1.28  -1.65  
MR60  2.697***  2.575***  2.012** 
 
 2.97  3.05  2.24 
DAY60  -0.810*  -1.043*  -2.117** 
 
 -1.67  -1.95  -2.11 
Constant 256.8*** 297.0*** 286.6*** 328.9*** 468.6** 476.4*** 
 2.66 2.91 2.77 2.93 2.54 2.99 
 
      
Adj R-
squared 
0.552 0.601 0.562 0.615   
This table presents the OLS regressions using state-ownership (STATEO), including 30-day and 60-day market variables 
respectively. LNNGDP is the regional net GDP calculated as the regional GDP excludes the (Exports – Imports) in the same 
area. The dependent variable is Underpricing which is the initial return between the first-trading day closing price and the IPO 
offering price, expressed as a percentage. UEO is the weighted average of the urban economic openness which is the sum of 
the city-level imports and exports as a share of this city’s GDP. The land-use right that a company owns in one city as a share 
of its overall land-use right is used as the weight. LNLAG is the natural logarithm of the time lag between issuing and listing 
dates. LSIZE is the natural logarithm of the IPO proceeds. ROREA is the return on real estate assets of a company. LNAGE is 
the natural logarithm of the period of time for which the firm has been running as a real estate company before the IPO. STATEO 
is equal to 1 if the company is state-owned, 0 otherwise. MR30 and MR60 are 30- and 60-day market returns before the IPO. 
DAY30 and DAY60 are the IPO numbers in 30 and 60 days prior to IPO as a share of all the IPOs across the sample period 
respectively. t-statistics are in parentheses for OLS regressions and z-statistics are in parentheses for 2SLS regressions. ***, 
**, * denote significance at 1%, 5% or 10% respectively. 
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Comparing the baseline results (Table 11 and Table 13) with the ones in Table 16, we 
do not find significant differences. The coefficients of UEO remain negative and significant at 
a 95% confidence level, while the scale of the impact increases by 20% and 8% when 
controlling respectively for 30- and 60-day market conditions. The effect of the time lag 
between issuing and listing dates remains positive, while the significance is reduced. The firm 
size does not significantly affect IPO underpricing any longer and this is inconsistent with the 
information asymmetry theory, though supporting the main argument that there is the presence 
of a distortion in the application of classic theories to the Chinese market. 
2SLS Model with Two Instruments  
One limitation of using 2SLS estimation relates to the quality of instruments used in the 
first stage. By using disposable household income per capita, we have a just-identified case and 
therefore we cannot test for the exogeneity of the instrument, a key assumption of the 2SLS 
estimation. As an alternative measure to instrument UEO, we use the distance of each city to 
the nearest port, following Wang et al. (2011). As part of the policy started in 1979 to aim at a 
more globalized Chinese market, the government has agreed on fourteen coastal cities 
becoming major ports (e.g. Shanghai, Guangzhou, Dalian). Therefore, the distance to the 
nearest major port can be seen as a valid instrument for the city’s trade openness. We follow 
the same procedure used for UEO to compute the weighted average of the distances for every 
company. Results of the over-identified 2SLS estimation using the disposable household 
income per capita and the distance of the city to its nearest major port are reported in Table 17.    
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 H1 H2 I1 I2 
 
    
UEO -0.306** -0.295** -0.822*** -0.691** 
 -2.02 -2.18 -2.76 -2.51 
LNLAG 37.30** 25.61* 37.65*** 27.05** 
 2.03 1.80 2.98 2.32 
LSIZE -29.58 -33.09 -19.09 -24.96* 
 -1.52 -1.63 -1.38 -1.95 
ROREA 0.313* 0.299 0.300** 0.287** 
 1.70 1.51 2.11 2.19 
LNAGE 1.65 3.507 -15.2 -9.613 
 0.05 0.12 -0.50 -0.34 
STATEO 71.42** 69.42** 78.72** 74.31** 
 2.18 2.20 1.97 2.06 
MR30 2.947  2.346**  
 1.62 
 2.20  
DAY30 -0.301  -0.526  
 -0.26 
 -0.35  
MR60  2.495***  2.226*** 
 
 2.79  3.58 
DAY60  -1.232  -1.299* 
 
 -1.36  -1.71 
TIME1 123.1* 69.65 174.1** 111.3* 
 1.70 0.89 2.56 1.74 
TIME2 38.84 -9.149 62.14 12.9 
 0.77 -0.15 0.97 0.22 
TIME3 -6.753 -48.76 29.29 -20.5 
 -0.19 -1.09 0.57 -0.41 
TIME5 26.62 -27.87 25.79 -26.1 
 0.65 -0.62 0.43 -0.47 
Constant 104.5 223.9 107 220.5* 
 0.84 1.44 0.88 1.94 
Adjusted R-squared 0.577 0.625   
This table presents OLS regressions including 30-day and 60-day market variables respectively. All the regressions in this table 
are controlled for time dummies. One time dummy was created to cover every five years. Five dummies are created while one 
was omitted in the regression due to collinearity. The dependent variable is Underpricing which is the initial return between 
the first-trading day closing price and the IPO offering price, expressed as a percentage. UEO is the weighted average of the 
urban economic openness which is the sum of the city-level imports and exports as a share of this city’s GDP. The land-use 
right that a company owns in one city as a share of its overall land-use right is used as the weight. LNLAG is the natural 
logarithm of the time lag between issuing and listing dates. LSIZE is the natural logarithm of the IPO proceeds. ROREA is the 
return on real estate assets of a company. LNAGE is the natural logarithm of the period of time for which the firm has been 
running as a real estate company before the IPO. STATEO is equal to 1 if the company is state-owned, 0 otherwise. MR30 and 
MR60 are 30-day and 60-day market returns before the IPO. DAY30 and DAY60 are the IPO numbers in 30 days and 60 days 
prior IPO as a share of all the IPOs across the sample period respectively. t-statistics are in parentheses for OLS regressions 
and z-statistics are in parentheses for 2SLS regressions. ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5% or 10% respectively 
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Table 17 UEO and Underpricing (2SLS with Two Instruments) 
Dependent Variable 
Underpricing 
J1 J2 K1 K2 
 
    
UEO -0.756** -0.706** -0.888** -0.799*** 
 -0.35 -0.31 -0.35 -0.30 
LNLAG 47.36*** 52.10*** 39.94*** 44.50*** 
 11.66 10.85 11.55 10.63 
LSIZE -39.87*** -27.98** -37.41*** -26.15** 
 -11.74 -12.73 -11.45 -12.09 
ROREA 0.284** 0.262** 0.243* 0.222* 
 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.12 
LNAGE -37.04 -34.27 -43.4 -39.04 
 -32.30 -30.14 -31.69 -29.04 
STATEO 96.54***  93.89***  
 36.80 
 35.81  
CHINA  128.7***  126.9*** 
 
 37.75  36.15 
DAY30 -2.006 -1.942*   
 -1.26 -1.17 
  
MR30 2.587** 2.515**   
 1.07 1.02 
  
DAY60   -1.585** -1.402** 
 
  -0.66 -0.61 
MR60   2.299*** 2.325*** 
 
  0.66 0.61 
Constant 321.1*** 194.9* 375.1*** 240.5** 
 103.8 104.6 102.2 101.9 
 
    
Durbin (score) chi2(1) 2.9280 2.5001 5.0492 4.0607 
 (p=0.0817) (p=0.1138) (p=0.0246) (p=0.0439) 
Wu-Hausman F(1,60) 2.61930 2.2224 4.6644 3.6949 
 (p=0.1108) (p=0.1413) (p=0.0348) (p=0.0593) 
This table presents 2SLS estimations with two instruments, where group C regressions control for the 30-day market return 
and 30-day IPO numbers prior the IPO while group D regressions control for the 60-day variables. The dependent variable is 
Underpricing which is the initial return between the first-trading day closing price and the IPO offering price, expressed as a 
percentage. UEO is the weighted average of the urban economic openness which is the sum of the city-level imports and exports 
as a share of this city’s GDP. The land-use right that a company owns in one city as a share of its overall land-use right is used 
as the weight. The instrumental variables for the UEO is the natural logarithm of the disposable household income per capita 
and the weighted average distance between the city where the properties are and the nearest ports. LNLAG is the natural 
logarithm of the time lag between issuing and listing dates. LSIZE is the natural logarithm of the IPO proceeds. ROREA is the 
return on real estate assets of a company. LNAGE is the natural logarithm of the period of time for which the firm has been 
running as a real estate company before the IPO. STATEO is equal to 1 if the company is state-owned, 0 otherwise. CHINA is 
equal to 1 of the company is listed in Mainland China, 0 otherwise.  MR30 and MR60 are 30- and 60-day market returns before 
the IPO. DAY30 and DAY60 are the IPO numbers in 30 and 60 days prior IPO as a share of all the IPOs across the sample 
period respectively. z-statistics are in parentheses for 2SLS regressions. ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5% or 10% 
respectively. 
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Table 18 First-stage Regression of 2SLS and Exogeneity of Instruments 
Panel A: First stage regression report   
  J1 J2 K1 K2 
R-squared 0.3715 0.4128 0.3722 0.4039 
F test 8.1672 10.0757 8.2073 9.7712 
Prob > F 0.0007 0.0002 0.0007 0.0002      
Panel B: Over - identification test (exogeneity of instruments) 
 J1 J2 K1 K2 
p- value     
Sargan (score) 0.0437 0.1957 0.1539 0.5340 
Basmann 0.0543 0.2253 0.1803 0.5637 
 
  
The effect of UEO on IPO underpricing remains negative and significant, with 
coefficient decreasing while statistical significance is increasing. The negative results on LSIZE 
are now consistent with the classic theory that the larger the firm, the smaller the uncertainty 
and therefore the smaller the underpricing of the firm is. A more significant relationship is 
found between the return on real estate assets and underpricing. As we have argued earlier, 
investors see the return on real estate assets as a reflection of a real estate company’s earning 
ability and they are more willing to pay more for companies with higher returns. Durbin and 
Wu-Hausman statistics are also reported here to test for the exogeneity of UEO. Excluding 
model J2 (insignificant Durbin and Wu-Hausman statistics), all other models report significant 
statistics, suggesting that UEO is indeed endogenous. Even though disposable household 
income per capita is a valid instrument, it may not be strong enough (see also Table 14). The 
joint significance of the two instruments is considerably increased according to the statistics of 
the first-stage regressions reported in Panel A of Table 18. The R- squared increases by at least 
42% and the F-test increases by at least 54%.  
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As we have an over-identified case with two instrumental variables and one endogenous 
variable (UEO), we can run the over-identifying restriction tests to determine whether the 
instrumental variables are uncorrelated with the error term (i.e. exogeneity of the instruments). 
The Sargan (1958) and Basmann (1960) Chi-squared statistics are calculated by regressing the 
sample residuals on the error term and the null hypothesis is ‘the instruments are exogenous’. 
We report the Sargan and Basmann statistics in Panel B of Table 18. If we exclude regression 
J1, all other models report insignificant statistics, suggesting that we cannot reject the null 
hypothesis. From the post-estimation tests on the quality of instruments, we conclude that, 
jointly, the two instruments are valid and effective for UEO and the negative effect of UEO on 
IPO underpricing is robust.  
4.5 Summary 
As the extreme IPO underpricing in emerging markets is not fully explained by existing 
empirical studies using theories valid in developed markets, we suggest a different approach to 
improve the explanation of this phenomenon. We find that the IPO initial return of companies 
with localised businesses is negatively affected by the urban economic openness (UEO) of the 
regions where the companies’ businesses are operated. Higher UEO can lead to higher demand 
for real estate, or through the Balassa Samuelson effect, to higher wages in the non-tradable 
goods sector and hence to higher real estate prices. Moreover, an improvement in UEO can 
increase productivity, which is found to be a major determinant of a firm’s profitability. All 
these channels decrease the uncertainty about the IPO valuation of a company. As a result, 
issuers have less incentive to underprice IPO shares. Chinese real estate companies provide a 
suitable experimental laboratory to establish this relationship. We find that these firms indeed 
show strong geographic investment patterns focused locally—usually at city level—and we 
also observe a highly heterogeneous degree of foreign trade across Chinese cities.  
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The findings demonstrate the influence of economic integration even within the country 
on IPO valuations. This study provides further evidence for the argument in the globalization 
literature that openness improves financial development. State-owned companies are also found 
to experience higher underpricing than privately owned companies, implying a negative impact 
of the special political system on the transparency in the financial market. Moreover, unlike 
previous studies, we show that a 60-day market return is a better proxy for market sentiment 
than the 30-day market return, which is attributed to the immaturity of the Chinese IPO market.  
Comparing to the significant impacts of variables related to the special regime, such as 
state ownership, the results on variables proxy for the information asymmetry are quite mixed. 
Overall, information-asymmetry related variables show some influence on the IPO outcomes. 
However, the impact is not as strong and consistent as the market variables, indicating a weaker 
explanatory power of classic theories than that of behavioral arguments in China. This implies 
extra caution to be taken when applying the long-established classic theories in emerging 
markets, as they are exclusively developed under a mature market model with empirical 
evidence drawn from western datasets.  
Finally, results are robust to the estimation of models with alternative specifications, 
including 2SLS models with disposable household income per capita and distance to ports as 
instruments.  
To conclude, the results have implications for investors, owners and underwriters who 
may differentiate between IPOs of locally operating companies in more or less open regions. 
The findings also of interest to policy makers who focus on the impact of regional economic 
development on local companies.  
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Chapter 5 : IPO Valuation and the Role of Geographic and Asset 
Diversification: Evidence from U.S. REITs 
In Chapter 4, we have identified a relationship between the urban economic openness 
and IPO short-run performance by using a real estate sample. The results imply the important 
role of the underlying real estate assets in the IPO valuation of a real estate company which 
needs to be further explored. In this chapter, we introduce another macroeconomic factor and 
investigate how the geographic locations of the underlying property assets can affect the real 
estate IPO valuation.  
5.1 Introduction and Hypothesis Development 
This study examines how the geographic (location) and property type diversification of 
a company’s underlying assets affect its IPO valuation and short-run performance. Although 
the investment diversification of public companies has been extensively explored, studies on 
geographic and asset type diversification have been limited by a lack of data. The special 
characteristics and corporate governance rules of real estate companies offer an opportunity to 
construct several measures of diversification for both property type and asset location. Previous 
studies have partly explained the difference in the short-run performance of real estate and 
industrial IPOs, finding the former inadequately explained by the widely accepted theories 
based on information asymmetry. One argument is that real estate IPOs perform differently due 
to the high reporting standards and level of information made public by these companies. In 
other words, there is better transparency and less uncertainty about the valuation of real estate 
companies, leading to lower underpricing.  
As mentioned in Chapter 2, real estate IPOs, along with the IPOs of other financial 
companies, are usually excluded from mainstream IPO studies. However, depending upon the 
sample size, time period, and market, the average initial return of real estate IPOs can be 
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negative. The relatively low underpricing, compared to industrial IPOs and the occasional 
overpricing of real estate IPOs, has become ‘a puzzle within a puzzle’.  Most classic theories 
have no or very limited explanatory power in the initial returns of real estate IPOs, especially 
as their assumption of information asymmetry implies a lowest initial return of 0% and cannot 
account for the overpricing.  
Other attempts to explain the difference focus on the special characteristics of real estate 
IPOs, specifically the fund-like structure, the low involvement of institutional investors and the 
underlying real asset holdings. Section 2.6 in Chapter 2 provides a detailed review of the studies 
on real estate IPOs. In short, the former two characteristics particularly existed before the 1990s 
and cannot account for the real estate IPO performance after the 1990s.  Previous studies 
suggest further investigations into the roles of the underlying real assets. 
This study builds on these two strands of literature (effect of diversification on firm 
performance and real estate IPO performance) to propose a new approach to explain the IPO 
valuation of real estate companies, which does not require the assumption of information 
asymmetries, and sheds some light upon the variation in IPO initial returns within the U.S. 
REIT market. 
While much of the limited literature on real estate IPOs is focused on why the initial 
returns are, on average, much lower than those of industrial IPOs, we cannot ignore that 
underpricing is also observed among real estate IPOs. For example, we find a 3.7% average 
initial return for the 175 IPOs in our sample with a standard deviation of 9.3%. However, the 
minimum initial return in our sample is -12.7%, whereas the maximum initial return is 45.8%, 
presenting a considerable variation.30 The aim of this study is to investigate what determines 
the IPO valuation and drives this variation in REIT IPO initial returns, with a focus on the 
                                                 
30 For more examples of initial returns of real estate IPOs, please refer to Chapter 2. 
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special characteristics of public real estate companies introduced by their underlying real asset 
holdings, rather than focusing on why REIT IPO underpricing is, on average, much lower than 
industrial IPOs. 
The corporate diversification literature focuses on the impact of diversification on return 
performance and asset valuation across different industries and consistently finds support for 
the existence of a diversification discount.31 Montgomery (1994) suggests that, in general, 
diversification does not positively affect firm performance and, in fact, may reduce expected 
returns by decreasing investment risk. In a real estate context, it is found that more diversified 
REITs have lower valuations than more concentrated REITs. The negative effect of 
diversification across property types is also documented by Campbell et al. (2003) and 
Cronqvist et al. (2001).  
More recently, a growing literature examines how investment and corporate activities 
are influenced by the geographic location, including geographic diversification. Coval and 
Moskowitz (2001) document that investors prefer firms with headquarters in the city in which 
the managers live. Similar ‘home bias’ results are found in several studies arguing that investing 
in local firms provides investors with informational advantages.32 For example, Landier et al. 
(2009) find that human capital and asset management decisions are affected by geographic 
dispersion, while Kang and Kim (2008) provide evidence that geographic proximity affects 
corporate acquisition decisions. However, these studies measure geographic proximity or 
dispersion based on the location of the company relative to its investors rather than on the 
locations of the firm’s actual business activities or investments, due to the difficulty in data 
collection and construction. 
                                                 
31 See, for example, Berger and Ofek (1995), Comment and Jarrell (1995), and Hund et al. (2010).  
32 See García and Norlib (2012) for a list of related studies.  
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Real estate companies with immobile underlying assets should be more prone to 
geographic influences. The transparency of real estate companies also makes it possible to 
construct geographic diversification based on exact asset holdings in different locations. The 
hypothesis of this study on the effects of asset locations on IPO initial returns is built on an 
investor base argument that is closely related to Merton (1987) and García and Norlib (2012). 
Merton (1987) argues that stocks with less investor recognition must offer higher expected 
returns to compensate investors for increased risk. García and Norlib (2012) study the 
geographic concentration of corporate business activities and show that ‘local’ firms have 
smaller investor bases and higher stock returns to compensate investors for concentrated risk. 
Ritter and Welch (2002) conclude that IPOs are one-off agency-based events in which initial 
returns are heavily dependent on the valuation of the IPO by underwriters and investors. 
Fundamental market valuation, asset pricing, and liquidity theories are unlikely to be able to 
explain short-run performance. Following Merton (1987), we argue that more focused firms 
have less investor recognition, which is normally detrimental to the success of an IPO as it 
decides the level of subscriptions. Therefore, issuers and underwriters need to underprice the 
shares to attract sufficient awareness of and participation from investors, resulting in higher 
initial returns. Although information-asymmetry-based theories are unable to explain the 
negative initial returns sometimes observed for REIT IPOs, the investor base argument does 
not assume the existence of information asymmetry and can also account for overpricing. 
Presented in this study is the first attempt to introduce a more exact method to calculate 
geographic diversification. The findings support the hypothesis that more diversified real estate 
companies (by property type or location) indeed experience lower IPO underpricing. 
Based on the deadweight cost theory by Chan et al. (2009), we develop the second 
hypothesis. Substantial holdings of real estate properties give REITs more bargaining power in 
the IPO valuation. Chan et al. (2009) argue that when the IPO companies can sell the properties 
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quickly and cost effectively in the private market, the issuers will have less incentive to 
underprice shares. Should an IPO fail (i.e. be undersubscribed) they can always sell the 
properties in the private market instead. That is, the initial returns will decrease when the 
deadweight cost of the IPO is low. Conversely, when it is relatively difficult to dispose of the 
assets in the private market, issuers will underprice more to guarantee the IPO success.  
The investor base argument is consistent with the deadweight cost theory. When the 
investor base or recognition of real estate companies increases with increasing geographic 
diversification, selling underlying assets in the private market becomes easier and cheaper. 
Therefore, according to the deadweight cost theory, issuers have less incentive to underprice, 
if not overprice, IPO shares, resulting in lower initial returns. More importantly, we discover a 
moderation effect that the deadweight cost factor holds in the relationship between the IPO 
valuation and the geographic diversification.  
We argue that in a period when a company could liquidate their properties more 
efficiently, the impact of geographic diversification on the IPO valuation will be weakened. In 
other words, for a highly geographically concentrated company, the issuer will underprice the 
shares relatively less if they can sell the properties in the private market quickly and cost-
effectively, should the IPO fail. As higher returns and transaction volumes in the private market 
are indicators of a friendlier condition for selling properties, we find evidence supporting the 
second hypothesis that the scale of the impact of the geographic concentration on IPO initial 
returns is reduced when the return and liquidity (transaction turnover) is higher in the private 
market.  
Despite the varying effects diversification may have on a company’s performance and 
the mechanisms through which these effects are transmitted, the measurement of diversification, 
and especially geographic diversification of particular businesses, at company level is not 
straightforward. Real estate markets are decidedly local in nature, which may provide an 
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information advantage to firms and individuals who have invested in obtaining local market 
knowledge. In addition, most real estate companies focus their portfolios on one or a few 
property types with a clear definition of their concentration strategy prior to their IPO. This, 
coupled with the fact that there is greater homogeneity in the structure and firm characteristics 
among REITs than within other industries, makes REITs a suitable laboratory to disentangle 
the effect on IPO initial returns of diversification from other cross-firm characteristics—as 
Hartzell et al. (2014) also argue.  
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows: Section 5.2 presents the data 
collection, variable construction, and methodology. Section 5.3 discusses the main results and 
relevant robustness checks, while the last section concludes this study. As a detailed review on 
the real estate and general IPO literature can be found in Chapter 2 as well as Chapter 4, we do 
not repeat them in this chapter.  
5.2 Data and Methodology  
The sample includes 171 US real estate IPOs from 1995 to 2014 and is collected from 
the Security Data Company (SDC) New Issues Database. We only include IPOs with 
information on both the offer price and first-trading-day closing price as both are required to 
calculate initial returns. Firm and issuing-level characteristics (e.g. venture-capital status, 
pricing technique, and offer size) are also obtained from the SDC database. Control variables 
for general market conditions at the time of the IPO (e.g. pre-IPO market return and turnover) 
are collected from Thomson Reuters DataStream. The total return on the NCREIF Property 
Index (NPI) is included to control for conditions in the private real estate market. 33  The 
NECREIF quarterly transaction data is used to calculate the volume-based turnover in order to 
                                                 
33 Established in 1982, NCREIF is a not-for-profit institutional real estate industry association that collects, 
processes, validates, and disseminates information on the risk/return characteristics of commercial real estate 
assets owned by institutional (primarily pension and endowment fund) investors. The property composition of the 
NPI changes quarterly as data contributing NCREIF members buy and sell properties. However, all historical 
property-level data remain in the database and index. 
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capture the liquidity in the private market. Our property type and geographic diversification 
variables are manually extracted from the IPO prospectus, the 10-K fillings for the IPO year, 
or the SNL Property database. 
The IPO initial return (IR) is computed as the difference between the closing price on 
the first trading day (hereafter the close price) and the IPO offer price, as a percentage of the 
offer price. To recall, we follow the majority of the empirical studies and do not adjust the IPO 
initial return by market return in the previous two chapters as the average market return is rather 
minor compared to the high level of underpricing of industrial IPOs. However, we cannot 
assume so when it comes to real estate IPOs which experience lower initial returns. Therefore, 
we adjust the initial return by subtracting the market return on the first day of trading as follows: 
𝐼𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛 =  
(𝐶𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 − 𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒)
𝑂𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒
− 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑛   (%) 
 Equation 18 
 
We construct two Herfindahl Indexes to measure both geographic and property type (or 
sector/asset-type) diversification. For each IPO company, we first calculate the share of 
properties in each state by manually extracting information on the size (square feet) of real 
estate holdings in that state at the time of the IPO. For certain property types (e.g. hotels, 
healthcare centres and multifamily communities) where property size is not reported in square 
feet, other size measurements (e.g. number of rooms and units) are used. Similarly, we collect 
information on the value of each property and calculate the percentage of assets for each 
property type. For hotel assets (with property values not reported), we use the product of the 
average daily rate, number of rooms, and the average occupancy rate.34 The Herfindahl Index 
                                                 
34 As the property type-level value is not reported for Select Income REIT, we equally divide the value by the 
number of asset type. For Boston Properties Inc. and Prime Group Realty Trust where the value of properties is 
not reported, we use the size of properties instead. We also estimate the models excluding these IPOs and results 
do not change significantly. 
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for geographic and property type diversification is calculated as the sum of the squared 
proportions, as follows: 
 







where 𝑃𝑖 represents the proportion of properties the company owns in a state or in an 
asset type and n is the total number of states or property types in which the company invests. 
The Herfindahl Index can range from 0 to 10000 with higher values representing higher levels 
of concentration. For estimation purpose, we scale both indexes by 10000, leaving a range 
between 0 and 1. 
We next construct a Herfindahl Index at the economic region level for each IPO 
company, by grouping its properties into eight economic regions as defined by Hartzell et al. 
(1987). 35  This index allows us to test whether the primary measure of geographical 
diversification is appropriate and to determine if the underlying economy is driving the initial 
returns, rather than the investor base/recognition argument.  
As a robustness check, we test four alternative geographic measures. Specifically, we 
include the number of states where the IPO company invests properties. We also create a 
dummy variable which is set equal to 1 if the headquarter state of the company is also the home 
to the largest concentration of properties. Finally, as a measure of geographic proximity, we 
calculate the average distance between each state where the company owns properties and its 
                                                 
35 Hartzell et al. (1987) divide all the states into eight regions, according to their alike underlying economies, which 
are New England, Mid-Atlantic Corridor, Old South, Industrial Midwest, Farm Belt, Mineral Extraction Area, 
South California and North California. For more details, please refer to their paper. 
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headquarter state. We construct both simple average and weighted-average variables where the 
share of total size of properties in each state is used as the weight, presented in the following:  
 















where 𝑑𝑖𝑗 is the distance (in miles) between state 𝑖 where company 𝑗 owns properties 
and the headquarter state of company 𝑗, n is the total number of states where company 𝑗 owns 
properties, and 𝑝𝑖𝑗 is the percentage of the portfolio that company 𝑗 owns in state 𝑖.  
Similarly, we include two alternative measures of property type diversification. We 
construct a dummy variable which is set equal to 1 if the firm invests in just one property type 
and 0 otherwise (e.g. a focused REIT has a value of 1). We also create a variable that is equal 
to the number of property types in which a REIT invests.  
We use the one-quarter lagged NCREIF PPI return (LNCREIF) and private market 
liquidity (LIQUIDITY) as indicators of the deadweight cost. LIQUIDITY is measured by the 
percentage of properties in the NCREIF Index that were sold in the IPO quarter. To test the 
second hypothesis, we interact the geographic diversification variable with each indicator of 
the deadweight cost.   
We also include firm- and market-level control variables which are similar to those in 
previous two Chapters. Specifically, we include firm size (LSIZE) and two dummy variables 
indicating the use of book-building pricing technique (BB) and venture-capital-backed status 
(VB). We also include MRETURN and VOLUME which measure the market return and IPO 
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number prior to the IPO respectively. As discussed in Section 2.4 that the pre-IPO market return 
measures the sentiment which drives up the first-day closing price, we expect a positive 
relationship between the MRETURN and real estate IPO initial returns. As an alternative to the 
lagged NCREIF NPI return, we weight LNCREIF by the percentage of properties each REIT 
owns in each of the four geographic regions defined by NCREIF: East, West, South and 
Midwest. Finally, we control for IPO investment opportunities available in each state by 
constructing a state-level IPO density variable. DENSITY is equal to the number of firms issuing 
IPOs that are headquartered in one state in a sample year, divided by the state population in that 
year, weighted by the size of the portfolio that the issuing firm has in each of the states. Table 
19 reports the definitions of all variables included in this study and associated data sources. 
Table 20 presents summary statistics for the regression variables. The average market-
adjusted initial return for the full sample (171 IPOs) is 3.70%. This is greater than the average 
initial return of 2.79% recorded by Chan et al. (2013) from 1996 to 2010 and less than the 5.34% 
average initial return documented by Gokkaya et al. (2015) from 1993 to 2007. After excluding 
28 real estate operating companies (REOCs) in the sample, the average initial return is 2.34%. 
The relatively low initial return supports the notion that industrial and real estate (especially 
REIT) IPOs might be materially different. For example, according to Ritter (2017), the average 
initial return of US industrial IPOs is constantly above zero across the sample period, with a 
minimum of 5.7% in 2008 and a maximum of 71.1% in 1999. The minimum initial return in 
our sample is -12.7%, while the maximum initial return is 45.8%. The standard deviation is 
9.3%.  
As expected, few real estate IPOs are venture-capital backed and the majority of real 
estate IPOs use book-building to price their shares. Average total IPO proceeds (LSIZE 
represents the log-transformed total proceeds) is $265.85 million, a value similar to the mean 
industrial IPO size as reported in Ritter (2017) for the period 1999-2015, suggesting that real 
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estate IPOs are not necessarily small-firm IPOs. Consistent with the focused geographic 
strategy of most listed real estate companies and the localised nature, the average number of 
states in which REITs own properties is nine. Furthermore, 17 of 125 companies, for which we 
have full geographic information, concentrate all their investments in one state. In contrast, only 
six IPO companies invest in more than half of the U.S. states. In addition, 57 companies hold 
the largest percentage of their portfolio in the state where they are headquartered, indicating a 
substantial home bias.  Finally, 83 of 104 REITs, for which we have data, invest in only one 
property type.  
Few statistically significant correlations are uncovered among our independent 
variables (all below 0.3, with many approximately zero). Table 21 contains the correlations 
between different measures of diversification/concentration.  Correlations are positive if both 
proxies represent diversification (e.g. DIST and DIST_W) or concentration (HHI_GEO and 
HHI_GEO_ECO; FOCUSED and HHI_ASSET). Negative coefficients are found when a 
diversification proxy is correlated with a concentration proxy (e.g. DIST and HHI_GEO; 
LASSET and HHI_ASSET). The correlations between all proxies for geography have an absolute 
coefficient above 0.56, while proxies for asset type diversification display even stronger 
correlations (the minimum is 0.87). Interestingly, no significant relation is found between 
geographic and asset type diversification/concentration measures. The only marginally 
significant coefficient is found between HHI_GEO and the first two proxies of asset type 




Table 19 Variables Description: Firm-, Issuing- and Geographic Factors (Chapter 5)  
Variable Description  
IR Market-adjusted IPO initial return which is the difference between the IPO offer price and the first-trading-day closing 
price, excluding the market return on the IPO day. Source: SDC Database and CRSP 
VB A dummy variable which equals 1 if the IPO is venture-capital-backed; 0 otherwise. Source: SDC Database 
BB A dummy variable which equals 1 if the IPO uses bookbuilding as pricing technique. Source: SDC Database 
LSIZE Log-transformed total proceeds of the IPO. Source: SDC Database 
MRETURN Three-month cumulative market return before the IPO date. Source: DataStream 
VOLUME The number of IPOs in a certain year divided by the total number of IPO across the sample period, presented as a 
percentage. Source: SDC Database 
LNCREIF One-quarter lagged NCREIF Property Index Return. Source: NCREIF Website 
LNCREIF_W One-quarter lagged NCREIF Property Index Return, weighted by the size of the property assets that the IPO company 
has in each of the four geographical regions by NCREIF definition, which are East, West, South and Midwest. Source: 
NCREIF Website 
LIQUIDITY Transaction turnover which is the percentage of the number of properties sold from the NCREIF NPI Index as a measure 
of private market liquidity. Source: NCREIF 
DENSITY The state-level IPO density which is, for one year, the number of IPOs that headquartered in the state divided by the 
population in this state. For each IPO, it is weighted by the size of the property assets that the IPO company has in each 
of the states. Source: SDC Database and The United States Census Bureau  
LSTATES Number of states where the IPO company's property assets are located, log-transformed. Source: IPO Prospectus and 10-
K File 
HEAD A dummy variable which equals 1 if the company has most of its properties in its headquarter state, 0 otherwise. Source: 
IPO Prospectus and 10-K File.  
DIST Average geographic proximity which measures the distance between the state where the IPO company's property assets 




























Table 19 Variables Description: Firm-, Issuing- and Geographic Factors (Continued)  
Variable Description  
DIST_W Geographic proximity which measures the distance between the state where the IPO company's property assets are 
located and the state where the company's headquarter is located, weighted by the size of the property assets that the 
IPO company has in the state. Source: IPO Prospectus and 10-K File 
HHI_GEO Geographic Herfindahl index which is calculated as the sum of the squared shares of property size that the IPO 
company has in each state; after scaling it by 10000, it ranges from 0 to 1 with lower value representing higher 
geographic diversification. Source: IPO Prospectus and 10-K File 
HHI_GEO_ECO Geographic Herfindahl index which is calculated as the sum of the squared shares of property size that the IPO 
company has in each of the eight economic regions which are defined by Hartzell et al (1987); after scaling it by 
10000, it ranges from 0 to 1 with lower value representing higher geographic diversification. Source: IPO Prospectus 
and 10-K File 
FOCUSED A dummy variable which equals 1 if it is focused-REIT, 0 otherwise; Source: CRSP and SNL 
LASSET Number of asset types that the IPO company has, log-transformed. Source: IPO Prospectus and 10-K File 
HHI_ASSET Asset-type-based Herfindahl index which is calculated as the sum of the squared shares of property value that the IPO 
company has in each property type; after scaling it by 10000, it ranges from 0 to 1 with lower value representing higher 
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Table 20 Summary Statistics of Variables 
Variables Mean Median Min Max StD N 
IR 3.697 0.750 -12.72 45.84 9.290 171 
VB 0.041 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.199 171 
BB 0.988 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.108 171 
LSIZE 5.167 5.249 1.609 7.877 0.968 171 
MRETURN 5.420 4.929 -15.84 34.35 6.664 171 
VOLUME 5.425 5.340 1.644 10.50 1.953 171 
LNCREIF 2.806 2.820 -7.330 5.430 1.797 171 
LNCREIF_W 2.811 2.967 -7.419 5.620 1.549 125 
LIQUIDITY 3.402 3.321 0.686 6.383 1.443 171 
DENSITY 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.000 129 
LSTATES 1.731 1.792 0.000 3.761 0.988 125 
HEAD 0.456 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.501 125 
DIST 965.3 1029 0.000 2321 594.9 125 
DIST_W 890.2 971.6 0.000 3161 624.0 125 
HHI_GEO 0.385 0.273 0.048 1.000 0.305 125 
HHI_GEO_ECO 0.457 0.345 0.046 1.000 0.298 125 
FOCUSED 0.798 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.403 104 
LASSET 0.192 0.000 0.000 1.609 0.407 104 
HHI_ASSET 0.926 1.000 0.329 1.000 0.171 104 
 
 
Table 21 Correlation Matrix 
Panel A: Correlation between diversification variables and control variables 
  VB BB LSIZE MRETURN VOLUME LNCREIF LNCREIF_W LIQUIDITY 
VB 1        
BB 0.0225 1       
LSIZE -0.0155 0.2063* 1      
MRETURN -0.0552 0.0649 0.0393 1     
VOLUME -0.0327 0.0288 -0.2108* 0.1369* 1    
LNCREIF 0.0674 0.0217 0.0132 -0.2822* 0.2303* 1   
LNCREIF_W 0.0820 0.0306 0.0662 -0.2286* 0.1621* 0.9759* 1  
LIQUIDITY 0.0401 0.0063 0.0712 -0.0846 0.2713* 0.3866* 0.3560* 1 
DENSITY -0.0423 0.1299 0.1161 0.0604 0.1914* 0.0985 0.1064 0.0613 
LSTATES 0.1226 0.0652 0.1952* 0.0423 -0.0908 -0.0483 -0.0744 -0.1152 
DIST 0.0837 -0.0322 0.1838* -0.0054 -0.0831 -0.0759 -0.0739 -0.0541 
DIST_W 0.0355 -0.0787 0.1268 -0.0235 -0.1476* -0.1236 -0.1349 -0.0884 
HHI_GEO -0.1184 -0.0311 -0.1242 -0.0478 0.0622 0.0336 0.0746 0.0462 
HHI_GEO_ECO -0.1105 -0.0275 -0.1869* -0.0827 0.1107 0.1077 0.1352 0.1136 
FOCUSED -0.2006* -0.0689 -0.1199 0.0095 -0.093 -0.0766 -0.0771 -0.0219 
LASSET 0.2314* 0.0649 0.1119 0.0073 0.0750 0.1020 0.1003 0.0615 



























Table 21 Correlation Matrix 
Panel B: Correlation between diversification variables 
  
DENSITY LSTATES DIST DIST_W HHI_GEO HHI_GEO_ 
ECO 
FOCUSED LASSET HHI_ASSET 
DENSITY 1         
LSTATES -0.0012 1        
DIST 0.0833 0.6136* 1       
DIST_W 0.0431 0.5629* 0.7898* 1      
HHI_GEO 0.0705 -0.9028* -0.6155* -0.6471* 1     
HHI_GEO_ECO -0.0262 -0.7835* -0.7651* -0.7642* 0.8249* 1    
FOCUSED -0.1219 0.1492 0.0087 0.1235 -0.2597* -0.1137 1   
LASSET 0.1404 -0.1276 0.0355 -0.1134 0.2152* 0.0800 -0.9415* 1  
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Following the IPO literature, we conduct a multivariate analysis to test the effects of 
both geographic and property type diversification by estimating the following equations using 
OLS:   
 












The dependent variable in both equations is the firm’s initial return (IR),  𝛽1 captures 
the effects of geographic and property type diversification, respectively, and 𝑉𝑖 represents a 
vector of m control variables. 
5.3 Results and Robustness Tests 
5.3.1 Geographic and Property Type Diversification 
Table 22 reports the main results of the initial return model using several measures of 
firm-level geographic diversification/concentration. Robust standard errors are reported below 
the coefficients. Ideally, we would include annual fixed effects to control for time variation in 
local, state, and national economic conditions, not captured by other control variables including 
conditions in commercial real estate markets. However, with 125 total IPO observations, we 
use three-year windows for the time fixed effects to preserve more degrees of freedom. The 
sensitivity of the results to this assumption is examined below. Results reported in column (1) 
of Table 22 contain the primary variable of interest, HHI_GEO. 
If we recall, we present a positive impact of the venture-backed status on IPO 
underpricing based on industrial IPOs in Chapter 3, contradicting the conventional certification 
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argument by Megginson and Weiss (1991) . However, a negative and significant coefficient of 
VB is found in this study. Real estate IPOs backed by venture capital firms are found to be 
associated with significantly lower initial returns which presents a certification role of the 
venture capitalists in real estate IPO valuation. 
 The size of the offering (LSIZE) is not predictive of initial returns. This is in sharp 
contrast to most empirical studies of industrial IPOs. However, it is consistent with the 
argument that classic information-asymmetry-based theories have little ability to explain the 
cross-section variation of initial returns of REIT IPOs (Brounen and Eichholtz, 2002, Wong et 
al., 2013b). In fact, as we can see now it is not the first time that the firm size, arguably the most 
commonly used measure of information asymmetry or uncertainty, fails to or only weakly 
explains the initial returns of IPOs in certain markets or sectors in this thesis.  
The estimated coefficient of the broad-based stock market return in the three months 
prior to the IPO (MRETURN) is positive and highly significant, indicating higher initial returns 
in rising markets. Once again, this finding supports the behavioural arguments (Loughran and 
Ritter, 2002, Ljungqvist et al., 2006) which posit that IPO short-run performance is also driven 
by investor sentiment. The estimated coefficient on VOLUME cannot be distinguished from 
zero, which suggests that the IPO volume prior to the IPO does not affect pricing in this industry.  
The inclusion of MRETURN controls for the recent performance of the general stock 
market. However, given the unique features of real estate industry, we posit that the 
performance of an IPO is also driven by the recent return performance of the underlying private 
real estate asset market. The estimated coefficient on LNCREIF is positive and highly 
significant. Thus, a hot private real estate market is also predictive of higher first-day IPO 
returns, even after controlling for recent returns in the general stock market. 
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Table 22 Geographic Diversification and IPO Initial Returns 
Dependent Variable 
Underpricing 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
VB -4.368* -4.876** -5.080** -5.116** -4.767* 
 -2.317 -2.355 -1.945 -2.402 -2.568 
BB -7.811 -8.777 -7.646 -8.717 -8.490 
 -8.336 -8.738 -7.184 -6.546 -7.249 
LSIZE 1.321 1.396 1.078 1.28 1.295 
 1.293 1.332 1.327 1.296 1.332 
MRETURN 0.432*** 0.440*** 0.411** 0.412** 0.414** 
 0.155 0.155 0.163 0.162 0.158 
VOLUME -1.233 -0.205 -1.299 -1.233 -1.266 
 -1.065 -1.573 -1.101 -1.07 -1.073 
LNCREIF 1.164** 0.989* 1.252** 1.058** 1.112** 
 0.491 0.553 0.528 0.529 0.529 
LIQUIDITY -0.248 -0.657 -0.173 -0.239 -0.262 
 -0.569 -0.683 -0.572 -0.573 -0.574 
DENSITY -6,156** -5,346* -5,710** -5,272* -5,319* 
 -2,663 -2,765 -2,738 -2,802 -2,743 
HHI_GEO 4.739**     
 2.028 
    
LSTATES  -0.838    
  -0.737    
HEAD   1.775   
   1.486   
DIST_W    -0.002*  
    -0.001  
DIST     -0.001 
 
    -0.001 
Time Dummies Y Y Y Y Y 
Constant 12.80 10.29 14.53 17.14 17.03 
 13.18 15.25 12.47 12.58 12.9 
Observations 125 125 125 125 125 
Adj R-squared 0.257 0.212 0.239 0.245 0.238 
This table presents Ordinary Least Squares estimations for a cross-section of real estate IPOs that have taken place between 
1995 and 2014 in the U.S.. The dependent variable is Underpricing which is the initial return between the first-trading day 
closing price and the IPO offer price, adjusted for market returns and expressed as a percentage.  The variable of interest is 
HHI_GEO in column (1), representing the geographic diversification which is calculated as the sum of the squared shares of 
property size that the IPO company has in each state, scaled by 10000, ranging from 0 to 1 with lower value representing higher 
geographic diversification. HHI_GEO is replaced by LSTATES in column (2), which is the natural log of the number of states 
where the company invests properties. Head in column (3) is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the company has most of its 
properties in the headquarter state; 0 otherwise. DIST_W in column (4) is the geographic proximity which measures the distance 
between the state where the IPO company's property assets are located and the state where the company's headquarter is located, 
weighted by the size of the property assets that the IPO company has in the state. DIST in column (5) is simply the average 
geographic proximity. VB is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the IPO is venture-capital-backed; 0 otherwise. BB is a dummy 
variable which equals 1 if the IPO uses bookbuilding as the pricing technique; 0 otherwise. LSIZE is the log-transformed total 
proceeds of the IPO. MRETURN is the three-month cumulative market return before the IPO date, based on the DataStream 
Market Index. VOLUME is measured as the number of IPOs in a certain year divided by the total number of IPOs across the 
sample period, presented as a percentage. LNCREIF is the one-quarter lagged NCREIF Property Index Return. LIQUIDITY is 
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the primary market liquidity measured by the number of properties sold in the IPO year as a percentage of the total outstanding 
properties that year. DENSITY measures the state-level IPO density which is, for one year, the number of IPOs that 
headquartered in the state divided by the population in this state, weighted by the size of the property assets that the IPO 
company has in each of the states. Time dummies are included for all the estimations. One time dummy is created for every 
3-year window. t-statistics are corrected for robustness and presented below the coefficient estimates. ***, **, * denote 
significance at 1%, 5% or 10% respectively. 
 
 
The first explanatory variable related to geography, DENSITY, proxies for the exposure 
investors have to the broader IPO market in the state where the IPO firm is headquartered. The 
estimated coefficient on DENSITY is negative and significant at the 5% level, suggesting that a 
higher concentration of IPOs in the state in which the firm is headquartered reduce initial returns 
because the process of information sharing becomes more efficient. This supports the 
information-spillover argument by Altı (2005) who argues that there is an unknown common 
factor in the IPO valuation which will be gradually revealed by previous IPOs.  
We now turn to our primary variable of interest. The coefficient estimate of HHI_GEO 
is positive and significant. As the Herfindahl Index is scaled by 10000, the result shows that 
1000 points increase in the index results in 0.47% decrease in the underpricing, which is a 
significant amount considering that the average initial return of REITs IPOs is around 2.3%. 
This provides support for the investor base argument that less geographic diversification is 
associated with higher IPO initial returns because issuers need to underprice more to make up 
for the insufficient recognition of their companies and to compensate investors for the greater 
risk of geographically concentrated portfolios (García and Norlib, 2012). 
In column (2) of  
 
Table 22 we replace HHI_GEO with LSTATES, which measures the number of states in 
which the IPO company’s properties are located. In column (3) we replace HHI_GEO with 
HEAD, which is a dummy set equal to 1 if the firm has most of its properties in its headquarter 
state. In column (4) we use DIST_W as our measure of geographic concentration. Finally, 
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column (5) reports the coefficient estimate on DIST, which is computed similarly to DIST_W 
but uses a simple average value of distances without weighting by property size in each state. 
In all four models using the alternative proxies for geographic concentration we find no 
statistical significance. Hence, we conclude that the Herfindahl Index is the only adequate proxy 
for geographic concentration.  This supports the importance of geographic diversification in 
explaining IPO underpricing. A higher concentration generates higher underpricing with 
companies wanting to attract a broader investor base. More importantly, it is not limited to the 
assumption of information asymmetry, which cannot account for the overpricing. When a real 
estate company is highly geographically diversified with a wide-spread investment base or the 
real estate company is well-recognised, the issuer has no incentive to underprice, if not taking 
the chance to overprice, the IPO shares. 
We next examine how property type diversification affects IPO initial returns, with 
proxies for geographic diversification excluded from the analysis. These results are reported in 
Table 23. The estimated coefficient of MRETURN remains positive and highly significant in all 
three specifications; the estimated coefficients of VOLUME cannot be distinguished from zero. 
The estimated coefficients of LNCREIF remain positive, although with reduced statistical 
significance. In Table 23, the estimated coefficients of DENSITY are still negative and 
significant in all specifications but with slightly reduced statistical significance relative to the 
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Table 23 Property Type Diversification and IPO Initial Returns 
Dependent Variable 
Underpricing 
(1) (2) (3) 
VB -4.817* -4.981* -4.691 
 -2.823 -2.823 -2.845 
BB -9.061 -9.095 -9.041 
 -8.579 -8.518 -8.523 
LSIZE 1.433 1.473 1.444 
 1.502 1.500 1.502 
MRETURN 0.436** 0.420** 0.427** 
 0.169 0.164 0.165 
VOLUME -0.231 -0.223 -0.255 
 -1.601 -1.604 -1.601 
LNCREIF 1.145* 1.150* 1.162* 
 0.669 0.686 0.677 
LIQUIDITY -0.841 -0.863 -0.816 
 -0.872 -0.877 -0.876 
DENSITY -5,505* -5,842* -5,600* 
 -3,105 -3,093 -3,115 
HHI_ASSET 5.515*   
 3.222 
  
FOCUSED  2.460*  
 
 1.470  
LASSET   -2.660** 
 
  -1.297 
Time Dummies Y Y Y 
Constant 0.933 3.964 6.357 
 11.13 10.71 10.65 
Observations 105 105 105 
Adj R-squared 0.233 0.235 0.237 
This table presents the Ordinary Least squares estimations for a cross-section of real estate IPOs that have taken place between 
1995 and 2014 in the U.S. The dependent variable is Underpricing which is the initial return between the first-trading day 
closing price and the IPO offer price, adjusted for market returns and expressed as a percentage. The variable of interest is 
HHI_ASSET in column (1), representing the property type diversification which is calculated as the sum of the squared shares 
of property value that the IPO company has in each property type, scaled by 10000, ranging from 0 to 1 with lower value 
representing higher property type diversification. HHI_ASSET is replaced by FOCUSED in column (2), which is a dummy 
variable which equals 1 if it is a focused REIT; 0 otherwise. LASSET in column (3) is the natural log of the number of asset 
types that the IPO company has. VB is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the IPO is venture-capital-backed; 0 otherwise. BB 
is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the IPO uses bookbuilding as a pricing technique; 0 otherwise. LSIZE is the log-
transformed total proceeds of the IPO. MRETURN is the three-month cumulative market return before the IPO date, based on 
the DataStream Market Index. VOLUME is measured as the number of IPOs in a certain year divided by the total number of 
IPO across the sample period, presented as a percentage. LNCREIF is the one-quarter lagged NCREIF Property Index Return. 
LIQUIDITY is the primary market liquidity measured by the number of properties sold in the IPO year as a percentage of the 
total outstanding properties that year. DENSITY measures the state-level IPO density which is, for one year, the number of 
IPOs that headquartered in the state divided by the population in this state, weighted by the size of the property assets that 
the IPO company has in each of the states. Time dummies are included for all the estimations. One time dummy is created for 
every 3-year window. T-statistics are corrected for robustness and presented below the coefficient estimates. ***, **, * denote 
significance at 1%, 5% or 10% respectively. 
 
Chapter 5  Diversification and Underpricing 
 151 
Table 24 Geographic and Property Type Diversification, Fixed Time Effect 
Dependent Variable 
Underpricing 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
VB -3.253 -3.083 -2.711 -2.637 
 -2.86 -2.819 -3.104 -3.135 
BB -7.302 -7.385 -7.085 -7.233 
 -8.407 -8.529 -9.002 -9.095 
LSIZE 1.396 1.402 1.225 1.228 
 1.415 1.409 1.436 1.44 
MRETURN 0.456*** 0.448*** 0.638** 0.632** 
 0.168 0.167 0.248 0.251 
VOLUME -1.479 -1.442 -3.976*** -3.989*** 
 -1.181 -1.153 -0.631 -0.631 
LNCREIF 1.227**  -0.261  
 0.598 
 -1.428  
LNCREIF_W  1.213**  0.309 
 
 0.54  1.068 
LIQUIDITY -0.209 -0.257 -0.135 -0.178 
 -0.734 -0.732 -0.837 -0.851 
DENSITY -5,475* -5,694** -7,315** -7,179** 
 -2,776 -2,762 -2,952 -2,863 
HHI_ASSET 7.189** 7.116** 6.290* 6.453* 
 3.323 3.315 3.493 3.436 
HHI_GEO 5.083** 4.911** 5.655** 5.619** 
 2.275 2.243 2.556 2.551 
Time Dummies Y Y N N 
Fixed Time Effects N N Y Y 
Constant -3.305 -3.022 -22.90 -18.49 
 -10.79 -10.89 -17.59 -15.69 
Observations 104 104 104 104 
Adj R-squared 0.286 0.289 0.345 0.345 
This table presents Ordinary Least Squares estimation for a cross-section of real estate IPOs that have taken place between 
1995 and 2014 in the U.S. The dependent variable is Underpricing which is the initial return between the first-trading day 
closing price and the IPO offer price, adjusted for market returns and expressed as a percentage. The variables of interests are 
HHI_GEO and HHI_ASSET. HHI_GEO represents the geographic diversification which is calculated as the sum of the squared 
shares of property size that the IPO company has in each state, scaled by 10000, ranging from 0 to 1 with lower value 
representing higher geographic diversification. HHI_ASSET represents the property type diversification which is calculated as 
the sum of the squared shares of property value that the IPO company has in each property type, scaled by 10000, ranging from 
0 to 1 with lower value representing higher property type diversification. VB is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the IPO is 
venture-capital-backed; 0 otherwise. BB is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the IPO uses bookbuilding as a pricing technique; 
0 otherwise. LSIZE is the log-transformed total proceeds of the IPO. MRETURN is the three-month cumulative market return 
before the IPO date, based on the DataStream Market Index. VOLUME is measured as the number of IPOs in a certain year 
divided by the total number of IPO across the sample period, presented as a percentage. LNCREIF is the one-quarter lagged 
NCREIF Property Index Return. LNCREFI_W is the one-quarter lagged NCREIF Property Index Return, weighted by the size 
of the property assets that the IPO company has in each of the four geographic regions by NCREIF definition, which are East, 
West, South and Midwest. LIQUIDITY is the primary market liquidity measured by the number of properties sold in the IPO 
year as a percentage of the total outstanding properties that year. DENSITY measures the state-level IPO density which is, for 
one year, the number of IPOs that headquartered in the state divided by the population in this state, weighted by the size of the 
property assets that the IPO company has in each of the states. The year fixed effect is adopted in column (3) and (4). Time 
dummies are included for estimations in column (1) and (2). One time dummy is created for every 3-year window. Time fixed 
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effects are controlled in columns (3) and (4). t-statistics are corrected for robustness and presented below the coefficient 
estimates. ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5% or 10% respectively. 
 
 
The regression results reported in column (1) of Table 23 include HHI_ASSET as a 
proxy for the asset-type concentration. The coefficient estimate is positive and significant at 
10%, providing some support for the notion that more property type specialization is associated 
with higher initial returns. This suggests investors need to be compensated for the increased 
risk associated with a more concentrated portfolio. In column (2) we replace HHI_ASSET with 
FOCUSED and find a positive and marginally significant coefficient, which is consistent with 
the previous finding. The positive effect of property type diversification is consistent with 
Brounen and Eichholtz (2002) who find a significantly higher initial return for IPO companies 
holding more than 80% in one asset type.  
In column (3) we replace HHI_ASSET with LASSET, which represents the logarithm of 
the number of property types the IPO firm owns. The estimated coefficient on LASSET, a 
measure of diversification and not concentration, is negative and significant, providing 
supporting evidence that fewer property types (more focus) are associated with higher initial 
returns. However, we use Herfindahl Indexes to measure both geographic and asset type 
diversification in the remainder of the analysis for three reasons. Firstly, the Herfindahl index 
represents a more precise measure of the degree of portfolio diversification of the company. 
Secondly, we find a much stronger ability of HHI to proxy for geographic concentration 
compared to other proxies, still having HHI for asset type being significant. Thirdly, HHI_GEO 
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Table 25 Geographic Diversification by the Definition of Economic Regions 
Dependent Variable 
Underpricing 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
VB -3.884 -3.707 -3.369 -3.229 
 -2.949 -2.913 -3.212 -3.263 
BB -7.887 -7.953 -7.945 -8.131 
 -7.499 -7.652 -8.029 -8.153 
LSIZE 1.438 1.441 1.293 1.308 
 1.465 1.455 1.489 1.495 
MRETURN 0.440** 0.435** 0.615** 0.607** 
 0.171 0.168 0.252 0.255 
VOLUME -1.444 -1.418 -3.873*** -3.909*** 
 -1.185 -1.152 -0.619 -0.625 
LNCREIF 1.242*  0.042  
 0.641 
 1.484  
LNCREIF_W  1.259**  0.702 
 
 0.564  1.103 
LIQUIDITY -0.303 -0.354 -0.179 -0.232 
 -0.749 -0.746 -0.832 -0.844 
DENSITY -5,401* -5,625* -6,931** -6,831** 
 -2,868 -2,831 -3,031 -2,936 
HHI_ASSET 5.601* 5.604* 4.718 4.925 
 3.216 3.206 3.326 3.279 
HHI_GEO_ECO 3.450 3.376 4.050* 4.146* 
 2.182 2.149 2.418 2.404 
Time Dummies Y Y N N 
Fixed Time Effects N N Y Y 
Constant -1.128 -0.976 -18.12 -12.97 
 -10.58 -10.70 -17.63 -15.31 
Observations 104 104 104 104 
R-squared 0.269 0.272 0.326 0.327 
This table presents Ordinary Least Squares estimation for a cross-section of real estate IPOs that have taken place between 
1995 and 2014 in the U.S. The dependent variable is Underpricing which is the initial return between the first-trading day 
closing price and the IPO offer price, adjusted for market returns and expressed as a percentage. The variable of interest is 
HHI_GEO_ECO in column, representing the geographic diversification based on eight economic regions defined by Hartzell 
et al. (1987). It is calculated as the sum of the squared shares of property size that the IPO company has in each economic 
region, scaled by 10000, ranging from 0 to 1 with lower value representing higher geographic diversification. HHI_ASSET 
represents the property type diversification which is calculated as the sum of the squared shares of property value that the IPO 
company has in each property type, scaled by 10000, ranging from 0 to 1 with lower value representing higher property type 
diversification. VB is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the IPO is venture-capital-backed; 0 otherwise. BB is a dummy 
variable which equals 1 if the IPO uses bookbuilding as a pricing technique; 0 otherwise. LSIZE is the log-transformed total 
proceeds of the IPO. MRETURN is the three-month cumulative market return before the IPO date, based on the DataStream 
Market Index. VOLUME is measured as the number of IPOs in a certain year divided by the total number of IPOs across the 
sample period, presented as a percentage. LNCREIF is the one-quarter lagged NCREIF Property Index Return. LNCREFI_W 
is the one-quarter lagged NCREIF Property Index Return, weighted by the size of the property assets that the IPO company 
has in each of the four geographic regions by NCREIF definition, which are East, West, South and Midwest. LIQUIDITY is 
the primary market liquidity measured by the number of properties sold in the IPO year as a percentage of the total outstanding 
properties that year. DENSITY measures the state-level IPO density which is, for one year, the number of IPOs that 
headquartered in the state divided by the population in this state, weighted by the size of the property assets that the IPO 
company has in each of the states. Time dummies are included for estimations in column (1) and (2). One time dummy is 
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created for every 3-year window. Time fixed effects are controlled in column (3) and (4). T-statistics are corrected for 
robustness and presented below the coefficient estimates. ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5% or 10% respectively. 
 
 
5.3.2 Robustness Tests 
Table 24 reports our estimation results when both HHI_GEO and HHI_ASSET are 
included in the regressions. Focusing first on column (1), the estimated coefficient on LNCREIF 
remains positive and significant at the 5 percent level. Other than MRETURN, the remainder of 
the control variables are not individually significant, once again suggesting that classic theories 
can hardly account for the initial returns of real estate IPOs, at least in the U.S.. However, 
greater DENSITY remains predictive of lower first-day returns. The estimated coefficients of 
HHI_GEO and HHI_ASSET are positive and significant at the 10 percent level or higher, 
confirming the results obtained for geographic and property type diversification separately. 
NCREIF produces total return indices for ‘core’ properties for a number of geographic 
segments, including total returns on core properties located in four geographic regions: East. 
West, South, and Midwest. Core NCREIF properties are existing assets that are fully leased, or 
nearly so, and located in a major metropolitan area. To create LNCREIF_W, we weigh the total 
returns in these four NCREIF regions by the distribution of the company’s IPO assets across 
these four regions. We replace LNCREIF with LNCREIF_W in columns (2) and (4) of Table 
24. Both the magnitude and the statistical significance of the coefficient estimate is very similar 
to LNCREIF, indicating that the overall impact of private market return on real estate IPOs is 
not affected by the geographic distributions of the property portfolios. Higher values of 
HHI_GEO and HHI_ASSET remain highly predictive of greater initial returns. 
In columns (3) and (4), we report results using annual time fixed effects in place of 
dummies for three-year windows. Despite the loss of degrees of freedom to the small sample, 
several results are noteworthy. First, NCREIF returns, both weighted and unweighted, no longer 
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have a significant effect on IPO initial returns, suggesting that annual time fixed effects better 
control for time variations in NCREIF PPI returns. Second, the estimated coefficients on 
VOLUME are negative and significant in models (3) and (4). In other words, a high 
concentration of IPOs in a given year is associated with lower initial returns. This also supports 
the information spillover explanation by Altı (2005). The estimated coefficients on HHI_GEO 
remain positive and significant at a 5% level. However, the statistical significance of 
HHI_ASSET is decreased to 10% compared to results in columns (1) and (2). We also notice 
that the R-squared of the fixed time effects models are approximately 5% higher than models 
using 3-year time dummies.  
To examine whether the negative effect of the geographic diversification on IPO initial 
returns is driven by the investor base channel, as we have proposed, rather than by the 
underlying economics, we replace the HHI_GEO with HHI_GEO_ECO, which is the 
geographic Herfindahl index based on eight economic regions, and re-estimate the models 
reported in Table 24. These results are reported in Table 25. The estimated coefficients on the 
control variables are not very statistically different from those reported in Table 24. The 
negative effect of asset type diversification also remains similar to those in Table 24. Similarly, 
the influence of asset-type diversification is reduced when the annual time fixed effects are used. 
As to HHI_GEO_ECO, no or very weak (when time fixed effects are controlled) impact is 
found, suggesting that none or very few of the results on the relationship between the 
geographic diversification and IPO valuation are driven by the underlying economies, 
reinforcing the investor base argument. 
One concern is that the initial return could be driven by the diversification discount 
effect. According to the diversification literature discussed in Section 5.1, investors tend to 
overvalue more focused REITs, indicating the tendency for investor-driven initial returns after 
the listing. In other words, the positive effect of concentration might be due to the after-market 
Chapter 5  Diversification and Underpricing 
 156 
trading. To test whether the positive effect of HHI_GEO is transmitted via the investor base 
channel rather than the diversification discount channel, we divide the initial returns of IPOs 
into pre- and after-market returns. Specifically, the pre-market return is the difference between 
the IPO offer price and the opening price of the first trading day and the after-market return is 
the difference between the opening and closing prices of the first trading day. We re-run the 
models in Column (1) of Table 24 on both pre- and after-market initial returns as well as their 
market-adjusted values. The results are presented in Table 26. We can see that the results on 
control variables and HII_GEO are consistent with the main results when the pre-IPO initial 
returns and the market-adjusted pre-IPO initial returns are considered (Column (1) and (3)). 
However, no significant relationships are found for the after-IPO initial returns. This finding 
implies that it’s the concentration/diversification has an impact the IPO initial return by 
affecting pre-IPO pricing via the investor base channel rather than the after-market trading via 
diversification discount channel. 
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Table 26 The Effect of Geographic Diversification on pre- and post-IPO Initial Returns 
Dependent Variable: Pre-IPO IR After-IPO IR Adj Pre-IPO IR Adj After-IPO IR 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VB -3.398* -0.0881 -2.825* -0.297 
 -1.845 -1.406 -1.638 -1.528 
BB -12.66 2.008 -12.97 1.5 
 -8.575 -1.463 -8.632 -1.598 
LSIZE 2.557*** -0.0428 2.589*** -0.0232 
 0.545 -0.324 0.548 -0.343 
MRETURN 0.176* 0.0417 0.182* 0.0452 
 0.0933 0.0471 0.0935 0.0508 
VOLUME -1.466** 0.348 -1.439* 0.424 
 -0.727 0.304 -0.731 0.324 
DENSITY -3,500* -412.6 -3,471* -196.1 
 -2,074 -871.8 -2,050 -930.7 
LNCREIF 0.795** 0.088 0.812** 0.29 
 0.31 0.164 0.31 0.185 
LIQUIDITY 0.668 -0.11 0.644 -0.164 
 0.471 -0.186 0.47 -0.192 
HHI_ASSET 1.951 0.669 1.925 0.376 
 2.632 1.491 2.669 1.581 
HHI_GEO 3.712* -0.797 3.779* -0.965 
 1.969 -0.812 1.961 -0.904 
Time Dummies Y Y Y Y 
Constant 7.671 -4.328 7.587 -4.647 
 10.89 -3.396 10.97 -3.744 
Observations 97 97 97 97 
Adj R-squared 0.428 0.129 0.432 0.116 
This table presents Ordinary Least Squares estimation for a cross-section of real estate IPOs that have taken place between 
1995 and 2014 in the U.S. The dependent variable in Column (1) and (3) is Pre-IPO IR which is the return between the offer 
price and first-trading day opening price and its market-adjusted form (Adj Pre-IPO IR), respectively. The dependent variable 
in Column (2) and (4) is After-IPO IR which is the return between the first-trading day opening and closing prices and its 
market-adjusted form (Adj Pre-IPO IR), respectively. HHI_GEO represents the geographic diversification which is calculated 
as the sum of the squared shares of property size that the IPO company has in each state, scaled by 10000, ranging from 0 to 1 
with lower value representing higher geographic diversification. HHI_ASSET represents the property type diversification which 
is calculated as the sum of the squared shares of property value that the IPO company has in each property type, scaled by 
10000, ranging from 0 to 1 with lower value representing higher property type diversification. VB is a dummy variable which 
equals 1 if the IPO is venture-capital-backed; 0 otherwise. BB is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the IPO uses bookbuilding 
as a pricing technique; 0 otherwise. LSIZE is the log-transformed total proceeds of the IPO. MRETURN is the three-month 
cumulative market return before the IPO date, based on the DataStream Market Index. VOLUME is measured as the number 
of IPOs in a certain year divided by the total number of IPO across the sample period, presented as a percentage. LNCREIF is 
the one-quarter lagged NCREIF Property Index Return. LIQUIDITY is the primary market liquidity measured by the number 
of properties sold in the IPO year as a percentage of the total outstanding properties that year. DENSITY measures the state-
level IPO density which is, for one year, the number of IPOs that headquartered in the state divided by the population in this 
state, weighted by the size of the property assets that the IPO company has in each of the states. Time dummies are included 
for all estimations. One time dummy is created for every 3-year window. Time fixed effects are controlled in columns (3) and 
(4). t-statistics are corrected for robustness and presented below the coefficient estimates. ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 
5% or 10% respectively. 
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Table 27 Moderation Effect of the Deadweight Cost Indicators  
Dependent Variable: 
Underpricing 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
VB -3.888 -3.569 -1.830 -1.712 
 -3.343 -3.761 -2.401 -2.889 
BB -7.294 -7.209 -6.990 -6.839 
 -8.714 -9.289 -8.474 -9.089 
LSIZE 1.558 1.405 1.554 1.389 
 1.379 1.432 1.348 1.385 
MRETURN 0.514*** 0.675*** 0.493*** 0.661*** 
 0.173 0.250 0.168 0.248 
VOLUME -1.48 -4.047*** -1.566 -4.010*** 
 -1.162 -0.642 -1.259 -0.641 
DENSITY -5,593* -7,320** -4,280 -6,347** 
 -2,820 -2,947 -2,818 -2,923 
HHI_ASSET 8.197** 7.178* 9.646*** 8.360** 
 3.510 3.680 3.558 3.640 
HHI_GEO 19.54*** 18.09** 17.21** 16.02** 
 7.276 7.473 7.133 7.604 
LNCREIF 2.446** 0.637 1.037** -0.676 
 0.947 1.208 0.502 -1.399 
LIQUIDITY -0.127 -0.106 1.203 1.006 
 -0.719 -0.842 0.901 1.127 
HHI_GEO X LNCREIF -5.045** -4.335*   
 -2.278 -2.390 
  
HHI_GEO X LIQUIDITY   -3.430* -2.914 
 
  -1.896 -2.031 
Time Dummies Y N Y N 
Fixed Time Effects N Y N Y 
Constant -9.477 13.55 -11.48 11.45 
 -12.41 12.72 -11.72 12.65 
Observations 104 104 104 104 
R-squared 0.312 0.362 0.313 0.362 
This table presents Ordinary Least squares estimation for a cross-section of real estate IPOs that have taken place between 1995 
and 2014 in the U.S. The dependent variable is Underpricing which is the initial return between the first-trading day closing 
price and the IPO offer price, adjusted for market returns and expressed as a percentage. The variables of interest are HHI_GEO 
X LNCREIF and HHI_GEO X LIQUIDITY which are the interaction terms between HHI_GEO and LNCREIF and LIQUIDITY 
respectively. HHI_GEO represents the geographic diversification which is calculated as the sum of the squared shares of 
property size that the IPO company has in each state, scaled by 10000, ranging from 0 to 1 with lower value representing higher 
geographic diversification. LNCREIF is the one-quarter lagged NCREIF Property Index Return. LIQUIDITY is the primary 
market liquidity measured by the number of properties sold in the IPO year as a percentage of the total outstanding properties 
that year. HHI_ASSET represents the property type diversification which is calculated as the sum of the squared shares of 
property value that the IPO company has in each property type, scaled by 10000, ranging from 0 to 1 with lower value 
representing higher property type diversification. VB is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the IPO is venture-capital-backed; 
0 otherwise. BB is a dummy variable which equals 1 if the IPO uses bookbuilding as a pricing technique; 0 otherwise. LSIZE 
is the log-transformed total proceeds of the IPO. MRETURN is the three-month cumulative market return before the IPO date, 
based on the DataStream Market Index. VOLUME is measured as the number of IPOs in a certain year divided by the total 
number of IPOs across the sample period, presented as a percentage. DENSITY measures the state-level IPO density which is, 
for one year, the number of IPOs that headquartered in the state divided by the population in this state, weighted by the size of 
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the property assets that the IPO company has in each of the states. Time dummies are included for estimations in column (1) 
and (3). One time dummy is created for every 3-year window. Time fixed effects are controlled in columns (2) and (4). t-
statistics are corrected for robustness and presented below the coefficient estimates. ***, **, * denote significance at 1%, 5% 
or 10% respectively. 
 
 
5.3.3 Moderation Effect of Deadweight Cost 
We report the results of testing the second hypothesis in Table 27. Columns (1) and (2) 
report results on the interactions between geographic diversification measured at the state level 
(HHI_GEO) and private market returns (LNCREIF) as an indicator of the deadweight cost, 
including 3-year time dummies and annual time fixed effects respectively. Along with no 
significantly different results from previous estimations for the control variables, we find 
significantly negative coefficient estimates on the interaction terms, supporting the argument 
that when the private market is more ‘sell’ friendly, the impact of the geographic diversification 
on the IPO valuation is weakened, i.e. highly concentrated companies will underprice relatively 
less as they could sell part of the asset portfolio in the private market if the IPO is not successful. 
In columns (3) and (4), we use liquidity in the private market as a second indicator of the 
deadweight cost (LIQUIDITY), proxied by transaction turnover in the IPO quarter, and interact 
it with HHI_GEO. Similarly, we find negative coefficients on the interaction terms, significant 
when 3-year time dummies are included, further supporting the second hypothesis about a 
moderation effect of the deadweight cost associated with IPOs, when markets are buoyant and 
liquidity-rich, on the relationship between geographic diversification and IPO initial returns.  
LNCREIF and LIQUIDITY are the indicators for the overall private market conditions 
and it is reasonable to question their ability to capture the right level of deadweight cost 
associated with an IPO company. As market conditions differ by regions, the deadweight cost 
of an IPO might be sensitive to the geographic portfolio of the issuing company. Therefore, as 
a robustness test, we construct the weighted state-level turnover by market value and property 
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numbers for each IPO company and replace LIQUIDITY with the alternative measures in the 
estimations in Table 27. The quarterly state-level transaction data is obtained from NECREIF 
directly. As the results are very similar to those in Table 27, reinforcing the interacted effect 
between the deadweight cost and geographic concentration, we do not report them here.  
5.4 Summary 
The listed real estate sector has generally experienced low levels of IPO underpricing 
relative to industrial companies. Moreover, REIT IPOs have produced negative average initial 
returns during some time periods, especially in the U.S. The findings in this study suggest no 
or very weak explanatory power of the classic theories on REIT IPOs, in agreement with the 
majority of real estate IPO studies. Therefore, we propose a new approach. Consistent with 
García and Norlib (2012), we find evidence that the share prices of more geographically focused 
firms, with an arguably smaller investor base, need to be underpriced more in order to attract 
the recognition of and participation from investors, which is critical to the success of the IPO. 
The measures of both geographic and property type concentration (computed as Herfindahl 
indexes) are positively and significantly related to IPO initial returns. These geographic 
concentration results hold only when the HHI measure based on the exact asset holdings is used, 
indicating that the HHI measure is a more appropriate measure of geographic 
concentration/diversification.  
The results also support the deadweight cost theory of Chan et al. (2009), who argue 
that when the going public entity can efficiently sell the portfolio properties in the parallel 
private market if the IPO fails, the issuer has less incentive to underprice and may even 
overprice the shares. Note that the deadweight cost theory does not require an assumption of 
information asymmetries either. Because the investor base of an IPO firm increases with 
increasing geographic diversification, selling underlying properties in the parallel private 
market becomes easier, leading to lower, or even negative, initial returns.  
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More interestingly, we find that the deadweight cost of an IPO weakens the positive 
effect of geographic concentration on it first-day return. In other words, a geographically 
concentrated IPO company would experience relatively lower initial returns if the deadweight 
cost of IPO failure is low.  
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Chapter 6 : Conclusion 
IPO is one of the most critical steps in a company’s lifetime and the puzzles surrounding 
it warrant a substantial amount of research. The extent of underpricing and the staggering 
amount of money that the issuers leave on the table in an IPO contradict the “common sense” 
in modern finance and is constantly a key area of focus among researchers in this field. This 
thesis focuses on the anomaly of the short-run IPO performance which, despite the extensive 
research, is still not fully understood, especially for specific industries, such as real estate, 
and/or countries.  
This thesis extends the literature by focusing on relatively unexplored areas in IPO 
studies: emerging markets, real estate sector and cross-country IPO performance. While 
entrenched in the well-developed literature, this thesis aims to provide a new macro-perspective 
on IPO underpricing, complementing the micro-level analysis conducted in previous research 
by using three unique datasets. Section 6.1 presents a short summary of the three studies and 
concluding remarks, each followed by its implications. Section 6.2 briefly proposes some 
potential future research questions.  
6.1 Conclusion Recapitulation and Implications 
This thesis asks the question as to what extent the economic factors and institutional 
settings could affect the IPO short-run performance alongside the widely-acknowledged firm- 
and issuing-level characteristics. We identify macroeconomic factors, rather than focusing on 
general stock markets or the overall economy, that significantly impact on IPO initial returns: 
a country’s financial integration with the rest of the world, the regional economic openness 
within a country, and geographic locations of an issuing company’s underlying 
businesses/assets.  
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Firstly, Chapter 3 identifies a new macroeconomic factor—international financial 
integration—to be critical to the IPO valuation. The first study is conducted on a sample of 
around 9000 IPOs across 37 countries, providing the opportunity to examine the impact that 
country-level institutional settings and, more importantly, their interactions with the financial 
integration have on the firm-level IPO valuation. The research question is essentially derived 
from two strands of literature on the relations between financial globalization and corporate 
finance activities, as well as cross-country IPO underpricing and country institutions. The 
former identifies a positive effect of a country’s financial globalization on the efficiency of the 
financial intermediation process whereas the latter finds that a group of country-level 
institutions, especially legal frameworks, affects the IPO valuation alongside firm- and issuing-
level characteristics.  
This study presents the first empirical evidence of a negative relationship between the 
level of a country’s financial integration and the initial returns of its IPOs. We find that both 
foreign and domestic IPOs experience improved efficiency in pricing due to the increasing 
financial integration. This relationship stands through alternative measures of financial 
globalization, such as the KOF Economic Globalization Index and the Financial Openness 
Index, and is not applicable only to certain periods of time. Other than the commonly-used OLS 
method in the IPO literature, hierarchical linear modelling is adopted to deal with the clustering 
structure and allows for the estimations on actual country-level variables, which is limited in a 
simple fixed-country effect model.  
The results further point out that country institutions, and in particular the legal 
framework, also have significant impacts on the firm-level IPO valuation. We include five 
different legal institutions which have all exhibited a negative impact on underpricing. In 
general, the findings show that when the legal institutional environment is better established, 
the uncertainty surrounding an IPO is reduced. Finally, we find negative coefficients of all five 
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interaction terms between financial integration and legal institutions. From one standard 
deviation below to one standard deviation above the mean of financial integration (2 standard 
deviation increases), the country institutions suffer more than 50% loss in the magnitude of the 
impact on underpricing. The findings reveal a moderation effect of international financial 
integration in the relationship between country institutions and IPO underpricing: increasing 
financial integration of a country weakens the impact of the institutional settings on IPO 
valuations.  
Three implications are highlighted in this study. Firstly, while the focus in IPO 
valuations is often placed on the firm- and issuing-level characteristics, the results suggest that 
macroeconomic conditions and/or the institutional environment can sometimes be neglected. 
Secondly, the findings provide the issuers and investors with insights into IPO valuations under 
a wider economic background. As financial integration decreases the cost of IPOs associated 
with underpricing and increases the capital that the issuing company can raise, it gives issuers 
incentives to seek more financially-integrated markets for listings. In addition, this dynamic 
relationship between financial globalization, country institutions and IPO performance is 
especially informative to issuers considering cross-border listings to either escape from or take 
advantage of certain institutional characteristics, as well as to foreign IPO investors. Thirdly, 
these findings indicate a positive role of financial globalization on the efficiency of primary 
markets, in line with the general argument in the law and finance literature that financial 
globalization improves domestic financial market efficiency and dissolves the boundaries 
between different capital markets by driving a convergence of the quality in institutional 
settings across countries. As emerging markets are more sensitive to the globalization process, 
this provides profound implications for those policy makers regarding the impact of 
globalization on domestic financial development as well as corporate activities. While financial 
globalization helps to improve the efficiency of the domestic market, it also provides domestic 
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companies with opportunities to choose foreign capital by reducing constraints from 
institutional settings, e.g. legal frameworks. Therefore, a sustainable development would be an 
improvement in the institutional settings and legal framework while taking advantage of the 
globalization process.     
Given the findings in Chapter 3, we extend the scope to a single-country study in 
Chapter 4 where we investigate whether, holding country institutions constant, the globalization 
process has an impact on the domestic IPO market in emerging markets where there is often 
heterogeneity in regional openness levels. 
To briefly summarize, the argument is as follows: urban economic openness could 
increase the prices of underlying real estate assets and the profitability of the issuing companies 
through increased productivity, the Balassa-Samuelson effect, and increased foreign 
investments into the real estate market. All these channels lead to a reduction in uncertainty 
surrounding IPO valuations, hence a decreased level of underpricing. To empirically test this 
relationship, we need a proper measure of urban-level economic openness which also presents 
a significant variation for estimation purpose, as well as a sample of IPO companies with details 
on the geographical splits of the operating businesses. The real estate sector in China provides 
a unique laboratory by which to explore this research question as it meets both the 
aforementioned requirements. A key challenge in the research design is the construction of the 
urban economic openness measure at a company level. The commonly used measure for 
country-level economic openness, foreign trade openness, is modified so that it can be used at 
a city-level. For each company, this urban economic openness is weighted by the share of land-
use right that the company owns in each city to its overall land-use right. 
 The results show a negative impact of urban economic openness on the level of 
underpricing. The OLS estimates suggest that a 10% increase in the urban economic openness 
will reduce underpricing by around 3%. For example, in 2010, the GDP for Nanjing and Dalian 
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is 513 and 516 billion Chinese Yuan respectively and the total foreign trade for Nanjing and 
Dalian is 309 and 340 billion Chinese Yuan respectively. With a 10% higher economic 
openness in Dalian (66% and 60% economic openness for Dalian and Nanjing respectively), 
issuing companies investing in Dalian would experience 3% less underpricing than those 
investing in Nanjing, holding the other factors constant. This significant impact holds after 
addressing potential endogeneity issues using 2SLS estimations and controlling for time 
dummies. More importantly, the concern that the effect has stemmed from the wider economy 
rather than foreign trade is eliminated by controlling for regional net GDP levels. Interestingly, 
some characteristics specific to the Chinese market are also found to have a significant influence 
on IPO performance: the state-owned companies or the companies listed in Mainland China are 
found to experience much higher underpricing than private companies or companies listed 
outside Mainland China. 60-day market return also appears to be a better proxy for the market 
sentiment, signalling a weaker form of market efficiency than in more developed markets.  
This study provides five main implications. Firstly, it suggests that the within-country 
variance between regional economic conditions (‘urban economic openness’ in this study), can 
also be critical to the outcomes of IPOs, further providing valuation implications for issuers, 
underwriters and investors. Specifically, the findings imply that the uncertainty about valuation 
is lowered if the assets are located in more economic open areas. Secondly, as emerging markets 
are typically prone to significant heterogeneity in regional economic development, this study 
provides a new perspective by which to examine the extremely high underpricing in other 
developing countries. The uncertainty surrounding regional economic conditions, other than 
the firm- and issuing-level factors, might also be the cause of the significantly high variation in 
the IPO initial returns in some emerging markets. Thirdly, the findings further inform policy 
makers in emerging markets that the economic and financial development of a country does not 
benefit all companies in the same way and the imbalance of regional development could also 
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impact on corporate finance activities.  Fourthly, the significant impact of the state ownership 
status and 60-day market return in China, which indicates a weak form of efficiency, implies 
that future research in emerging markets should place a greater focus on the influential political 
system and government of that country. Finally, by using real estate IPOs as a testing ground, 
the findings suggest that real asset holdings and their location may expose companies to a 
greater sensitivity towards macroeconomic factors. This result could be further extended to 
other corporate finance studies focusing on the effect of real asset holdings used as collateral 
even for non-real estate companies.  
In the final stage of this thesis, Chapter 5 further explores the unique role of underlying 
assets in IPO valuations. As the relationship between regional trade openness and a company’s 
IPO valuation is essentially transmitted through the location of a company’s underlying real 
estate assets, we investigate the impact of the geographic factor (the third macro-economic 
determinant in this thesis) on real estate IPO valuations. 
We argue that real estate companies with underlying properties presenting a high 
geographic concentration have a lack of investment base or investor recognition which is 
critical for an IPO to be successful. As a result, issuers have incentives to underprice more to 
attract sufficient subscriptions, or even over-subscriptions. By using a new method to measure 
the detailed geographic concentration/diversification at property-location level based on the 
classic Herfindahl Index, a positive effect of the geographic concentration of a company’s 
underlying properties on its IPO initial return is identified in the U.S. market. Unlike the 
improvised measures of geographic diversification used in previous studies, we find that this 
relationship is only significant when this detailed measurement is used, providing indications 
for future studies on geographic location. By regrouping the U.S. states into eight economic 
regions according to their actual economic activities and constructing a new geographic 
diversification variable based on these economic regions, we also demonstrate that geographic 
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diversification rather than underlying economy impacts on IPO underpricing. Unlike the overall 
market return which captures the market sentiment and drives higher initial returns, the market 
return on the private market has no direct impact on REITs IPOs when the time effect is 
controlled. However, we find that when the private market is ‘selling friendly’ (higher market 
return and turnover), issuers’ incentives to underprice IPOs due to high geographic 
concentration are reduced. This result is not altered by the alternative indicator for the level of 
deadweight cost—weighted state-level private market turnover, which captures the issuing 
company’s geographic portfolios. In other words, geographic concentration shows a smaller 
impact on IPO valuation if the real estate companies can sell properties in the private market 
easily, should the IPO fail. The findings suggest a weakened relationship between the 
geographic diversification and IPO valuation when the real estate company is associated with 
lower deadweight cost for its IPO failure.  
Three implications can be drawn from this study. Firstly, this study adds a new 
conceptual approach in real estate markets to explain the anomaly of positive initial returns 
which is not captured by classic theories assuming information asymmetry. Secondly, this study 
not only provides issuers and investors with a better understanding of IPO valuations of real 
estate companies, especially the uniqueness of underlying real estate assets, but also indicates 
new investment strategies for IPO investors: the valuation is set higher if the underlying assets 
of the issuing company are more geographically diversified. In other words, there is a much 
higher likelihood of the investors being rationed to overpriced shares from a more 
geographically diversified IPO. In addition, private real estate market conditions surrounding 
an IPO should also be considered. Finally, this study offers researchers the opportunity for 
further investigation into the role of the underlying assets in IPO events in other industries 
which hold significant real assets (e.g. utility, energy and transportation industries).  
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Aside from the key findings supporting the main hypotheses, this thesis also produces 
some other highly interesting results. As the most commonly used measures for information 
asymmetry and market sentiment, firm size (LSIZE) and market return (MRETURN) before IPO 
are included as control variables throughout the three studies. Although we find a significant 
and negative effect of LSIZE on underpricing in the cross-country dataset, it does not exist in 
the Chinese and U.S. real estate datasets, indicating that the significant effect of firm size 
identified on the cross-country dataset might be driven by IPOs from developed countries. In 
contrast to this, market return consistently shows a significant explanatory power throughout 
all the datasets. This interesting finding does not come as a surprise considering the recent trend 
in the literature that more empirical studies report the inability of classic theories on non-
western markets. Given that the information-asymmetry-based theories are developed on top of 
the classic finance theories under the developed or western market regime, it is likely to be 
distorted when other factors, especially regime-related factors, are considered in emerging 
markets. While these findings imply that it is questionable to assume a universal explanatory 
power of classic theories in all markets and sectors, they do, however, strongly support the 
significance of behavioural arguments when it comes to emerging markets and real estate 
sectors. 
In closing, we have utilized an economic perspective to tackle the research questions in 
all three studies of this thesis, presenting some previously unseen findings in this extensively 
researched area. Despite inherent difficulties in empirically establishing certain macroeconomic 
effects on corporate-level activities, we should not assume that such influences from 
macroeconomic conditions do not exist.  
6.2 Future Research 
The extensive literature on IPO short-run performance can seem overwhelming and 
making new approaches stand out among many other established theories or models can seem 
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intimidating. However, we cannot neglect the fact that the underpricing puzzle remains 
unsolved and the studies on the IPO performance carry a great impact. It is now widely agreed 
that not a single model can account for the IPO initial returns and which model or models are 
the most appropriate depends on many factors such as industries, markets and time periods. 
Future studies should focus on the economic significance of different models under different 
circumstances. With the increasing availability of data, more empirical studies need to be 
carried out in emerging markets where the consideration of economic conditions and country 
institutions becomes exceptionally important. 
In this section, we briefly summarize some potential questions generated by this thesis 
for future research, in and beyond the field of IPO. Firstly, although financial integration is 
found to benefit both domestic and foreign IPOs, whether there is a relative difference between 
the magnitude of the impact they experience needs to be further investigated. Foreign IPOs are 
more likely to take place in emerging markets as a result of the financial integration process 
which allows companies to seek a more transparent or efficient institutional setting in foreign 
markets. Our next project after this thesis is to carry out a study in an emerging market which 
treats the foreign IPOs as a treatment group and domestic IPOs as a control group in order to 
examine the dynamics of how foreign and domestic IPO performance, in the short and long run, 
might react differently to financial integration.  
Secondly, as we find that more-developed country institutions significantly reduce the 
uncertainty surrounding the IPO, the question should be asked as to whether the post-IPO 
(short-term and long-term) performance of foreign IPOs, which have gone public in a stronger 
institutional setting, are better than their domestic rivals.  
Thirdly, as we find that financial globalization seems to compensate for the poor country 
institutions in IPO events, a similar effect of financial globalization and its interaction with 
institutional settings on other corporate activities can be expected. Since corporate governance 
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is often heavily influenced by institutional settings, especially in emerging markets, it is natural 
to investigate the dynamics between the corporate governance in emerging markets, country 
institutions and financial globalization; a project that we are currently working on.  
Finally, the findings in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 suggest a research direction towards 
the role of underlying assets in real estate corporate finance. Although the underlying assets 
bring the real estate sector greater transparency which potentially reduces the agency problems 
in corporate finance activities, the findings in this thesis suggest that the “non-tradable” and 
“unmovable” underpinning of the real assets seem to make the real estate sector more 
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